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ABSTRACT  
 
Laura Jeanne Sims: “Rethinking France’s “Memory Wars”: Harki and Pied-Noir Collective 
Memories in Fifth Republic France” 
(Under the direction of Donald Reid) 
 
This dissertation is a cultural history of the memory narratives and practices of two 
postcolonial communities in France. The Harkis, Algerians who fought with the French Army 
during the Algerian War of Independence, and the Pieds-Noirs, settlers of European origin in 
Algeria, were forced to migrate to France when Algeria gained its independence in 1962. 
Analyzing the various memory carriers, including “cyber” carriers, that Harkis, Pieds-Noirs, and 
their descendants have used to transmit understandings of the colonial past reveals the evolving 
concerns of members of these communities and the changing ways in which they have imagined 
themselves, particularly in relation to the rest of French society.  
Harki and Pied-Noir case studies offer insight into the politics of collective memory in 
Fifth Republic France. As groups with different racial and cultural backgrounds, they have 
radically dissimilar levels of power, resources, and visibility. Pieds-Noirs have constructed the 
only museum currently dedicated to the colonial past in France, the Centre de Documentation 
des Français d’Algérie, while children of Harkis have relied more heavily on the opportunities 
for social networking and the quick, public transmission of information afforded by the Internet. 
A comparative approach also highlights the different roles that gender and generation have 
played in shaping Harki and Pied-Noir collective memories. Finally, as products of the French 
colonial project, these communities and their collective memories provide an opportunity to 
iv 
explore France’s complicated rapport with its imperial past. I challenge the notion that 
conflicting memories of this period should be interpreted in the framework of “memory wars,” as 
it obscures the productive work of memory. Harki and Pied-Noir narratives and practices have 
almost always been aimed at fostering inclusion, carving out spaces for reconciliation, and 
providing a basis for belonging in France.  
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962) constituted one of the longest, bloodiest, 
and most historically significant wars of decolonization. Algeria won its independence at a 
devastating cost of hundreds of thousands of casualties and nearly two million displaced 
inhabitants. The French made systematic use of torture and massacred entire villages as they 
sought to maintain control of the region. In their efforts to expel the French, independence 
fighters employed terror tactics against civilians of both European and North African origin. 
Following this internecine violence, Algerians faced the arduous task of building a new state 
amidst division and destruction. The French suffered as many as thirty thousand casualties, the 
displacement of approximately one million settlers of European origin, and the loss of a territory 
that they considered not as a colony, but as a constituent element of France.
1
   
The conflict revealed fundamental contradictions between the principles of republican 
universalism, predicated on ideals of equality and liberty, and colonialism, which depended on 
subordination.
2
 Despite the state’s claims that “Algeria was France” and its inhabitants were 
French citizens, the official legal and administrative category of “Muslim”3 excluded most 
                                                 
1
 Throughout its 130-year history, the territory of French Algeria held an exceptional, and often contradictory, status 
in the French Empire. Although the conquest of Algeria constituted part of the French state’s imperial expansion 
project in the nineteenth century, the Second Republic extended French department status to the coastal regions of 
Algeria in 1848. In Fifth Republic (i.e. post-colonial) France, discussions of France’s colonial project and its 
consequences have focused on Algeria. 
 
2
 Republican ideology dictates that the state will treat each citizen as an abstract individual and remain blind to 
differences in gender, race, or religion. In French Algeria, however, the state used a language of religion to 
institutionalize social and political hierarchies between the colonizer and the colonized. 
 
3
 “Because of the role of Koranic law in all aspects of Muslim life, they were governed under a régime d’exception, 
designed both to recognize their individual identity via a statut personnel as Muslims and to exclude them from full 
2 
French of North African origin from exercising the same rights as “Europeans” in these 
departments of France.
4
 The paradox of French Muslim de jure versus de facto rights challenged 
French self-perceptions as defenders of the “Rights of Man.” In granting independence to 
Algeria and renouncing their imperial ambitions, however, the French reclaimed their place as 
proponents of liberty. They thus avoided grappling with the ideological inconsistencies of the 
colonial period and their implications for French identity and history.
5
 
French Algeria and the Algerian War have remained controversial moments in French 
history due to the commemorative dilemmas they pose and the “existential” questions they 
raise.
6
 It has proven especially challenging to narrate and memorialize the history of French 
Algeria due to its ambiguous status in the French Empire. The bitter legacy of the struggle has 
persisted in the minds of participants and their descendants, making it particularly difficult to 
construct a historical narrative of the conflict that most parties accept. Moreover, “memory” of 
this conflict has stayed inextricably linked to the meaning ascribed to the colonial system and the 
                                                                                                                                                             
French citizenship and political equality. A decree of July 1865 introduced a measure of reform, giving them French 
nationality, but again withholding citizenship: ‘The Muslim native is French’, it declared; however, only by 
renouncing Islam could he ‘benefit from the rights open to a French citizen’.” P. Dunwoodie, “Postface: History, 
Memory and Identity—Today’s Crisis, Yesterday’s Issue,” French History 20, no. 3 (2006): 318–332: 325. 
 
4
 The Jewish Algerian population constituted a particular case. Algerian Jews were granted full citizenship by the 
Décret Crémieux of 1871 and, like the descendants of European settlers, most migrated to mainland France 
following Algerian independence. They have not always identified with the French Algerian community, however, 
and the Centre de Documentation des Français d’Algérie includes Algerian Jews in the category of “native 
populations.” While their unique trajectory in metropolitan France falls outside the scope of this project, they are an 
important group that deserves its own study. 
 
5
 As Todd Shepard has argued, “In 1962, invocations of “Muslim origin” gave way to descriptions of “North 
Africans” or “Algerians” who could not be “European” or “French.”  With no public debate, the French government 
made common-sense understandings of racial or ethnic difference the basis of laws that denied most people from 
Algeria the right to remain French.” Distinguishing between “French” and “Algerian” thus became a question of 
national, rather than ethnic identity. Shepard, Invention, 12. 
 
6
 Scholars have documented the difficulties faced by individuals and societies in coming to terms with defeat. 
“Perhaps more than any other kind of episode, [defeat] opens people to the intellectual and political scrutiny of their 
own past while exposing them to the psychological consequences of what is a deeply threatening experience.” John 
Horne, “Defeat and Memory in Modern History,” in Defeat and Memory: Cultural Histories of Military Defeat 
Since 1815, ed. Jenny Macleod, First Edition edition (Basingstoke England ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 
11–29, 26. 
3 
imperial project. As a result, controversies and debates about the memory of the Algerian War 
have often become proxies for difficult conversations about some of the thorniest issues in 
France today: racism, French identity, and the future of republican universalism. Acts of memory 
thus have important social repercussions. 
The objective of this dissertation is not to trace the evolution of a collective memory of 
French Algeria and the Algerian War, as Benjamin Stora and others have done.
7
 Rather, my 
project explores how two groups of French citizens who were directly affected by the Algerian 
War have engaged with the evolving colonial legacy. The Harkis, Algerians
8
 who fought with 
the French Army during the Algerian War, and the Pieds-Noirs, settlers of European origin in 
Algeria, were forced to migrate to France when Algeria gained its independence in 1962. Harkis, 
Pieds-Noirs, and their descendants have personally experienced these controversial events and 
their self-understandings are tied to how the events are “remembered” in France. The colonial 
system produced these groups. As such, they have served as awkward reminders of the now 
unpopular colonial ideology and the onerous defeat. How have members of these groups 
constructed a usable past and how has these practices changed over time? Analyzing their 
memory narratives and practices reveals the evolving concerns of members of these communities 
and the changing ways in which they have imagined themselves, particularly in relation to the 
rest of French society.  
These case studies present three opportunities for the study of historical memory. First, 
they offer insight into the important dynamics between the processes of remembrance and 
                                                 
7
 Benjamin Stora, La gangrène et l’oubli: la mémoire de la guerre d’Algérie (Paris : Editions La Découverte, 1992); 
Jo McCormack, Collective Memory: France and the Algerian War (1954-1962) (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 
2007). 
 
8
 I am referring to the native peoples of Algeria, whom the French called indigènes. Yet, before the 1930s, the 
Europeans settlers and their descendants, rather than the indigènes, were called “Algerians.” Vincent Crapanzano, 
The Harkis: The Wound That Never Heals (University of Chicago Press, 2011), xi.  
4 
identification.
9
 My dissertation, like Michael Rothberg’s Multidirectional Memory, challenges 
the premise that “the boundaries of memory parallel the boundaries of group identity.”10 Since 
our identities are complex and our memories mutable, the correlation between memory and 
identity is not linear. The terms “Harki” and “Pied-Noir” do not reflect some basic and internal 
sameness. Instead, Harkis are united by a common past and a shared present; the same is true for 
Pieds-Noirs. Rather than approaching Harkis and Pieds-Noirs as cohesive memory communities, 
however, I have considered how acts of collective memory within these groups intersect with 
competing processes of identification, including gender and generation. Several important essays 
on facets of Harki and Pied-Noir memory have been published in recent years; however, my 
work is the first to analyze in detail the conceptual categories of generation and gender in the 
formation and dissemination of memory in these communities and within France. 
 The cases of Harki and Pied-Noir collective memories also provide an occasion to 
analyze the relationship between the ways in which memories are transmitted and the politics of 
collective memory. In The Vichy Syndrome, Henry Rousso identified four vectors—
organizational, cultural, official, and scholarly—through which individuals, groups, and 
institutions contribute to the public memory of an event.
11
 I argue that these memory carriers are 
invested with different types of authority, afford varying levels of visibility, and assert different 
                                                 
9
 I understand “identity” as “the processual, interactive development of the kind of collective self-understanding, 
solidarity, or ‘groupness’ that can make collective action possible.” Rogers Brubaker, Ethnicity Without Groups 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 34. 
 
10
 Michael Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory : Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization 
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2009), 5. 
 
11
 Henry Rousso, The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1991). I employ Hue-Tam Tai’s definition of “public memory”: “By ‘public,’ I refer to ritual 
performances, speech acts, visual media, and other cultural activities that are articulated and made available or 
accessible to others rather than kept secret. These representations may be the works of single individuals or the 
products of collective efforts. I am thus…referring…to individuals and groups who openly try to claim a piece of the 
past.” Hue-Tam Tai, “Introduction: Situating Memory,” in The Country of Memory : Remaking the Past in Late 
Socialist Vietnam, ed. Hue-Tam Tai (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 1–17: 7. 
5 
degrees of authenticity in the public sphere. My dissertation also updates Rousso’s typologies to 
include a new “cyber” carrier that is faster, less filtered, and perhaps more democratic than the 
other vectors. I am the first to examine in comparative terms how members of these groups have 
used different vectors of memory. I analyze the memory narratives they have transmitted through 
organizational (association journals, monuments, museums), cultural (memoirs, films), and cyber 
(websites, discussion forums) carriers. My dissertation also shows how Harkis, Pieds-Noirs, and 
their descendants have employed official and scholarly carriers, as well as how they have 
engaged with the historical narratives transmitted by those outside their communities (non-Harki 
or Pied-Noir historians and the French state). Harki and Pied-Noir case studies are particularly 
fruitful means through which to study the politics of memory in France. As groups with different 
racial and cultural backgrounds, they have radically dissimilar levels of power, resources, and 
visibility in French society. Pieds-Noirs, for example, had sufficient means to construct the only 
museum dedicated to the colonial past in France, the Centre de Documentation des Français 
d’Algérie. Children of Harkis, on the other hand, have relied more heavily on the opportunities 
for social networking and the quick, public transmission of information afforded by the Internet. 
 Lastly, Harkis and Pieds-Noirs are large groups, but the questions they raise about 
France’s relation to its colonial past are larger still. The past decade has seen increased concerns 
among scholars, political leaders, journalists, and other public figures about the socially divisive 
potential of “memory,” particularly that of the colonial era. Since 2005, several important 
postcolonial historians have employed a paradigm of “memory wars” to interpret the disparate 
memory practices and narratives of former colonial subjects, including Harkis, Pieds-Noirs, 
veterans groups, and others, who have a stake in this past. In 2006, Pierre Nora announced: 
We have passed from a modest memory, which only demanded to make itself admitted 
and recognized, to a memory ready to impose itself by any means. I have elsewhere 
6 
evoked a ‘tyranny of memory’; it would be necessary today to speak of its terrorism. So 
much so that we are less sensitive to the suffering that it expresses than to the violence by 
which it wants to make itself heard.
12
  
 
My dissertation calls into question the utility of this interpretation of collective memory 
as competitive. While French citizens had vastly different experiences of colonialism and the 
Algerian War, framing their discordant acts of memory as acts of war obscures the productive 
work of memory. Hyperbolic claims about the destructive power of “memory” overlook the 
basic function of collective or shared memory—to create a basis for cohesion and solidarity. In 
examining the intertwined histories of Holocaust and postcolonial memories, Michael Rothberg 
has likewise critiqued a competitive memory model. He explained that “many people assume the 
public sphere in which collective memories are articulated is a scarce resource and that the 
interaction of different collective memories within that sphere takes the form of a zero-sum 
struggle for preeminence.”13 Rothberg proposed instead that we “consider memory as 
multidirectional: as subject to ongoing negotiation, cross-referencing, and borrowing: as 
productive and not privative.”14 I employ his model of multidirectional memory in this 
dissertation. In the context of my project, this entails recognizing discordant memory narratives 
and then exploring, rather than assuming, whether they are indeed constructed in conscious 
opposition. I identify efforts to build solidarity, or some shared sense of belonging, through acts 
of memory. Since I have observed that some Harkis, Pieds-Noirs, and their descendants have 
internalized the memory wars paradigm and adopted its discourse, I have expanded this approach 
                                                 
12
 Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory, 269. Citing Nora in Jacques Buob and Alain Frachon, “‘La France est 
malade de sa mémoire’: Pierre Nora et le métier d’historien,” in “Colonies: Un débat français,” Le Monde 2, June 
2006. Rothberg’s translation and emphasis. All translations are my own unless otherwise noted. 
 
13
 Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory, 2-3. 
 
14
 Ibid, 3. 
7 
to include highlighting the impact of the competitive memory model on how architects of 
collective memory frame their actions. 
My dissertation reveals another level on which memory of colonial Algeria and the 
Algerian War has proven divisive. The competitive memory model focuses on conflicts between 
groups over memory; my project identifies important disputes within these groups over how to 
interpret their history. Members of these groups, of different genders and generations, transmit 
discordant narratives through various memory carriers, sometimes actively opposing each other.  
Such intra-communal conflicts are especially apparent on websites, which broadcast heated 
debates among members of both groups about how they should represent and commemorate the 
past. These findings call into question the fairly rigid battle lines that scholars depict in their 
explanations of the “memory wars.” At the same time, they remind us that the process of 
constructing a collective memory is naturally contentious and rarely converges easily on a single 
shared version of the past.
15
 The lack of a national hegemonic memory of colonialism and the 
Algerian War does not necessarily portend the destruction of the social fabric of the Republic.  
Finally, the histories of Harki and Pied-Noir collective memories reveal that both groups 
are ultimately seeking a place for themselves in the national imagination. At the root of each 
intra-communal memory conflict is a debate over how best to foster solidarity with other 
members of French society. My dissertation shows that while some architects of Harki and Pied-
Noir collective memory explicitly challenge specific narratives transmitted both within and 
outside their communities, others are more comfortable with coexisting conflicting memories. 
                                                 
15
 As Mary Stevens has observed, it is the “nature of public memory to be a field of struggle.” Stevens, “Visibility, 
equality, difference,” 108. Iwona Irwin-Zarecka has likewise argued, “The expression ‘collective memory’ suggests 
a consensus. And yet, the social construction of ‘realities of the past’ is frequently a site of intense conflict and 
debate.” Iwona Irwin-Zarecka, Frames of Remembrance: The Dynamics of Collective Memory (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction Publishers, 1994), 67.  
 
8 
Their works demonstrate a wish to create a place for themselves in French history, not to deny 
others this same right. 
Harki and Pied-Noir Case Studies 
As Algerians of North African origin who supported the French during the Algerian War, 
the Harkis embody many of the complexities and tragedies of this conflict—and of the colonial 
period in general.
16
 The Harkis were auxiliaries who assisted the French Army in a variety of 
military and civilian capacities. They also played an important symbolic role in the war. The 
French portrayed the Harkis’ assistance as evidence of “Muslim” loyalty to French Algeria. 
Following Algerian independence, the Army disarmed the Harkis and left them in Algeria, where 
they faced violent reprisals from the victorious nationalists for their perceived betrayal during the 
war. Despite restrictive French evacuation plans for the Harkis, approximately sixty thousand 
Harkis and their families were able to escape to France. Nearly half of these Harki families were 
placed in internment camps upon their arrival and some remained there for over a decade. 
In Algeria and among Algerian immigrants in France, the term “Harki” became 
synonymous with “traitor.” The Harkis were linked to the injustices of the colonial regime 
through their decision to support the French. Harkis’ wives and their children inherited the 
consequences of this choice and carried the stigma by association. Subject to discrimination in 
French society for their North African origins and rejected by Algerian immigrants in France, the 
Harkis and their families experienced a form of double rejection. In response to this exclusion, 
many Harki fathers stayed silent about their experiences and some Harki children have chosen 
                                                 
16
 The term “Harki” has come to signify all French Muslim men who fought with the French Army, and indeed all 
“pro-French” Muslims, during the Algerian War. Historically, the Harkis were only one of several different groups 
of civil combatants (including Moghaznis, Auto-defense groups, and career soldiers) who performed various tasks 
for the French Army. Many scholars prefer to use the term “auxiliaries,” rather than “Harkis” to avoid this 
confusion. I will use the term “Harkis” since I am analyzing the discourses of those who identify themselves and 
their fathers as such. 
9 
not to identify as such. For those who do assume this identity, interpreting the Harki past has 
remained key to their understandings of themselves and their place in French society. My 
dissertation explores the memory work of these Harkis, their wives, and their children. 
The first chapter of this dissertation details the interrelated histories of French and 
Algerian national memories of the Algerian War, Harki historiography, and Harki collective 
memory practices. In it I analyze the main subjects of historical inquiry and controversy. My 
dissertation contributes to the history of this group by identifying important debates among 
children of Harkis about how to interpret the past and by analyzing how Harki children use 
websites as a new memory technology. I employ a model of multidirectional memory to interpret 
Harki efforts to achieve recognition for their difficult past. Analyzing their references to the 
Holocaust and their claims of a Harki genocide allows me to situate the Harkis within a wider 
history of cross-referencing between Holocaust and colonial memories. It also enables me to 
critique the competitive memory model that has developed in France by demonstrating that most 
Harki and Pied-Noir memory work is aimed at fostering social inclusion. Finally, the 
comparisons I draw with the history of Pied-Noir collective memory, particularly with regard to 
the way they use different carriers and what this indicates about their access to resources, offers 
further insight into the politics of collective memory in Fifth Republic France. 
The Pieds-Noirs, also known as French of Algeria,
17
 are the descendants of the settler 
population who came to Algeria from various European countries (mainly France, Malta, Italy, 
and Spain
18
) beginning in 1830 in search of economic and social opportunities. In 1962, at the 
moment of Algerian independence, unstable conditions in Algeria prompted most of the one 
                                                 
17
 I use the term “French Algerians” in Chapter 9 when studying the Centre de Documentation des Français 
d’Algérie (CDDFA) because it is how they identify themselves in this institution. 
 
18
 Around 50% of the settlers migrated from France. 
 
10 
million Pieds-Noirs living in this territory to migrate to metropolitan France. Their historical 
trajectory has thus made this population both internal migrants and double exiles,
19
 with 
multicultural identities and heritages. They are also heirs to a complicated and painful colonial 
past in France. 
The place of Pieds-Noirs in French society, like that of the Harkis, has been shaped by 
evolving French attitudes towards their Algerian territory and what it represented. In the French 
state’s discourse during the nineteenth century, the settlers were glorified “as a civilizing force, 
exercising an influence both on people and on the environment.”20 At the same time, a French 
image of Algeria as “a colonial dumping ground”21 for the undesirables of European society 
translated into a lingering impression of the Pieds-Noirs as poor and uncultured. In the mid-
twentieth century, as anti-colonial sentiment increased, the Pieds-Noirs were sometimes 
portrayed as grands colons, powerful landowners who exploited their privileged political and 
socio-economic positions as French of European origin. Many Pieds-Noirs had never been to 
mainland France
22
 and harbored their own misconceptions about the metropolitan French. They 
also resented Paris’s control over their political and economic affairs.  
Following Algerian independence, as France’s colonial empire “turned from a point of 
pride to a source of shame,”23 the hostile perceptions and relations continued. Throughout the 
Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962), much of the metropolitan French population 
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identified Pieds-Noirs “with those who fought to the bitter end to remain in Algeria,”24 blaming 
them for prolonging the bloody and divisive struggle for Algerian independence. It was during 
this historical moment that the term “Pied-Noir,” a derogatory nickname for French Algerians 
that has since become widely used, emerged.
25
 The sudden and unforeseen mass migration of 
Pieds-Noirs at the end of the war also colored mainland French attitudes toward these migrants.
26
 
The substantial financial and administrative challenges that their arrival posed made it difficult 
for metropolitan French to sympathize with their forced migration.
27
  
The identities of Pieds-Noirs and their relations with other members of French society 
today are informed by heated debates over how to interpret the colonial past. Many Pieds-Noirs 
mourn the loss of territory of French Algeria and celebrate their Algerian heritage. Anti-
colonialists, historians, and others, however, have been outspoken against Pied-Noir memory 
practices, which they interpret as “nostalgérie, a pathological nostalgia for Algeria”28 and their 
loss of a privileged position in this society.
29
 At the same time, as well educated migrants of 
European origin and appearance, the Pieds-Noirs faced fewer barriers to integration in France 
than the Harkis and their families. My dissertation argues that Pied-Noir memory work has 
reflected twin desires within their community. First, rather than diminishing their cultural and 
historical differences, the Pieds-Noirs have used memory practices and technologies to express 
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their own particular collective memories and thus to resist complete integration in France. At the 
same time, Pied-Noirs have sought to challenge the understandings that others have of their 
history in French Algeria, namely that they were exploitative colonists, which have formed the 
basis for their exclusion in France.   
The Pieds-Noirs are a well-documented community, as my historiography in Chapter 6 
attests. My project is the first to analyze the Centre de Documentation des Français d’Algérie 
museum and Mur des Disparus monument in Perpignan. I show how Pied-Noir commemorative 
practices have developed in response to the evolving memorial climate in France and the 
changing needs of their aging community. They have shifted the focus of their commemoration 
away from a discussion of colonial ideology and glorification of colonial acts to an emphasis on 
their status as victims, so as not to alienate Pied-Noir youth and French public opinion. I also 
demonstrate that although the Pieds-Noirs are often perceived by scholars as some of the most 
active participants in the “memory wars” over the colonial past, their memory work is most often 
aimed at gaining acceptance and recognition from the French as well as on building a shared 
memory of French Algeria with other migrants from Algeria. Lastly, my analysis of Pied-Noir 
websites reveals that Pieds-Noirs are most interested in constructing virtual sites of memory to 
replace those sites that they lost in Algeria. 
Harkis, Pieds-Noirs, and their descendants share the experience of fleeing Algeria and 
settling in France, where they remained uncomfortable reminders of the nation’s imperial past. 
Both groups faced exclusion and hostility on the basis of their historical identities and the early 
history of their memories reveals a great deal of cross-referencing and joint memory work among 
their members. Harkis and Pieds-Noirs likewise navigated the same evolving memorial climate 
13 
in France, from the general silence following the Algerian War to the recent “resurgence” of 
collective memories and the emergence of an implicit theory of memory competition.  
The memory practices and narratives of these two groups have also diverged in important 
ways. In addition to making use of cyber and other carriers of memory for different purposes, 
Harkis and Pieds-Noirs have transmitted their past to their children through different mediators. 
Gender has played a significant role in the transmission of Harki memory, as “Harki” is a 
specifically male-coded category and the legacy of colonialism impacts the perception of gender 
differences among French of North African origin. Due to the first generation’s silence about 
their experiences and to the rather tenuous place that young men of North African origin occupy 
in the French imagination, Harki daughters have taken the lead in constructing and challenging 
representations of the Harki past. In contrast, since the children of Pieds-Noirs have been easily 
integrated into French society, the Pieds-Noirs have agonized over how to persuade them to 
participate in specifically Pied-Noir memory practices. A comparative approach to these case 
studies thus attests to the importance of employing gender and generation as categories of 
analysis and reveals more about these memory communities than if they were approached 
separately. 
The Study of Memory 
Since “memory” emerged as a subject of historical inquiry in the late 20th century, 
scholars have explored the relationship between individual and collective memories. Historians, 
including Benjamin Stora and Henry Rousso, have applied explanatory schema developed by 
Sigmund Freud for individual memory, including repression and trauma, to understand how 
14 
nations have interpreted and remembered conflict, particularly defeat.
30
 These analytical tools 
helped make sense of the public silences, identified as “collective amnesia,” that seemed to 
appear in the wake of violent events. Freud’s notion of the unconscious as “a repository of 
repressed memories, inaccessible to normal consciousness, but capable of disrupting our 
conscious lives”31 was also used as a metaphor for the various public manifestations or 
resurgence of this collective memory.
32
   
Although the work of Rousso and Stora has strongly influenced my dissertation, I am 
skeptical about the utility of extending the concept of “memory” from individuals to a collective, 
including the nation. Like Maurice Halbwachs, who emphasized the social nature of memory, I 
am more interested in how collective memory functions as a social process.
33
 Collective 
memory, or “the way the past is represented, managed, and understood by societies,”34 entails the 
careful selection of certain elements and the silencing of others to satisfy both the needs of the 
group and its members. It is this type of memory “that may have been initiated by individuals but 
that has been mediated through networks of communication, institutions of the state, and the 
social groupings of civil society.”35 The challenge for scholars in studying “collective memory” 
is to avoid reifying what is invariably a process, and a highly contentious one, at that. For this 
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reason, terms that convey active meanings, such as construction, invention, representation or 
commemoration, often seem preferable to “memory.”  
If we study about collective memory with the language and frameworks of individual 
memory, we can overemphasize the tendency of collective memory to merge into a single 
version of the past.
36
 We can fail to identify the power dynamics involved in creating and 
maintaining “collective amnesia.”37 As Jo McCormack has argued, “Forgetting divisive elements 
of the past once again goes hand in hand with nation building. Obviously though this nation is 
inherently exclusionary and built on unsure foundations.”38 Like Daniel Sherman, I refuse “to 
privilege coherence over difference.”39 I am interested in memory conflicts—the cracks and 
fissures, contentions and disputes in collective memory that have no clear parallel on the 
individual level.  
At the same time, I would like to challenge a paradigm of memory competition that has 
emerged over the past two decades. I outline the development of this paradigm more fully in the 
section of this Introduction on France’s “memory wars.” While some memory competition does 
exist, my dissertation shows that just as often, memory serves as the basis for reconciliation.  In 
examining these features of Harki and Pied-Noir collective memories, I employ a model of 
multidirectional memory. Approaching memory as “multidirectional” enables me to think about 
collective memory as “open-ended field of articulation and struggle” and to identify the 
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“complex acts of solidarity in which historical memory serves as a medium for the creation of 
new communal and political identities.”40 As Rothberg explained: 
It is often difficult to tell whether a given act of memory is more likely to produce 
competition or mutual understanding- sometimes both seem to happen simultaneously. A 
model of multidirectional memory allows for the perception of the power differentials 
that tend to cluster around memory competition, but also locates that competition within a 
larger spiral of memory discourse in which even hostile invocations of memory can 
provide vehicles for further, countervailing commemorative acts.
41
  
 
My project diverges from Rothberg’s, however, in important ways. Rothberg studied the cross-
referencing of Holocaust and post-colonial memory and the ways in which these two collective 
memories developed in tandem. While I analyze the ways in which Harkis invoke memory of the 
Holocaust in Chapter 3, my dissertation focuses on multiple, often contradictory, narratives of 
the same event. I show the multidirectionality of different collective memories of the Algerian 
War.  
In The Construction of Memory in Interwar France, Sherman identified a 
historiographical gap in the study of memory when he argued, “Recent scholarship leaves little 
doubt that the construction of memory as a form of representation is a political and social 
process, but the materials, operation, purposes, and consequences of that construction have only 
just begun to receive the theoretical and historical attention they merit.”42 While Rothberg’s 
model of multidirectional memory helps evaluate the purposes and consequences of Harki and 
Pied-Noir memory practices, Rousso’s notion of memory carriers allows me to analyze the 
materials that members of these groups use. Rousso defined a carrier as “any source that 
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proposes a deliberate reconstruction of an event for a social purpose.”43 The two vectors most 
commonly used by Harkis, Pieds-Noirs, and their descendants are organizational and cultural. 
Organizational carriers are constructed by groups of people who “join organizations for the 
purpose of preserving and unifying the personal memories of group members. Groups sometimes 
become attached to a rather static image of the past, which they then promote actively as well as 
passively.”44 Forms of organizational carriers include association publications and 
commemorative practices as well as their lieux de mémoire,
45
 literal or figurative places that 
groups invest with mnemonic meaning. These memory practices are invariably concerned with 
consensus, as they must convey the shared memory of the organizations’ members.46  
Cultural memory carriers, on the other hand, present what appear to be highly 
individualistic memories through a variety of media, including literature, film, and television.
 
These representations are created for public consumption and the publishers and producers of 
these narratives endow them with legitimacy and greater visibility in French society. Rousso 
noted that since these carriers present their message in artistic form, this message tends to be 
implicit rather than explicit. The authors of these works are less concerned with consensus, but 
still aim at influencing and contributing to both their group’s collective memory and the public 
memory of their past. 
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Harkis, Pieds-Noirs, and their descendants have transmitted memories through Rousso’s 
other vectors, official and scholarly, as well. When employing these vectors, they have engaged 
to a greater and more direct extent with the historical memories and narratives of those outside 
their communities. Official carriers of memory, including legislation, monuments, and other 
forms of commemoration, are produced by the French state, which often asserts itself as the 
ultimate authority on interpretations of the past. Scholars have documented the essential 
functions such mediations play in the process of nation building, particularly in the aftermath of 
defeat.
47
 In the first thirty years following the Algerian War, the state did not attempt to 
commemorate the conflict and dedicated few public spaces to colonial memory. Since the 1990s, 
when the state began to re-evaluate its colonial past, Harkis and Pieds-Noirs have lobbied for 
official recognition of their memories. They have often been dissatisfied, however, with the 
overtures made by the state. My dissertation analyzes the efforts of Harkis, Pieds-Noirs, and their 
descendants to establish official carriers of their memory as well as their resistance to other 
national, commemorative practices. 
Scholarly carriers of memory, including works of history, “reconstruct the facts and 
propose ways of interpreting them,”48 and their authority stems from the rigors of an academic 
methodology. Some Harkis, Pieds-Noirs, and their descendants have produced scholarly work. 
They have also engaged with the work of other scholars on their communities and on the 
                                                 
47
 As Sherman has argued, “As a form of representation, commemoration seeks to reinforce the solidarity of a 
particular community or set of communities. It does so by forging a consensus version of an event or connected 
series of events that has either disrupted the stability of the community or threatened to do so.” Sherman, The 
Construction of Memory, 7; John Gillis, Commemorations : The Politics of National Identity (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1994); W. Fitzhugh Brundage, The Southern Past : A Clash of Race and Memory 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005); Jenny Macleod, Defeat and Memory: 
Cultural Histories of Military Defeat Since 1815, First Edition edition (Basingstoke England ; New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008).  
 
48
 Rousso, Vichy Syndrome, 221. 
 
19 
histories of French Algeria and the Algerian War, more generally. Harkis and Pieds-Noirs have 
appropriated historians’ narratives as frameworks for their own memory narratives. They have 
also, however, directly challenged and dismissed the findings of historians that do not fit with 
their understanding of the past. 
The notion of scholarly carriers of memory raises another important issue in the study of 
memory- the dynamic between “memory” and “history” as competing sources of knowledge 
about the past. A distinction between collective memory and the practice of history as an 
academic discipline emerged in the late-twentieth century when scholars became interested in 
how and why people engaged with the past.
49
 In his seminal work, Les Lieux de Mémoire, Pierre 
Nora argued that history and memory were fundamentally equated from the time of the French 
Revolution until the early 20
th
 century and both worked in the service of building the Republic. 
He conceptualized memory as “life” and a “bond tying us to the eternal present.” He understood 
“History, on the other hand, [as] the reconstruction, always problematic and incomplete, of what 
is no longer.”50 The fact that memory emerged as an object of historical inquiry suggested to 
Nora that they are no longer joined and are, in fact, in opposition. Other historians have 
emphasized the differences between memory and history. While they acknowledge that the 
process of collective memory serves important legitimizing functions for a community, these 
scholars ultimately see collective memory as faulty, incomplete, and divisive. History, with its 
rigorous methodology and critical approach to sources, is presented as the objective, 
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dispassionate alternative to collective memory, and thus a more reliable and authoritative source 
of truth about the past.
51
  
This understanding of the dynamic between memory and history is reflected in the 
competitive memory model. Rothberg has noted how struggles over memory of the Algerian 
War have translated into confrontations over pedagogy and the writing of history.
52
 Historians 
have reacted strongly to state intervention in the field of history, in the form of laws dictating 
how the past should be interpreted,
53
 as well as to the demands of different group for historical 
narratives that reflect their interpretations of the past.
54
 Nora and others have denounced 
“memory” as fostering social divisions.55 In Historical Knowledge, Historical Error, Alan 
Megill argued that a return to objective, critical history is necessary for resolving the 
increasingly violent conflicts occurring on a global scale over competing interpretations, or 
memories, of the past. At the same time, historians of French Algeria have been well aware of 
the obstacles to producing scholarly works on this period, including a serious lack of sources and 
the politically sensitive nature of the subject.
56
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Considering history as a “scholarly carrier of memory,” as Rousso does, downplays the 
distinction between memory and history. Rousso is more concerned with the reciprocal 
relationship between history and collective memory. He explains that while historians’ points of 
view and questions cannot help but be shaped by the collective memory of an event, the historian 
also helps to shape that memory through his or her research. This understanding stems from a 
postmodern critique of historical narrative. Jo McCormack has argued, “history provides a 
historical memory that is one representation of the past amongst others.”57 In Eric Hobsbawm’s 
introduction to the volume, The Invention of Tradition, he argued, “all invented traditions, so far 
as possible, use history as a legitimator of action and cement of group cohesion.”58 This critique 
interprets both memory and history as the product of power dynamics.
59
   
A new appreciation for the value of memory as a source of historical truth has developed 
alongside this postmodern critique of the distinction between history and memory. For those who 
are suspicious of, or silenced by, the process of historical production, memory can serve as a 
corrective to the exclusionary practices of historical writing.
60
 Barbara Misztal has argued that 
memory, which derives its authenticity from personal experience, can “play an important role as 
a source of truth” in places “where political power heavily censors national history and where 
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oppressed nations have a profound deficit of truth.”61 This is also the case in societies in which 
national history is not censored, but is still being negotiated, as in France with regard to the 
colonial legacy. The cases of the Harkis, Pieds-Noirs, and their descendants provide an occasion 
to observe how memory practices emerge in the context of historical silences and how history is 
written where there are limited sources and an absence of personal memories due to trauma. My 
dissertation ultimately argues that memory and history, as two approaches to understanding the 
past, are formed in relation, and not opposition, to one another. Historians’ lines of inquiry have 
been shaped by collective memories of the Harki past, but their work has also been used to 
contextualize and legitimate memory narratives. 
Returning to Rousso’s typologies, I argue that the Internet constitutes an additional, 
significantly different type of memory carrier, which we might call a “cyber” carrier. This study 
is the first by an historian to examine how these groups use websites and online discussion 
forums to construct and transmit their collective memories. Analyzing “cyber” memory vectors 
provides an opportunity think about the role of media in the transmission of memory. The 
Internet offers a way of representing the past without the filters of French media, publishers, and 
the state, allowing more individuals to act as architects of collective memory. It enables those 
with limited access to financial and political resources to participate in the public sphere. For 
Harki children who cannot or do not want to publish a memoir or make a film, the Internet has 
provided a place to publicly disseminate a historical narrative. Moreover, as a free and easily 
accessible means of communicating information, these websites reach an audience “that is 
different and potentially larger than that of traditional audio-visual media.”62 At the same time, 
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websites do not have the same authority that these more traditional media afford. Whereas 
memoirs published by daughters of Harkis have received attention in the national press, the 
Harki websites are not well known among non-Harkis. For the Pieds-Noirs, who have a longer 
history of constructing and transmitting a collective memory, websites supplement their other 
practices. They mainly draw attention to the works of their memorial associations, including 
their monuments and museum. They do not create discussion forums on which to debate the 
meaning of their past, as children of Harkis have. 
The structure of the Internet imposes its own logic on the ways memories are presented 
and read online. The digital ontology of memory is one of storage and retrieval, which contrasts 
with the cognitive processes of recollection and association that comprise human memory.
63
 
Computers can be used as external memory repositories, but their software design does not 
reflect a cultural understanding of memory.
64
 Unlike monuments or books, which offer a 
relatively fixed text for others to accept, reject, or reinterpret, digital memory is accessed in a 
continuous and fragmented manner. This interface limits how participants receive, process, and 
imbue meaning in the information that is stored. It makes it difficult, for example, for children of 
Harkis to present a coherent and consistent narrative of their past. At the same time, the non-
narrative nature of digital memory opens up possibilities for contesting national, official history. 
As a collection of thoughts, conversations, and representations, online collective memory 
resembles an archive of sorts, a compilation of texts for people to assemble and interpret. Yet it 
is an alternative, subversive archive, which undermines the monopoly of the state in the 
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preservation of memories. This counter-archive limits the state’s ability to erase traces of the past 
that undermine the national narrative. Deleting practices are essential here. Since digital memory 
is less susceptible to the erosion of time than objects, documents, and the human mind, the 
Internet constitutes a potential “end of forgetting.”65 This safeguard against the transient nature 
of memory has reassured the children of Harkis, who have understood themselves as “those 
forgotten by history (les oubliés de l’histoire),” and the Pieds-Noirs, who fear that their 
“memory” will be lost with their generation. 
As a new medium of communication, the Internet also offers social networking 
possibilities for physically dispersed and fragmented communities, such as the Harkis and the 
Pieds-Noirs. My dissertation explores how members of these groups make use of the Internet to 
create or recreate connections based on the idea of a shared past. In the case of the Harkis, their 
children have used the Internet to promote collective action, most often to publically contest 
official memory practices. Using websites as a means of communication and subversion, they 
have signaled their lack of ideological consensus and have organized national boycotts of the 
commemorations. Pieds-Noirs, who have a long associative tradition and greater access to means 
of protest and resistance to official memory, have used the social networking possibilities 
afforded by the Internet differently. By posting photos of public landmarks and private 
residences in Algeria, they have sought to digitally reconstruct the historically and symbolically 
significant places of their past. They have also attempted to reconnect with former Algerian and 
Pied-Noir classmates and neighbors with whom they can reminisce and commemorate their 
losses. 
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Ultimately, these websites also afford historians the opportunity to observe the 
contentious process of collective memory. One reason why scholars have not examined discord 
within groups over memory of the Algerian War is that they have not had access to these 
conflicts.  Because of the public nature of discussions on websites, historians can observe quite 
clearly the construction and policing of memory. On Harki websites, administrators establish on 
the site an official memory for the association, which they update through various articles 
announcing the appropriate reactions to current events.  Furthermore, they regulate what is 
posted in the discussion board forums both by removing offensive posts and by lecturing posters 
about the “proper” perspective on issues of collective memory and identity. Participants also use 
the sites to respond to and contest interpretations expressed by on other sites. Websites make 
visible to historians the conflicts that nearly always occur within groups when constructing a 
collective memory, and therefore constitute a valuable new source for collective memory studies. 
At the same time, it is important not to overestimate the severity of these online conflicts. 
Certain features of “cyber” carriers have contributed to the emergence and dominance of the 
competitive memory model in France.
66
 The “memory wars” metaphor emerged from the 
perception that disputes over the past had progressively invaded the public sphere. This 
impression has been due in large part to the rising influence of new media, which diffuse 
information more quickly and accelerate disputes.
67
 The anonymity afforded by the Internet may 
have also contributed to the sense of fierce conflict in debates about the colonial past. Behind the 
protective veil of a pseudonym, online participants are less inhibited in their speech and their 
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exchanges take on a more aggressive tone, thereby heightening tensions. This phenomenon is 
compounded by the ability to react almost instantaneously, without the filters of time or 
institutions. Since the Internet affects the speed, tone and pervasiveness of confrontations over 
the past, it produces extreme versions of what are normal collective memory processes. 
In my study of Harki and Pied Noir memory narratives and practices, I employ gender as 
a category of analysis. I agree with the observation of Sylvia Paletschek and Sylvia Schraut that 
memory and gender are “multiply intertwined: gender is a product of cultural remembrance, is 
called up by memory and social practices and is constantly re-inscribed into the collective 
memory. Memories are, moreover, gendered.”68 At the same time, gender functions differently 
depending on the particular context of remembrance. My dissertation is the first to analyze the 
relationships between gender and memory in Harki and Pied-Noir memory communities and to 
systematically explore the ways in which memory of the Algerian War has been gendered.  I 
draw on methodologies developed through the intersecting fields of women’s history and oral 
history,
69
 studies of women’s Holocaust testimonies,70 and analyses of the gendering of war, 
national identity, and empire
71
 to address four sets of questions. 
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First, how do collective memories of colonial Algeria and the Algerian War enforce or 
challenge understandings of gender roles? “Harki” is a male-coded category, since the Harkis 
were originally soldiers and their families became part of the Harki community through their 
association with this male figure. Daughters of Harkis, however, have become particularly vocal 
representatives of this community through their mainstream memoirs and novels. In Chapter 5 of 
this dissertation, I explore how Harki sons have resented the co-opting of this “male history” by 
female narrators. I also argue that the popularity of the Harki daughters’ texts reveals how the 
legacy of colonialism has continued to shape French understandings of gender roles among 
French of North African origin. As Joan Scott has explained in the context of debates over the 
headscarf in France, Muslim women have often been perceived as victims, “of Muslim 
patriarchy in general and of predatory Muslim boys in particular. In this way, the picture of the 
Muslim community as a homogeneous entity, dictating the lives of its female members, was 
systematically developed; its counterpoint was the individualism and gender equality of 
republican France.”72 Harki daughters’ writings, then, have been embraced as acts of 
emancipation from their fathers and brothers.  
Second, I address the question of whether women remember differently than men by 
identifying gender specific practices of memory among the Harkis.
73
 Harki daughters, for 
example, have published most of the memoirs on the Harki past, whereas the majority of 
webmasters for Harki websites are sons of Harkis. I also compare the content of the narratives 
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transmitted by Harki sons and daughters. Several studies have explored the different language 
and framing techniques men and women use to convey their personal accounts of the past.
74
 The 
“absence of emphasis on choice” that James Fentress and Chris Wickham identified in women’s 
memories is quite applicable in the case of the Harkis. Fentress and Wickham explained this 
phenomenon by observing, “women, however powerful, have tended to live their lives in 
environments whose public, external power structures have been under the control of men.”75 
The question of choice is central to interpreting the Harki past and Chapter 4 of this dissertation 
analyzes how Harki sons and daughters have disagreed on this issue. 
The third set of questions considers how Algerian War commemorations and monuments 
have been gendered. I take up the call by Schraut and Paletschek “to examine gender-specific 
meanings attached to existing places of memory, the (national) symbols, values, concepts of 
power and history related with them, as well as the implicit images of masculinity and femininity 
they contain.”76 In honoring the Harkis’ service to France as soldiers, the French state has 
ascribed a form of martial masculinity to the Harkis. This type of masculinity has been 
undermined by the collective memories of the Harkis and their families, who explain that the 
Harkis suffered the emasculating humiliation of abandonment and failure to protect their 
families. In Chapter 3, I argue that this is one reason why Harki children have created their own 
commemorations that reflect their understandings of their fathers as victims of French violence, 
rather than as soldiers. 
Finally, since this dissertation focuses on the contentious process of collective memory, 
as well as its potential as a basis for reconciliation, I explore the roles gender has played in 
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memory conflicts. As debates among Harki sons and daughters demonstrate, gender constitutes 
yet another level on which memory divisive. In their memoirs, women are more likely to present 
highly individualistic narratives that do not conform to collective understandings of the Harki 
past. This gendered division does not, however, figure into the “memory wars” model of 
competitive memory that I critique in this dissertation. I also consider whether forms of 
“multidirectional memory” appear gendered. Harki daughters tend to seek reconciliation with 
other French of North African origin through a shared history of colonial oppression. Some 
Harki sons, on the other hand, have presented the Harkis as patriotic Frenchmen and asserted 
their right to belong in French society. 
Generation is another useful category in the study of memory. Scholars have examined 
how memory, particularly of a traumatic event, is transmitted from those who experienced the 
event to their children. In studying the work of second-generation Holocaust survivors, Marianne 
Hirsch introduced the concept of “postmemory.” “‘Postmemory’” describes the relationship that 
the ‘generation after’ bears to the personal, collective, and cultural trauma of those who came 
before-to experiences they ‘remember’ only by means of the stories, images, and behaviors 
among which they grew up. But these experiences were transmitted to them so deeply and 
affectively as to seem to constitute memories in their own right.”77 I argue that generation 
functions differently in the Harki and Pied-Noir memory communities. The memory work of 
Harki children reflects the “structure of inter- and trans-generational transmission of traumatic 
knowledge and experience” that defines postmemory.78 The second generation of Pieds-Noirs, 
however, do not seem to have inherited the traumatic experiences of their parents to the same 
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degree. Since their arrival in metropolitan France, Pieds-Noirs have struggled to transfer their 
memory to those who never lived in Algeria. Most of their memory practices are aimed at 
institutionalizing their narratives in monuments, museums, and archives so that it will not 
disappear after they are gone. First generation Harkis, in contrast, remain relatively silent about 
the past in comparison to members of the “postmemory” generation. 
Historiography of the Algerian War and the “Memory Wars” Paradigm 
 The first thirty years following the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962) were 
marked by a lack of public discussion in France about the meaning and significance of 
colonialism. Not only did the French find it difficult to commemorate the loss of their empire, 
but the trauma experienced by those who fought in the Algerian War produced an aversion to 
revisiting this past. This silence extended to academia, where historians faced a limited source 
base and remained ideologically divided. Beginning in the late 1990s, social and political 
developments in both France and Algeria, including the trial of Maurice Papon, revelations of 
torture, and the releasing of key documents regarding the Algerian War in French archives, 
prompted the French to publically confront their colonial legacy and to begin evaluating its 
contemporary significance.
79 
The French state started to dedicate spaces to colonial memory, 
constructing war monuments to those who died for France,
80
 and to produce laws aimed at 
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establishing “a normative vision of colonial history.”81 
 The turn of the millennium has ushered in a new phase in the history of this memory. This 
period has not only marked the end of amnesia regarding the Algerian War,
82
 but, according to 
some scholars, has also been characterized by the reverse trend—a surfeit of colonial memory.83 
Groups with a stake in the colonial past have engaged in a wide range of public memory 
practices: observing commemorations, constructing monuments, publishing memoirs, novels, 
and films, and participating in memorial associations. Their memory work is interpreted as a 
reaction to France’s inability, or unwillingness, to deal with its colonial legacy, which had made 
it difficult for descendants of colonial subjects to find a place in French society. 
This most recent development has concerned French scholars of colonial history, who 
view this “explosion of memory” as a threat to the unity of the Republic.84 As Nicolas Bancel 
has observed: 
it is possible to think of this phase of colonial rehabilitation which has, since the early 
years of the twenty-first century, haunted France, as indicative of a far more profound 
preoccupation that relates to the widespread sentiment that France is disintegrating, on 
the verge of collapse, being systematically dismantled and its grandeur waning, a 
                                                 
81
 Laws pertaining to the colonial past include the Gayssot law, enacted in 1990, which protects against anti-Semitic 
or xenophobic attacks, the Taubira law in 2001, which recognizes slavery as a crime against humanity, and the 
controversial law of February 2005, which stipulated that school curricula would “acknowledge in particular the 
positive role of the French overseas presence.” Pascal Blanchard, Nicolas Bancel, Sandrine Lemaire, ed. La 
Fracture Coloniale : La Société Française Au Prisme De L’héritage Colonial, (Editions La Découverte, 2005,) 17. 
 
82
 Mohammed Harbi and Benjamin Stora, La Guerre d’Algérie: 1954-2004, La Fin de L’amnésie (Paris: R. Laffont, 
2004). 
 
83
 Johann Michel, Gouverner Les Mémoires - Les Politiques Mémorielles En France (Presses Universitaires de 
France - PUF, 2010), 138-139; Bancel and Blanchard, “La colonisation,”139 ; Henri Rousso, “La guerre d’Algérie 
et la culture de la mémoire’, Le Monde, 4 April 2002; Mary Stevens, “Commemorative Fever? French Memorials to 
the Veterans of the Conflicts in North Africa,” French Studies Bulletin 26, no. 97 (December 21, 2005): 2–4. 
This is not the first time that the French have worried about the presence of “too much memory.” Rousso identified a 
similar “surplus” of memory of the Vichy regime. Eric Conan and Henry Rousso, Vichy, un passé qui ne passe pas, 
Édition : édition revue et corrigée (Paris: Fayard/Pluriel, 2013). 
 
84
 Blanchard, Bancel, Lemaire, ed. La Fracture Coloniale, 11. 
 
32 
grandeur which historically has always been inextricably linked to the representation of 
the history of the nation.
85
  
 
Lingering colonial tensions in French society, identified by Pascal Blanchard and Nicolas Bancel 
as “the colonial fracture,”86 appear to manifest themselves in disputes over the past.87 More 
importantly, scholars perceive memory conflicts as heightening and reinforcing these social 
tensions: “it is growing more apparent that memory (especially when articulated in the plural) 
has generated conflicts, as sources of serious difficulties for the contemporary ‘vivre ensemble’ 
that is already so threatened.”88  
Most of these concerns emerged after the National Assembly passed a law in February 
2005 defending France’s colonial project and the legislation triggered such uproar among anti-
colonialists on the left, descendants of colonial subjects, and educators, that the government 
repealed the offending article in November of 2005.
89
 The fallout from this law revealed the 
limits of the French state’s power to impose a national memory of colonialism. Outrage over the 
law may also have contributed to the widespread protests by immigrant and minority youth that 
erupted in the banlieues during the fall of 2005.
90
 To Nora and other scholars observing the 
particular vehemence of the polemics surrounding the law, the incident seemed to highlight “the 
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conflictual incompatibility of memories”91 and to signal a new degree of political and social 
polarization in France.
92
   
To make sense of the current state of colonial memory, some scholars have employed the 
paradigm of “memory wars.”93 This conceptual framework was first introduced by Daniel 
Lindenberg in 1994 to describe how political and social movements since the French Revolution 
have used, and often misused, historical symbols and analogies for legitimizing purposes.
94
 
Lindenberg did not define the concept of “memory wars” in his article and it has remained a 
highly ambiguous, if evocative, term. Those who employ the term seem to understand “memory 
wars” as a pattern of memory conflicts in modern France in which various groups proclaim 
competing memory narratives and fracture the Republican ideal of a single shared history.
95
 For 
postcolonial scholars Benjamin Stora, Eric Savarèse, Pascal Blanchard, and others, the colonial 
past, including the Algerian War, constitutes a particularly divisive “battlefield” of French 
memories.
96
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These historians identify the Harkis, Pieds-Noirs, and their descendants as main 
participants in the “memory wars.”97 Yet these cases challenge basic features of the “memory 
wars” paradigm. The war metaphor presents conflicts as battles between monolithic identity 
groups with highly codified collective memories. A war, after all, requires the existence of 
distinct “rival camps.”98 Bancel and Blanchard identify “a polarization of colonial memories in 
France, with clearly distinguished opposing ‘camps.’”99 In analyses of the conflicts over the 
February 2005 law, some scholars positioned the Harkis in the “camp” of those who are 
“nostalgic” for French Algeria.100 Harkis have participated in Pied-Noir organizations, including 
those that express nostalgic sentiments toward French Algeria,
101
 and Article 5 of the law 
specifically protects the Harkis from insults and defamation.
102
 And yet, children of Harkis were 
among the most outspoken opponents of the law’s pro-colonial stance,103 hinting at deep 
divisions among Harkis about how to understand and commemorate the colonial period.   
The war metaphor also provides a deceptive sense of continuity between memory 
conflicts and the battles they are evoking. The actors, stakes, and causes of the Algerian War are 
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not perfectly reproduced in disputes about how to interpret the past; instead, these disputes 
reflect the current social context in which they the take place. The Harkis are defined by having 
sided with the French against the FLN during the Algerian War.
104
 But the Harkis and their 
descendants have occupied an ambivalent place in a “fractured” postcolonial French society. 
They continue to be rejected as “traitors” by Algerian immigrant communities, where the term 
“Harki” has become an insult. The Harkis and their families are equally lost in a polarized 
political climate. Harkis have traditionally been portrayed as “collaborators” by the anti-colonial 
left and they are neither comfortable with the Gaullist right, given that Charles de Gaulle gave an 
order to abandon the Harkis in Algeria after the war, nor with the anti-immigrant rhetoric of the 
Front National. Their liminal postcolonial status, and not their status during the war, helps 
explain the Harki descendants’ conflicting understandings of the past and how they position 
themselves in relation to Algerian immigrants and the rest of French society. Moreover, the 
collective memories of Harkis and Pieds-Noirs have changed in important ways since the end of 
the war. Analyzing Pied-Noir association journals reveals that members of this community have 
adapted their memory narratives and practices in response to the evolving status of the colonial 
legacy in France and the general memorial climate.     
The concept of a “war of memories” implies a zero-sum game of irreconcilable 
memories.
105
 It evokes a scenario in which groups seek to annihilate other narratives to establish 
their own. As Savarèse explains, “The notion of ‘memory wars’ allows us – at least partially – to 
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understand a novel situation: Pieds-Noirs, Harkis, former combatants, even drafted soldiers or 
‘suitcase carriers,’106 compete, through various militant actions, to have their memories 
converted into official history – to the detriment of the memories of competing ‘groups.’”107 This 
understanding of memory conflicts, however, obscures attempts among groups to reconcile 
conflicting narratives. Some architects of Harki and Pied-Noir collective memories do explicitly 
challenge specific narratives, but others are more comfortable with coexisting competing 
memories.
108
 Furthermore, my research reveals that intra-communal debates among Harkis and 
Pieds-Noirs are ultimately about how to situate themselves within a France coming to terms with 
its colonial legacy. Their efforts to incorporate their past into competing national understandings 
of the Algerian War demonstrate their desire to create a place for themselves in French history, 
not to deny others a place in the national community.  
Finally, scholars who employ the term “memory wars” have not fully interrogated how 
their use of the concept may reify it.
109
 In her review of Savarèse’s Algérie : La guerre des 
mémoires and Blanchard and Veyrat-Masson’s Les Guerres de Mémoires : La France et Son 
Histoire, Mary Stevens notes that “the authors largely accept the concept at face value and in so 
doing they run the risk of affording it a potentially dangerous credibility.”110 Politicians, 
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including Presidents Francois Hollande and Abdelaziz Bouteflika, have, since 2005, adopted the 
“memory wars” terminology to describe memory conflicts in France and Algeria.111 Scholars 
note that these politicians have denounced the “wars” as evidence of communautarisme, the 
desire to disassociate from the national community.
112
 The specter of communautarisme provides 
both a justification for discrediting the memory work of various non-state actors and an excuse to 
impose a hegemonic interpretation of the past. Harki children and Pieds-Noirs have likewise co-
opted the metaphor of “memory wars” to frame their memory practices and relationships to the 
memories of others. As this discourse of competitive memory has circulated out of academic 
settings, from historians of memory to the communities they study, it may have ultimately 
perpetuated fears about the potential divisiveness of memory.  
My dissertation thus not only reveals the limitations of using this conceptual framework 
for analyzing the Harki and Pied-Noir memory practices and objectives, but also shows that as an 
incarnation of the competitive memory model that Rothberg has identified, it can be a highly 
problematic way of interpreting the current memorial climate. I argue that it reflects the concerns 
of this climate rather than providing a useful framework for studying them. A paradigm such as 
“multidirectional memory” is more appropriate because it allows analytical space for examining 
attempts at reconciliation through memory. 
Sources and Structure 
 My dissertation is divided into two parts, one for each of the Harki and Pied-Noir case 
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studies, consisting of eight chapters in total. I employ a thematic approach, focused on specific 
themes and vectors of memory. Thus, while this dissertation is organized chronologically, 
several chapters cover the same time periods. I investigate the different media that Harkis and 
Pieds-Noirs have used to construct and transmit memory narratives. As such, I consulted 
published primary sources, including memoirs, novels, and scholarly works by members of the 
communities, as well as association journals at the Bibliothèque Nationale de France and films 
through the Inathèque de France. Harki and Pied-Noir websites, discussion forums, and blogs are 
available to the public online and I received additional materials through listservs. I attended 
protests, commemorations, film screenings, and conferences, and I conducted interviews with 
association members, website administrators, memoir writers, and other activists in the memory 
communities. Finally, my research took me to the former locations of two Harkis camps, Bias 
and Rivesaltes, as well as to the Pied-Noir museum and memorial in Perpignan. 
In the Harki section, the first chapter traces the histories of Harki collective memory and 
historiography in the context of French and Algerian memories of the Algerian War. I also 
examine the main subjects of debate in the Harki past and analyze the stakes different groups 
have in how this history is interpreted. The themes of paternal and institutional silence have been 
well established in Harki scholarship. In the second chapter, I analyze the exceptions to first-
generation Harki silence, in the form of association journals and memoirs. I also interrogate how 
the self-identification of second-generation Harkis as “les oubliés de l’histoire” has informed 
their memory work. The third chapter explores the reactions of Harki children to official 
commemorations of the Harki past. I show how they have organized boycotts and hosted their 
own counter-commemorations in order to challenge the state’s focus on the Harkis’ military 
service and to hold the state responsible for its role in the post-independence violence against the 
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Harkis. The fourth chapter analyzes the role of gender in the construction and transmission of 
Harki collective memories. I compare memory narratives communicated by Harki daughters 
through cultural vectors with those found on male dominated websites and discussion forums. I 
show that they disagree on two key historical questions: how to interpret the French colonial 
project in Algeria and the Harkis’ motivations for siding with the French during the Algerian 
War. The fifth chapter studies how Harki children have employed cyber carriers of memory to 
contest narratives constructed by other Harki descendants and those outside their community. I 
highlight the intra-communal memory disputes that are revealed and even exacerbated through 
this medium.   
The first Pied-Noir chapter constructs a history of Pied-Noir memory practices since their 
arrival in France and details the historiography of this group within the context of evolving 
attitudes towards the colonial period. I identify the dominant themes and narratives they have 
transmitted through cultural and organizational vectors and examine how they have constructed 
their identity in reaction to other groups in French society. The next chapter in this section traces 
the evolutions in Pied-Noir commemorative practices. I concentrate on the memory work of the 
Cercle Algérianiste, the largest Pied-Noir association and the founder of two of the most 
important Pied-Noir monuments: the reconstructed Sidi-Ferruch memorial and the Mur des 
Disparus. I argue that members of the Cercle have adapted the focus of their commemorations to 
reflect the current politics of memory, which reward positions of victimhood, and to facilitate the 
inter-generational transmission of memory. This chapter also describes the ways in which Pieds-
Noirs have employed websites as a new memory technology. The final chapter is a case study of 
the Cercle Algérianiste’s Centre de Documentation des Français d’Algérie, which is the only 
museum site in France devoted entirely to the colonial past. I analyze the narratives presented in 
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the CDDFA and the functions this institution serves for their memory community. I show that 
even as they try to preserve their historical and cultural differences, the Pieds-Noirs who 
constructed this museum are ultimately seeking acceptance of their past from the rest of French 
society.  
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CHAPTER 1: MAKING SENSE OF THE HARKI PAST: HARKI HISTORY, 
COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND HISTORIOGRAPHY 1954-2013
1
 
Since 1962, different groups with competing motivations, concerns, and perspectives 
have written about the history of the Harkis. In this chapter, I analyze the changing ways in 
which various historians, the French and Algerian states, participants in the Algerian War, 
Harkis, and their descendants have ascribed meaning to the Harki past. This chapter is divided 
into two parts. In the first, I present the interrelated histories of French and Algerian national 
memories of the Algerian War, Harki collective memory practices, and Harki historiography 
through three main phases. I focus in particular on sources of silence and what they signify. 
Historian Michel-Rolph Trouillot has observed, “Silences enter the process of historical 
production at four crucial moments: the moment of fact creation (the making of sources); the 
moment of fact assembly (the making of archives); the moment of fact retrieval (the making of 
narratives); and the moment of retrospective significance (the making of history in the final 
instance).”2 The Harki past has been silenced, with varying degrees of intention, at each stage of 
the historical process. This chapter details how Harki memory practices emerged in the context 
of these historical silences. It also explores the difficulties of narrating Harki history in the face 
of limited sources and an absence of personal memories due to trauma. 
The second section of the chapter presents the main areas of historical contention 
involving the Harkis and their descendants. These issues are often tied to larger debates about the 
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colonial past, including the paradox of French Muslim de jure and de facto rights, the unique 
status of French Algeria, and the violent nature of the Algerian War. I analyze what is at stake in 
these disputes, why they persist, and, since the past is re-constructed based on the concerns of the 
present,
3
 what they reveal about the continuing significance of the colonial legacy. Although 
revisiting the past, particularly a traumatic one, can be divisive, these debates ultimately 
constitute conversations about how to assign meaning to shared events and are part of the normal 
social process of coming to terms with the past. 
Phases of Harki Historiography 
1960s – 1970s  
For the first thirty years following the Algerian War, the French pursued a policy of 
“active forgetting” regarding the conflict.4  The purpose of a national collective memory is to 
unite a country around a shared, and often celebratory, interpretation of the past. The Algerian 
War had ended in a costly and embarrassing defeat for the French, and a large part of the French 
population came to think of the conflict as a disaster. Moreover, leaders did not want to 
jeopardize France’s new economic and diplomatic relations with its former colonies by narrating 
or commemorating the history of colonialism. Thus the French state preferred to avoid the 
subject entirely. French citizens, including the Harkis, other former participants in the war, and 
historians generally followed suit. Pieds-Noirs constituted the notable exceptions, as they 
publicly mourned the loss of French Algeria. 
French silence extended to the level of scholarship on the Harkis, a group whose history 
was particularly problematic to narrate. The Harkis were emblematic of the disastrous and 
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divisive war, having made the “choice” to fight and defend the colonial regime. To say there 
were no academic studies on the Harkis during this time would be an exaggeration; there were, 
for example, some psychologists who studied the effects of trauma among the Harkis.
5
 
Nonetheless, the perceived absence of scholarly interest in the Harkis was so pronounced that it 
earned the Harkis the label of “those who have been forgotten by History.”6 Chapter 2 of this 
dissertation explores how the perception of Harki children that they and their parents had been 
forgotten, or ignored, shaped their collective identity and memory work.
7
 
Harkis and their wives had their own reasons for remaining silent, both in public and at 
home, about their past. Sociologists and other scholars have since argued that due to the trauma 
of the conflict, as well as a sense of guilt over its consequences for their families, most Harkis 
did not transmit memories of the war and their migration to France to their children.
8
 As a result, 
many sons and daughters of Harkis grew up with a fundamental lack of understanding of what 
had occurred, why they were in France, and why their family’s past constituted a source of 
shame. Harkis and their wives also generally avoided discussing their experiences in public 
because they wanted to integrate into French society, not draw attention to their role in the war. 
Many, particularly the wives, lacked the education and French language skills necessary to 
express themselves, even if they had wanted to.
 
 Thus, there was no Harki collective memory to 
speak of at this time. Yet, not all Harkis stayed entirely silent about the past. In Chapter 2, I 
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analyze the memory narratives of Saïd Ferdi and Brahim Sadouni,
9
 who published memoirs in 
the 1980s, and the Harkis who participated in the Union Nationale des Anciens Combattants 
Français de Confession Islamique (UNACFCI) association. I show that these Harkis engaged 
with the past in fragmented, and often individualized, ways. 
In Algeria, the post-independence regime likewise avoided critical historical engagement 
with the war, so as to promote national unity. Rather than opting for silence, however, the 
Algerian state mythologized the event.
10
 Lydia Saadi-Bouras’s analysis of Algerian textbooks 
has revealed “the Algerian school discourse transforms and reduces all of national history to an 
epic saga of the resistance against colonial forces that followed one another in Algeria, papering 
over every trace of fratricide and the unsettling struggles that might tear the nation apart.”11 This 
heroic narrative had the dual functions of legitimizing the FLN government and creating the 
foundation for a strong national identity.
12
 As evidence of the fratricide of the war, the Harkis 
posed a challenge to the narrative of national unity through their very existence. Therefore the 
Harkis were presented simply as traitors and collaborators who did not belong to the national 
community.
13
 In order to avoid reanimating tensions, scholars have generally shied away from 
exploring the extent to which Algerians supported the French.
14
 Specialists certainly have not 
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addressed the violence exacted on the Harkis immediately following independence.
15
 The power 
of the “traitor” narrative was such that in post-independence Algeria, former independence 
fighters became a privileged elite, while the Harkis and their descendants who remained in 
Algeria were marginalized in society.
16
 
Mid-1970s – early 1990s 
In 1974 and 1975, second generation Harkis drew French attention to the situation of the 
Harkis through protests and hunger strikes. Their immediate aim was to force the closure of the 
last Harki camps. This they accomplished. They were also, however, seeking to break the silence 
surrounding the Harki past. Scholars have documented a causal relationship between paternal 
silence at home, institutional silence in public, and the second-generation Harkis’ move to 
activism in the mid-1970s.
17
 In Chapter 2, I use the concept of “postmemory” to explore how 
Harki children inherited the weight of the Harki past without the “content,” or specific 
narratives.
18
 Harki success in raising national consciousness of their situation earned this period 
of protest the label of “Harki Spring.”19 Harki children continued these efforts in 1991 with 
another round of protests, or “revolts against oblivion.”20 Another way in which second 
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generation Harkis addressed the gap in knowledge about the Harkis was by producing their own 
scholarly works. In the 1980s and 90s, several Harki children completed theses, and later 
published manuscripts, in the fields of history and sociology.
21
 These second-generation Harki 
scholars were particularly interested in the Harki camps and the integration of Harkis in France, 
which had been formative experiences for them.
22
 
Although France remained quiet about the war, the protests prompted some official 
gestures towards the Harkis. The French state awarded the same veteran rights to Harkis as those 
enjoyed by French soldiers from the Algerian War, and also provided financial assistance to 
some Harki families.
23
 Increased awareness of the Harkis and their descendants also led to more 
scholarly interest in the group, particularly about the second generation and the integration 
challenges they faced. Joining these scholars in writing about and publishing on the Harkis were 
military officers who had led them during the war and had helped protect them in the 
aftermath.
24
 These men were mostly interested in documenting the Harkis’ abandonment by the 
French Army. This betrayal echoed one felt by many officers who believed the French had won 
the war on the battlefield, only to be defeated in the political arena. Most scholars, however, still 
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did not engage to a large extent with the Algerian War and the events that brought the Harkis to 
France and to the camps. In Algeria, the status of the mythologized narrative of the war remained 
essentially the same during this time. 
Late 1990s – 2013  
Since the late 1990s, important social and political developments in France and Algeria 
have prompted both countries to confront and engage more fully with the history of the Algerian 
War. In Algeria, the Civil War of the 1990s weakened the FLN’s authority, and, as a 
consequence, fractured the FLN’s memory hegemony. New dissident narratives of Algerian 
history have emerged, along with increased opportunities for historical research and more space 
for debate about the Harkis in Algeria. The FLN, though, still controls the national narrative.
25
 
The Harkis’ marginalized status in Algerian society was reaffirmed in 1999 when a legal 
measure was passed that excluded those who did not have a “patriotic attitude” during the war of 
independence from certain jobs.
26
 Then, in 2001, Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika 
compared the Harkis to Nazi collaborators and asserted that they were still not welcome to 
return. This comment sparked outrage among Harkis and their descendants and led to an 
intervention on their behalf by French President Jacques Chirac. The Harki question became a 
central issue in Franco-Algerian relations, and in 2005 Bouteflika altered his position toward the 
Harkis, saying, “We have committed errors with regard to the Harkis’ families and relations and 
did not exhibit good sense.”27 Despite both Bouteflika’s retraction and the growing pluralism of 
memory in Algeria, however, the Harkis remain marginalized in the official historical record. 
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In France, a number of different factors, including the opening of the archives concerning 
the Algerian War, the trial of Maurice Papon, who had been Paris Police Chief at the time of the 
conflict, and the public admission of General Aussaresses that he had tortured suspected 
supporters of the FLN during the war, combined to break the official silence about the colonial 
past in the 1990s. In 1999, the French National Assembly officially recognized the conflict as a 
“war,” whereas before it had been referred to as “events” or “police operations” as a way to 
delegitimize the independence movement.
28
 The French state also made commemorative 
overtures to the Harkis, whose history now appears in middle and high school textbooks—albeit 
in a distorted and fragmentary form.
29
 In 2001 the state formally recognized the Harkis’ 
contributions during the Algerian War in the form of a plaque in the Invalides in Paris, a speech 
by French President Jacques Chirac honoring the Harkis’ service and sacrifices, and a national 
day of remembrance, September 25
th
, which has since become an annual 
commemoration.
30
 Many Harki children remain dissatisfied with these gestures because they did 
not acknowledge France’s responsibility for its role in the post-independence violence.31 In 
Chapter 3 I analyze how second-generation Harkis have protested against and boycotted official 
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commemorations that recognize only the Harkis’ status as soldiers. They seek instead an official 
apology and a law that would establish the Harkis as victims of the French state and protect them 
against defamation.
32
 
New interest in the colonial past has also translated into additional scholarly attention 
toward the Harkis. Second-generation Harkis continue to lead the charge in expanding our 
understanding of Harki history. The experiences of Harkis and their descendants in France, 
including the effects of paternal and institutional silences of processes of identification, 
collective memory formation, and integration, have been especially well documented.
33
 
Narrating the history of the Harkis in Algeria has remained more controversial, as the next 
section of this chapter will explore.  
Since the 1990s, groups with a stake in the colonial past have begun to challenge the 
French policy of “deliberate forgetting” by engaging in their own memory practices: observing 
public commemorations, constructing monuments, publishing testimonies, participating in 
memorial associations, etc. France’s inability, or unwillingness, to deal with its colonial legacy 
had made it difficult for descendants of colonial subjects to find a place in French society. Harki 
children have developed a particularly active memory community to compensate for these 
challenges to integration. In the absence of a family memory for many and an official history of 
the Harkis, second-generation Harkis have sought to construct a collective understanding of the 
past. Like other groups in France, they have created lieux de mémoire, literal or figurative places 
in which to invest their emotions. They have put plaques at the sites of former Harki camps and 
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have contributed to the construction of a permanent exhibition in the town of Ongles, where 
there had been a sizeable Harki settlement, making it the first Harki museum.  
Harki children have also published over a dozen novels, memoirs, and films, and created 
more than twenty websites to transmit their narratives of the past. Daughters of Harkis have 
become particularly influential architects of Harki memory and public representatives of Harkis 
and their descendants, having published the majority of the texts.
34
 These Harki daughters are 
well known in France, as their works have received significant media coverage.
35
 This 
predominance of female authors marks a shift from earlier periods of activism, including during 
the protests in the mid-1970s and early 1990s, when women held fewer leadership roles. Like 
these protests, such texts constituted a reaction to the silence of Harki fathers. Many of these 
works explore the central question about the Harkis: Why did these French of Algerian origin 
cooperate with the French in a conflict, which, in retrospect, most French and Algerians see as 
“wrong”? By investigating their father’s motivations, these daughters have provided 
explanations and justifications even when their fathers could not or would not. Through the 
individual narratives presented in their texts, most authors exonerate the Harkis of the “traitor” 
charge by arguing that they had no agency, that they were forced to fight for France in order to 
protect their families, and/or that they had also, at one time or another, supported the Algerian 
independence cause.  
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My dissertation contributes to research on Harki collective memory by identifying and 
analyzing significant debates among Harki children about how to interpret the Harki past. In 
Chapter 4, I show that rather than constituting a unified memory community, Harkis have been 
divided over key historical questions. My project is also the first to explore how Harki children, 
particularly their sons, have employed “cyber” carriers of memory to construct and transmit 
competing memory narratives. I argue that whereas Harki daughters’ memoirs present the Harkis 
as victims of France’s exploitative regime in Algeria and appeal to Algerian immigrants to 
France as joint victims of colonialism, websites managed by Harki sons portray the Harkis as 
defenders of French Republican values in French Algeria and situate them within a French 
tradition of military commemoration. Chapter 5 also analyzes the ways in which Harki children 
have used the Internet to challenge non-Harki interpretations of their past. 
In contrast to the earlier colonial “amnesia,” then, historians have argued that the colonial 
past has become “completely visible and recurrent in the heart of French society.”36 Some 
scholars and politicians, particularly those who employ the paradigm of “memory wars,” fear the 
effects of the proliferation of colonial memories on the social fabric of the Republic. They 
perceive in competing expressions of collective memory a potential fracture of the Republic into 
different communities of interest. The history of Harki collective memories, however, suggests 
an alternative trend: Harki children are seeking a place for themselves in the national 
imagination. Their memory practices are often aimed toward highlighting shared experiences and 
creating a sense of belonging either with other French of Algerian origin. Thus, contrary to 
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current fears about the divisive effects of engagements with France’s colonial past, such 
practices indicate a profound desire for inclusion in French society.  
Debates Within Harki Historiography 
Who are the Harkis? 
The meaning of the term “Harki” has changed over time. Today, Harki can be applied to 
any Frenchman of North African origin seen as having been complicit with the French regime, 
including drafted recruits (drawn from the small portion of the population that had full French 
citizenship), career officers, elected representatives, civil servants, and veterans. This term has 
even been extended to their spouses and children, although “Harki” remains a primarily male-
coded category. Their association to this male figure thus defines wives and daughters of Harkis. 
At the time of the Algerian War, by contrast, “Harki” had a far more specific meaning; the label 
was used to designate the largest of four groups of auxiliaries, each of which performed a variety 
of different functions for the French Army.
37
 
The Harkis were temporary formations of civilian auxiliaries who were attached to an 
army unit for the purpose of aiding in “order maintenance operations,” which was how the 
French referred to the Algerian War until 1999.
38
 The second group, the Groupes mobiles de 
protection rurale (GMPR), were nicknamed the “police du bled,” and they were civil units 
charged with helping keep order in rural zones.
39
 The Moghaznis, the third group, aided the 
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Sections Administratives Spécialisées (SAS), organizations charged with the task of “re-
establishing a direct link to the population […] by way of social action: opening schools, 
hospitals, and construction sites”40 and “demonstrating France’s benevolence.”41 This was the 
only group that engaged with and helped promote the ideology of French Algeria. The final 
group, the Groupes d’autodéfense (GAD), were formed in regions where the armed branch of the 
FLN had a strong presence and were made up of entire villages charged with informing the 
French Army about rebel movements. Nearly all of these individuals were volunteers, except for 
the leaders. Few were armed. 
The auxiliaries had a tenuous relationship with the French Army—one that is not always 
conveyed in discussions of the Harkis.
42
 As Stora explains, “They were in the service of the army 
without being in the interior of the army.”43 Although the organization of the auxiliaries 
resembled a military structure, they retained a civilian status.
44
 The Harkis were essentially 
laborers for the army. If they were injured, for example, their compensation would fall under the 
category of a “work accident.”45 Some auxiliaries signed contracts with the Army on a day-to-
day basis. Several Harkis have since explained that they saw themselves as laborers, rather than 
soldiers, but it is difficult to gauge the extent to which other Harkis felt this way during the 
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war.
46
 Also, the Harkis’ loyalty was never entirely trusted, as officers were suspicious of their 
political commitments. French soldiers thought the auxiliaries might betray France by running to 
the FLN with their weapons.
47
 Some Harkis did switch sides; it is hard to estimate how many, 
but historians have documented that movements of people and resources between the groups 
were not uncommon.
48
 As a result, the auxiliaries were often inadequately armed, particularly the 
members of the GAD. 
Given their wide variety of experiences and informal attachment to the Army, it is 
unlikely that the auxiliaries possessed any sense of collective identity during the war. Following 
Algerian independence, when the violent reprisals began and the French left them behind, the 
Harkis united around a shared experience of persecution and exclusion. Other Algerians and 
French did not tailor their attitudes or conduct based on the specific function an auxiliary 
performed during the war. This moment is when the Harki label took on its larger sense.
49
 In 
fact, the term “Harki” is usually only applied to the auxiliaries who fled to France and the paths 
of those who remained in Algeria do not feature centrally in Harki narratives. Harki children 
memory activists usually do not make a distinction between different types of auxiliaries because 
the global term is effective for forming a collective memory and mobilizing around shared 
causes. Memoirs and novels, however, demonstrate the wide diversity of experiences and 
functions of the Harkis during the war.  
There is also an important historiographical debate about whether a particular group of 
French of North African origin who worked for the French Army in mainland France belongs 
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under the category of “Harki.” The Auxiliary Police Force (FPA) was created in late 1959 to 
help combat the FLN’s influence in Paris. Recruited from Algeria, they performed “important 
reconnaissance work by infiltrating Muslim areas.”50 These FPA became known for their 
“volatile brutality” for several reasons.51 The context of a “veritable urban guerilla” conflict in 
Paris was particularly violent.
52
 Officers encouraged “a culture of brutality since the utilization 
of ‘native’ soldiers, with a reputation for savagery, had long been an instrument of divide and 
rule, as well as of punitive terror, in colonial armies,”53 and they “constituted a kind of quasi-
autonomous unit that operated outside the normal hierarchical control of the main police force 
and the checks and balances that operated to ensure some degree of restraint and 
accountability.”54 
Were members of the FPA “Harkis”? The answer to this multifaceted question depends 
on which scholar one asks. Hamoumou refers to the “Harkis de Paris” and House and MacMaster 
also identify them as Harkis, but Manceron asserts the term “Harki” was “improperly but 
commonly employed to designate members of the FPA.”55 The FPA do not usually appear in 
works by Harkis and their children. This is probably partly because after the war, they were 
integrated into the Paris police force
56
 and faced no violent reprisals or abandonment, 
foundational events for Harki collective identity. Another possibility is that their omission in 
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Harki accounts is deliberate because of their reputation for brutality, which has had a significant 
impact on public perception of the Harkis. This absence would then demonstrate that the authors 
are constructing the past with a French audience in mind. The first time many French 
encountered the term “Harki” was in relation to the FPA and some in the metropolis had 
witnessed their violence first hand.
57
 House and MacMaster note that “numerous letters of 
complaint and petitions” about the brutality of the Harki patrol officers exist in the historical 
archives.
58
 Manceron argues that this perception of the Harkis, colored by the actions of the FPA, 
prevented the development of sympathy in France for the violent reprisals the Harkis faced in 
Algeria.
59
 In general, works that are critical of the Harkis are more likely to stress their active 
participation in the war, including their complicity in acts of torture, while the memory narratives 
of Harkis and their children include very few incidents of Harkis committing violence. 
Between the shifting meaning of the term “Harki,” the debates about who should be 
included, and the auxiliaries’ exterior status in the Army, it is difficult to determine how many 
Harkis there were during the war. Historians’ estimations range from 200,000 to 500,000.60 
Harki numbers have been widely disputed. Partisans of French Algeria present a high number of 
Harkis, as doing so suggests widespread support for the former colonial regime. Harki activists 
likewise employ a high figure to demonstrate that they were not part of a small, marginalized 
group who supported the French, and thus should not be easily dismissed today. The Algerian 
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57 
state, however, advances the much lower figure of 125,000 pro-French auxiliaries in total, and 
depicts the Harkis as a minority of mainly of urban, westernized elites, who were politically 
invested in French Algeria.
61
 Incidentally, this argument is belied by the fact that while the four 
groups of auxiliary troops came from a variety of backgrounds, the majority were from rural 
areas, (where the FLN had the strongest influence), illiterate, and non-francophone.
62
 
Why did Harkis support the French Army? 
The question of the Harkis’ motivations for “enlistment” is the keystone to most memory 
narratives. No one was born a Harki; individuals became a member of this disenfranchised, 
heterogeneous group through their support of France. The Harki identity is thus tied to the 
question of why they fought alongside the French. The motivations of individual Harkis are 
largely inaccessible to historians, due to a lack of written sources and the Harkis’ hesitancy to 
speak about their past. For these reasons, the Harkis’ intentions have been the source of great 
debate. From 1962 until the 1990s, the most common explanation for the Harkis’ participation in 
the war was that they had acted out of a patriotic attachment to France.
63
 This explanation 
coincided with the French use of the Harkis during the war as a political weapon to undermine 
the FLN’s argument that Algerians wanted independence, even if the Harkis’ officers doubted 
their loyalty. Pieds-Noirs have likewise presented Harkis as evidence that colonial Algeria was 
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not an oppressive place for French Muslims. Officers who rescued and advocated for Harkis 
have cited the Harkis’ patriotic motivations to make the case that they deserved better treatment 
in France and recognition for their service.
64
  
Historian François-Xavier Hautreux has argued, however, that considering the 
backgrounds of auxiliaries, the majority of whom were poor, non-francophone peasants from 
rural areas with only a rather vague notion of “France,” it is unlikely that political ideology was 
indeed a main factor for the Harkis.
65
 Historians Mohand Hamoumou and Abderahmen Moumen 
agree, arguing that while political ideology may have been a strong motivating factor for 
members of a Westernized elite (functionaries, career soldiers, notables, and caïds—local leaders 
who worked with the French) or former soldiers, it could not be a determining factor for the 
majority of the auxiliaries.
66
 Although the argument that Harkis were motivated by patriotic 
attachment has generally fallen out of favor, it still appears on Harki websites, where some Harki 
children argue that since “Algeria was France” until 1962, the Harkis were in fact loyal to their 
state. This explanation helps to combat accusations that the Harkis had betrayed their nation by 
fighting for the French.
67
 
In the late 1990s, due to the changing memorial climate in France, scholars began to 
reexamine the war based on additional sources that had previously been unavailable. Their 
efforts to better understand wartime experiences and practices, including the extent of the 
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violence committed against civilians, produced two new interpretations of the Harkis’ 
motivations.
68
 These projects are controversial because they draw attention to the atrocities 
committed by both the FLN and the French state. The first reason, enlistments in response to 
FLN violence, is currently considered to be the principal factor. Hamoumou and Moumen 
explain that the FLN employed terror as a means of imposing itself as the only representative of 
the Algerian people. We know now that local FLN leaders killed more Muslim civilians than did 
French military officers.
69
 As Hamoumou and Moumen underscore, “In this context, the majority 
of harkis and moghaznis became so in order to flee the terror of the FLN, in order to protect 
themselves and defend their families.”70 Hamoumou and Moumen have argued that many former 
auxiliaries were not necessarily against Algerian independence. Thousands of men fought first 
for the FLN and then became Harkis because they refused to participate in violent attacks against 
Muslim civilians or Europeans.
71
  
The second explanation was that some enlistments were forced or brought about through 
“pressures” applied by the French Army. Hamoumou and Moumen explain that as Army officers 
tried to gain control over the rural Algerian population and to limit the FLN’s influence, they 
used psychological tactics, including propaganda sessions in the villages. They also rounded up 
certain Muslims in positions of authority, intending to compromise and thus condemn them in 
the eyes of the FLN. Less commonly, Harkis were recruited through physical or psychological 
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coercion, in the face of threats of retaliation against their family,
72
 imprisonment and even 
death.
73
 
In the 1990s, economic factors emerged as an additional explanation for the Harkis’ 
enlistment. As Hamoumou and Moumen explain, “The extremely difficult living conditions in 
the Algerian countryside, with a high unemployment rate, lands often arid and insufficient for 
feeding the whole family properly, could have prompted certain Muslims to enlist as 
auxiliaries.”74 This explanation, however, remains problematic. An oral study that these 
historians carried out among hundreds of former auxiliaries in the hopes of distinguishing a main 
motivating factor found that enlistment for economic reasons was the most rare.
75
 
Scholars have recently introduced an additional, culturally specific motivation: family or 
clan solidarity as an incentive for enlistment. Hautreux has explained that since the community is 
privileged over the individual in Algerian society, “enlistment can be understood as a collective 
action subject in part to the decision of a recognized familial authority figure.”76 Hamoumou and 
Moumen have added that “Obligations of loyalty encouraged the enlistment of entire families, 
and even entire villages or tribes, when one of its members were assassinated or when the head 
of the family, or village, or tribe, enlisted against the FLN.”77 These cultural limitations on the 
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Harkis’ agency call into question whether we can consider particular Harkis as having made a 
decision to support France. 
Memoirs, novels, and films have been able to explore the Harkis’ motivations on an 
individual level. Works of Harki literature tend to highlight the diversity of experiences during 
the war, and of the motivations behind enlistment, many of which were not patriotic. These texts 
complicate earlier understandings of Harkis by providing the justification that Harkis were trying 
to protect their families from the threat of violence. Some Harki fathers in the texts explain that 
they were actually in favor of independence, but against the methods the FLN employed to 
achieve this goal and a few confess to having originally fought with the FLN or even to have 
aided the FLN while they were auxiliaries. Memoir writers are responding to the exclusion they 
felt as children of traitors; their texts can be interpreted as attempts to frame the past in a way 
that eliminates former grounds for Harki exclusion, and as indications of a desire to become 
closer to Algerians in France. 
Why were the Harkis left in Algeria? 
On March 19, 1962, the Evian Accords, which marked the end of the conflict and 
signaled Algeria independence, went into effect. As the French planned the withdrawal of their 
forces, the decree of March 20, 1962 stated the Harkis were to be offered three options: enlist in 
the French Army,
78
 return to civilian life with a bonus, or take a six-month provisional contract 
as part of the local forces that were being formed.
79
 Vincent Crapanzano has observed that 
around 1,500 auxiliaries opted for the first choice, while the “vast majority” took the second 
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option, “which they were often encouraged to do by their officers.”80 The Army disarmed the 
Harkis before leaving, which left them defenseless against the impending threat of reprisals.  
This is a controversial and significant moment in Harki history for several reasons. From 
a historiographical perspective, it has been difficult to document French conduct towards the 
Harkis and to evaluate their motivations. We do not know whether, and in how many cases, the 
three choices were proposed to the Harkis or, for that matter, whether the Harkis understood the 
options they were given.
81
 Several Harkis testify to simply waking up one morning, finding the 
barracks empty and discovering that French troops had left with all of their weapons. Even if the 
stipulations of the decree of March 20 were clearly communicated, scholars generally agree that 
the French plan for the repatriation of the Harkis and their families was rather limited and 
constraining. Historian Gilles Manceron has argued that because of the Harkis’ civilian status 
and their informal attachment to the Army, they simply were not eligible for the types of 
evacuation procedures and protection normally given to soldiers.
82
 As Besnaci-Lancou and 
Moumen explain, “Not having military status, they had to be returned to civilian life, disarmed 
and sent back to their homes.”83 
The plan’s restrictions may also be explained by the fact that French authorities 
underestimated the risk that the Harkis faced by remaining in Algeria.
84
 They expected that 
Article X of the Evian Accords, which stipulated that the Harkis would not face reprisals for 
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their support of France, would be enforced.
85
 There is also evidence that the Harkis themselves 
did not realize the extent of the threat against them.
86
 Moumen has argued that most Harkis did 
not want to leave Algeria, their families, and their livelihoods for France, especially because they 
seemed unaware of the danger they faced.
87
 The main archival source that documents the 
violence against the Harkis indicates that the Algerian government reassured the Harkis that no 
harm would come to them.
88
 Even when Pierre Messmer (Secretary of the Army) and Louis Joxe 
(in charge of Algerian Affairs) were made aware of the scope of the violence against the Harkis, 
however, they did not revise their plan. On May 12, 1962, Messmer sent a telegram sanctioning 
officers who had taken it upon themselves to evacuate groups of Harkis to France. On the same 
day, Joxe gave an order to send back to Algeria “any auxiliaries who arrived outside the general 
repatriation plan.”89 Repeated restrictions, expulsions, and interdictions, then, suggest that 
authorities sought to prevent the arrival of too many Harkis and their relatives in France. 
The next line of investigation, then, has been to explore why the French Administration 
wanted to limit the number of Harkis who came to France. Historian Benjamin Stora has argued 
that the French were afraid that if the Harkis came to France, then they might turn against the 
Army and join the OAS (the Organisation de l’Armée Secrète, a French terrorist organization 
committed to keeping Algeria French).
90
 In May of 1962, the newspapers Le Figaro and Le 
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Monde both published articles suggesting that Harkis in the metropole would likely support the 
OAS’s position against the French government.91 As Crapanzano has observed, “Clearly, other 
factors—race, ethnicity, cultural difference—were also at play since, if the OAS were to find 
support in France, it would surely have been from among the pieds-noirs,” whose arrival was not 
restricted.
92
  Even if this threat had little basis in reality, as Besnaci-Lancou and Moumen have 
argued,
93
 it reinforced earlier mistrust of the Harkis and their motivations during the war. 
Another explanation is that French authorities wanted to avoid a massive installation of 
Harkis because the Administration was already inundated by the logistical challenges posed by 
the arrival of one million Pieds-Noirs in the metropolis. This interpretation draws attention to the 
subordinate status of French Muslims, which contrasted with French republican values.
94
 Todd 
Shepard has explained, “in 1962 the Algerians were French in law (droit), but, in all other 
domains, the vast majority of them were treated and represented differently and worse than their 
co-citizens. In the case of the Harkis, this tension between the ‘legal’ and the ‘real’ was 
particularly accentuated.”95 Pieds-Noirs were welcomed and provided for upon arrival, while 
“the government took measures to bar access to the metropole for French Muslim citizens from 
Algeria.”96 Through these actions, the French state made it clear that French citizenship was 
defined by religion and race, which it had denied while Algeria was part of France. 
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In the realm of memory, the question of why France left the Harkis has been posed in 
terms of “abandonment.” Claims that “France abandoned the Harkis,” made by some former 
French officers, supporters of French Algeria, and Harki children, indicate that France failed to 
satisfy its moral obligations towards these auxiliaries. In Chapter 3 I show how the notion that 
Harkis were victims of France’s neglected responsibilities has become central to Harki identity 
and collective memory practices. Associations of first-generation Harkis and their children have 
begun commemorating May 12, the day when Messmer and Joxe sent orders to prevent Harkis 
from entering France, as the “Day of the Harki Abandonment.”97 In 2013, this date was marked 
by a march of approximately one hundred fifty Harkis and their families, demanding official 
French recognition of the role the French played in the violence that followed by disarming the 
Harkis and preventing their departure to France.  
What was the extent of the violent reprisals against the Harkis? 
Scholars have found the history of post-independence violence against the Harkis and 
their families uniquely challenging to write. Whereas there has been a growing scholarly interest 
in French colonial violence, including three episodes related to the Algerian War, the 1945 
massacres of Muslims at Sétif, the 1961 killings of Algerian protestors by Paris police, and the 
1962 attack on protestors at the Charonne metro stop in Paris,
98
 the extended violence against the 
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Harkis has not received the same level of scholarly attention.
99
 This historiographical gap can be 
explained by a significant lack of sources. Historians trying to construct a narrative of the 
violence have been forced to rely heavily on the only reliable archival document, a subprefect’s 
account of the killings in one of Algeria’s seventy-two districts. More potential archival sources 
are being made available in France, but access to any relevant records in Algeria remains barred. 
The main sources of information on the violence are eyewitness accounts given by French 
military officers and Harkis themselves, of which there are few since this violence initially 
produced a form of traumatic silence.
100
  
The main sources of uncertainty and debate revolve around the scope of the violence, 
including casualty figures, and determining responsibilities.
101
 Historian Guy Pervillé has argued 
that the number of Harkis and their families killed during this period of reprisal violence is the 
most uncertain figure in the history of the Algerian War.
102
 Since we do not know exactly how 
many auxiliaries fought for France, and as anyone who supported the French in a civil capacity 
or who was related to a Harki constituted a potential victim, it is impossible to calculate how 
many people may have been targeted for their supposed Harki status or association to a Harki. 
We also cannot determine how many likely targets of violence simply settled into life in a new, 
independent Algeria. As Manceron explains, “the great majority of those who were, at one 
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moment or another, employed as auxiliaries during the war continued to live in Algeria, 
integrating into social life, avoiding being designated by the stigmatizing term of ‘Harkis.’”103 
 Historians’ inability to document the casualties has left the topic open to disputes and 
polemics.
104
 In November 1962, journalist Jean Lacouture provided an initial estimate based on 
official French sources of 10,000, which he then revised to 100,000 in 2001.
105
 Benjamin Stora 
has advanced the conservative estimate of 10,000 to 25,000 casualties,
106
 while historians 
generally agree that it is probably closer to 75,000.
107
 Some Harki activists, who seek material 
and symbolic reparations from the French state, have argued the figure is nearly 150,000.
108
  
Another important historiographical question, raised by historian Sylvie Thénault, is 
whether the violence constitutes a single massacre or multiple events—the “Harki massacre” or 
“massacres of Harkis.”109 The notion of a “Harki massacre” as a single historical event emerged 
around 2001, when Harki children began to demand public recognition of the violence they 
experienced. Eyewitness accounts, however, suggest that attacks were sporadic, inconsistent, and 
varied widely according to the region.
110
 The severity and scope of the threats that the Harkis 
faced depended on the social and political dynamics in each individual village and changed over 
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time.
111
 Moreover, Harki experiences of violent reprisals varied wildly: whereas some Harkis 
and their families do not report witnessing acts of violence, others describe in graphic detail acts 
of an exceptionally atrocious nature. It seems, therefore, that understanding the violence in terms 
of a plurality of massacres is more appropriate. For Harki activists, however, it remains useful to 
speak in terms of a collective, shared event. 
A final contested issue revolves around identifying the perpetrators of violence, and thus 
assigning responsibility for the massacres. In their accounts of the war, many Harkis describe 
their perpetrators as neighbors or acquaintances, revealing the local and personal qualities of this 
violence. To what extent were the attacks centrally organized, and thus state supported? It is not 
clear whether the order to kill the Harkis came directly from the FLN government, which had 
signed and publicly backed Article X of the Evian Accords. At the very least, it appears that 
authorities enabled the massacres by encouraging lists of auxiliaries to be drawn up and placing 
Harkis under surveillance at the end of the war.
112
 The exact role of the Algerian state probably 
changed over time as successive FLN leaders gained power and as the Algerian government 
went through phases of upheaval and stability.
113
 Most likely, individuals and groups, motivated 
by hate or vengeance, took advantage of a period of political anarchy following independence to 
carry out violence.
114
 Historians have argued that rogue members of the independence 
movement, who joined late and were anxious to prove their commitment to the cause, were 
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among the main perpetrators.
115
 The Algerian government has supported this argument because 
it shifts blame off of the FLN and is less threatening to their heroic narrative of the independence 
struggle. The extent to which France can be considered responsible for the scope of the violence, 
for not intervening and preventing those threatened from escaping to France, has been disputed. 
When Messmer and Joxe received accounts of the violence from French Army officers, they 
gave orders not to increase tensions between France and Algeria by getting involved with 
“internal affairs” of the new Algerian state.116  
The period of post-independence violence against the Harkis is a significant event in the 
collective memories of Harkis and their families. Commemorating the Harki massacre, or the 
“Harki genocide,” as some Harki children refer to it, establishes their status as victims, rather 
than traitors. Moreover, the pursuit of French recognition for their role in the violence has 
become a central, uniting cause for Harki children. In 2001, a coalition of fifty associations, led 
mainly by Harki sons, pursued a legal case against France for having committed a “crime against 
humanity.”117 Whereas Harki children had previously focused on the injustice of the internment 
camps in their protests, Harki associations have since claimed that their only demand is for 
France to acknowledge its role in the post-independence violence.
118
 While both Nicolas Sarkozy 
and François Hollande promised during their presidential campaigns to recognize France’s 
responsibility, neither have done so in their capacity as head of the French state. 
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The French state’s public recognition of its role in the Harki massacres would situate the 
Harkis within the national historical narrative, giving them a symbolic place in the national 
imagination. Their desire for this status motivates Harki children to place responsibility on the 
French and seek retribution from the French state, rather than the Algerians, who were the direct 
perpetrators of the violence.
119
 Paradoxically, their charges against France indicate their 
attachment to French society, as the social context in which they recall this memory. Focusing on 
the responsibility of the French, as opposed to that of the Algerians who did the killing, can also 
act to bring the populations of Algerian origin in France together. It provides a basis for 
reconciling with Algerian immigrants, who have also experienced discrimination and injustice 
from the French state. In Chapter 3 I explore this “multidirectional” aim of some Harki memory 
work. 
Why were the Harkis and their families put in camps? 
Historians estimate that sixty to eighty-eight thousand Harkis and their families fled to 
France in total, with approximately twenty-five thousand arriving through government 
repatriation plans.
120
 The rest escaped through their own means or with the aid of sympathetic 
military officers and were either set up in communities near the officers, who could assist them, 
or integrated individually into different regions of France.
121
 Most of those who arrived through 
official channels were placed in transit camps. A tradition had developed over the twentieth 
century, or what Denis Peschanski has called the “century of camps,”122 for the French state to 
use camps to manage populations it did not know how to integrate into mainstream society. The 
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Rivesaltes camp, for example, was created as a solution to dealing with “undesirable foreigners” 
in 1939 and had housed refugees from the Spanish Civil War, French Jews in World War II and 
members of the FLN captured in France before the Harkis arrived in 1962.
123
 The French had 
also employed camps on a massive scale during the Algerian War as part of a plan designed to 
disrupt FLN support and supply networks.  
Conditions in the Harki camps varied, but were often appalling, partly due to the fact that 
even with the restrictive repatriation policies, the number of arrivals far exceeded expectations 
and preparations. The camps were intended as a temporary measure for managing the installation 
of the Harkis and their families. They remained open much longer than expected, however, due 
to logistical challenges in finding places for the Harkis to live and work. Certain prefects in 
regions with high percentages of Algerian immigrants did not want Harkis to reside there 
because they feared this would cause conflicts. Additionally, some employers were reluctant to 
hire the Harkis, and there was a substantial housing shortage in France. Thus, many Harkis and 
their families stayed in the camps until 1975, when the protests by second-generation Harkis 
prompted the French state to close them. Since they had been isolated from the French 
population for over a decade, many Harki families found it difficult to integrate into French 
society. This process was especially challenging for Harki wives who did not work outside the 
home or attend school, given that they had fewer occasions to leave the camps than their 
husbands or children. 
Why did the French consider the Harkis a population that needed to be managed in 
camps? The auxiliaries had supported the French Army in Algeria and had French citizenship, 
yet were housed behind barbed wire, were subject to a military lifestyle with strict discipline, and 
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could not leave without permission.
124
 The French state has argued these camps provided a 
means of protecting the Harkis and their families from potential reprisals from Algerians living 
in France. There were a few incidents in the first few years following independence, but not 
enough to justify continued use of the camps. Historians have argued that placing Harkis in 
camps enabled the French state to hide them from public view, and thus calm fears of local 
populations who did not want a mass of migrants from Algeria living nearby,
125
 as well as to 
avoid reminding French citizens of the divisive Algerian War,
126
 and to control them from 
potentially joining the OAS.
127
  
Historians have considered the implications of the Harki camps for understanding the 
French state’s attitude towards French Muslims at the moment of decolonization. As Jeanette 
Miller has asked, “What does their decision to put Harkis in the camp[s] indicate about their 
conception of this population as repatriates and French citizens?”128 The Harkis and their 
families were officially considered repatriates (rapatriés),
129
 but the way they were treated 
contradicts this status.
130
 It has been debated whether the Harkis were actually imagined as 
refugees, and handled as though they were fleeing their Algerian homeland, rather than returning 
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to France.
131
 If we compare the French state’s treatment of Harkis and Pieds-Noirs at the end of 
the war, it becomes clear that religion and race formed the basis for discrimination and 
geographic exclusion. A certain “hierarchization of populations” is revealed through strikingly 
different conditions of arrival.
132
 Priority was given to finding and constructing housing for 
Pieds-Noirs,
133
 who, it was believed, would be easier to integrate into French society. Moreover, 
the Harkis had to verify their French nationality with the French Administration,
134
 whereas 
citizenship was automatically confirmed for Pieds-Noirs. Moumen, Besnaci-Lancou, and others 
have noted that a colonial dynamic was recreated in the camps, which were run by former Army 
officers and Pieds-Noirs, who supposedly were more familiar with Muslim culture and might 
have spoken Arabic.
135
 
Most Harkis and their children never lived in the camps and the experiences of those who 
did varied significantly according to how long they were there and what conditions they faced.
136
 
A shared sense of injustice over the existence of these camps, however, has become a defining 
feature in their collective memories. The Harki camps contribute to a shared narrative of 
victimhood and serve as another example of France’s failed moral obligations to the Harkis. The 
term “camps” is powerful, as it calls to mind other persecuted populations, and garners sympathy 
for their past. In their mid-1970s and early 1990s protests and elsewhere, second-generation 
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Harkis have referred to them as “concentration camps” or “ghettos” to accentuate this parallel.137 
The ways that Harki children evoke memories of the Holocaust to frame their own narratives, a 
practice of “multidirectional” memory, is further explored in Chapter 3. The sites of former 
camps have become important lieux de mémoire and Harki associations organize visits there to 
commemorate this period of their history.
138
  
Conclusions 
Exploring this set of questions about the Harki past reminds us that the history of the 
Harkis, and the Algerian War more generally, remains highly contested. Silences about the 
Harkis have occurred at every level of historical production. Even as awareness of the Harkis and 
their descendants grows in France, historians often lack the sources necessary for constructing 
narratives and historical understanding, and thus leave parts of this past open to speculation. In 
this context, Harki memory work takes on extra importance. Harki memoirs, associations, and 
websites address subjects that historians often cannot. They respond to the absence of a wealth of 
individual memories, particularly those of Harki wives, and offer a potential basis for collective 
memory. Works of Harki literature present a diversity of experiences, which are meant to combat 
prejudices about Harkis’ motivations and simplified versions of Harki history. Associations and 
websites offer a different view on the Harki past by representing their collective history. All of 
their memory memory narratives constitute interventions in historiographical debates and 
reactions to the sense of exclusion Harkis and their children have experienced in France and 
Algeria. By responding to French interest in the Harki past, Harki memory work reveals a desire 
to carve out a place in France for the Harkis and their families.  
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CHAPTER 2: “LES OUBLIÉS DE L’HISTOIRE”: HARKIS, TRANSMISSION, AND 
THE GENERATION OF POSTMEMORY, 1962-1990S 
 This chapter analyzes the roots and emergence of Harki collective memory. The protests 
of 1975 and 1991, which first drew French public attention to the plight of the Harkis, also 
constituted the Harkis’ first concerted engagement with their shared past. As Claire Eldridge has 
observed, in contrast to the case of the Pieds-Noirs, “there was neither initial outpouring of 
memoirs nor any politicized collective mobilization from the harki population. Instead, it took 
over a decade and the emergence of a new generation for this silence to be definitively broken.”1 
The protests also marked the first time that the Harkis and their families understood themselves 
as a collectivity and identified on a national scale.
2
 Indeed, it was during the 1991 revolt that 
descendants of Harkis affirmed the name “Harki” and “claimed it as a rallying call.”3 
 Participants and scholars have framed the 1975 and 1991 protests as “revolts against 
oblivion.”4 These demonstrations, and subsequent forms of second-generation activism, have 
been interpreted as responses to the paternal and institutional silences that have enveloped the 
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Harki past.
5
 Political scientist Johann Michel has explained, “In the absence of responses from 
the central government, resentment and bitterness have carried even more radically and violently 
among the children of Harkis, while the fathers have often tended, out of trauma or shame, to 
withdraw into silence.”6 Stéphanie Abrial has agreed that the second-generation Harkis’ actions 
reflected their frustration at institutional silence: “The violence they use is a mirror image of the 
tensions felt with the absence of recognition, from France, of their fathers’ history.”7 Mohand 
Kara, a second-generation Harki, focused on paternal silence as the cause for his generation’s 
activism in his work: “the more the parents have not talked…the more the son today rebels.”8  
The lack of transmission within Harki families, which I contextualized in Chapter 1, has 
been well documented by scholars.
9
 Yet the first generation’s silence about the past was not 
complete. Since the early 1970s, Harkis had created and participated in their own associations. 
Two Harkis, Saïd Ferdi and Brahim Sadouni,
10
 published memoirs in the 1980s and two others, 
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Messaoud Kafi and Abdallah Krouk, did the same in 2009 and 2010.
11
 These sources constitute 
an important component of early Harki collective memory, yet they have not received the 
attention they deserve in Harki scholarship. Even Vincent Crapanzano, who has conducted a 
number of interviews with first-generation Harkis, does not analyze their memory practices and 
narratives between the 1970s and 90s. In the first section of this chapter I outline the context of 
this memory work and in the second, I analyze these exceptions to the rule of silence. I explore 
how first-generation Harki memoir writers and participants in the Union Nationale des Anciens 
Combattants Français de Confession Islamique (UNACFCI) engaged with the past. I also 
consider how the memories expressed through these organizational and cultural carriers have 
influenced the ways in which Harki children have constructed their collective memories. 
 In their fragmented, individualized approaches to the past, these sources reveal a lack of 
consensus on the central question in Harki history: why the Harkis supported France. The 
UNACFCI’s association journal, Français Musulman, included the voices of French army 
officers, politicians, and Pieds-Noirs, who all highlighted the Harkis’ ideological commitment to 
French Algeria and their subsequent sacrifices. Harki themselves in the association were more 
critical of the decision, in light of the rejection they had experienced in France. The four memoir 
writers offer a different perspective on the Algerian War than the Harkis who participated in the 
UNACFCI. The memoir authors were all young Harkis—at the start of the war in 1954, Ferdi 
was ten years old, Kafi was eleven, Sadouni was twelve, and Krouk was twenty-two—and three 
of them were underage when they “enlisted.” Their age may account for why they felt 
comfortable sharing their experiences. As children, or young men, drawn into the war, they cut 
sympathetic figures. Moreover, in their texts, they all minimized their own participation in the 
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violence. It may have been that they were not commanded to perform the most despised tasks, 
including translating during interrogations, due to their youth, or perhaps they chose, whether 
consciously or not, to leave out these aspects of their tenure as Harkis. Harki memoir writers 
most often demonstrated a lack of political motivations, or even of agency to make a choice, and 
many expressed regret with this “decision” that landed them in France. Their position on the 
question of the Harkis’ motivations in many ways resembles that of Harki daughters, whose 
memoirs I explore in Chapter 4. The texts by these young Harki memoir writers, then, serve as a 
bridge between the works of first and second-generation architects of Harki memory. The lack of 
consensus among the Harkis themselves, the historical actors at the center of this identity, has 
translated into debates and even memory conflicts, which I present in Chapter 4, as Harki 
children have attempted to make sense of their shared past. 
In the third section of this chapter, I explore why second-generation Harkis have, since 
1975, understood themselves and their families as “les oubliés de l’histoire,”12 those who have 
been forgotten by history.
13
 Scholars have used this label as well, without critically engaging 
with its significance. I argue that this (self-) designation has served three functions for the Harki 
community. First, in declaring the specificity of their past, it has enabled Harkis to distinguish 
themselves, and their place in French society, from that of Algerian immigrants. Second, it fits 
with the narrative that they have constructed of their parents as victims of France’s failed 
obligations towards its citizens. Lastly, as a shared cause, it has effectively united the Harki 
children in the face of their vastly different personal experiences. 
                                                 
12
 Besnaci-Lancou and Moumen, Les Harkis, 77; Eldridge, “We’ve Never Had a Voice,” 89; Moumen, Les Français 
Musulmans, 17; Michel Roux, Les Harkis, ou, Les oubliés de l’histoire (Paris: Editions La Découverte, 1991). 
 
13
 This expression could also be translated as “the forgotten ones of history” or “history’s forgotten people.” 
79 
Historical Context 
The memory work of the Harkis and their children must be situated in the context of the 
evolving place of North Africans in French society. In the immediate aftermath of the Algerian 
War, an influx of Algerian migrant workers arrived in France. At this time France was 
experiencing a period of steady economic growth. Algerians took profited from the liberal 
migration laws outlined by the Evian Accords in 1962 to pursue economic opportunities in 
France, while French industries profited from this source of cheap labor.
14
 As a result, over 
400,000 Algerians came to work in France in the first three years following Algerian 
independence.
15
  
This mutually beneficial arrangement halted following the economic crisis and global 
recession of the early 1970s. Persistent unemployment led to anti-immigrant sentiment, and anti-
Arab racism, among out-of-work French who were frustrated at having to compete with 
foreigners for jobs.  The 1970s were also marked by a steep increase in anti-Algerian violence in 
France.
16
 As a result of this violence, France closed its borders to additional migrant workers in 
early 1974. At the same time, the state implemented family reunification policies that enabled 
workers who were already in France to bring their families from Algeria. This change led to new 
forms of anti-immigrant racism as it became clear that immigrants were settling down more 
permanantely in France.
17
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The Harkis were likewise targeted during this period of anti-Algerian sentiment, despite 
being French citizens.
18
 French of European origin, who either did not know of the Harkis’ 
particular history or did not care, discriminated against them on the basis of their race and 
religion. Régis Pierret has observed that, “North African origin is lived as a barrier that racism 
makes uncrossable. The color of the skin, the first name and the family name are identity 
markers.”19 Yet, while they experienced the same forms of exclusion in France, immigrant 
workers actually enjoyed more employment opportunities than the Harkis, many of whom had 
been isolated in the camps and had not received training, as the immigrants had.
20
   
Sung Choi has observed that during this moment of heightened anti-immigrant feeling, 
the French state began to implement programs aimed at promoting the status of Harkis over 
immigrant workers.
21
 Harkis were awarded official veteran status, with all of the rights and 
benefits that this status accords, in November of 1974. In addition, prefects received directives 
stipulating that “there should be no difference between rights accorded to the harkis and to 
metropolitan French [nationals].”22 While they demonstrated a degree of French attention 
towards the Harkis, these measures did not eliminate the significant difficulties Harkis and their 
families faced in securing lodging and employment. It is important to note, however, that “Even 
as officials promoted the harkis, and made much of their French status, they showed little interest 
in dismantling the camps. Instead, the emphasis on the citizenship of the harkis served mainly to 
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disparage other Algerian immigrants.”23 Stéphanie Abrial has likewise identified a lack of 
genuine concern for the Harkis’ situation in the state’s gestures towards them. For her, the period 
of 1973 to 1979 highlighted the significant discrepancies between these gestures and the material 
needs of the Harkis and their families.
24
 
These measures also did not reduce tensions between Algerian immigrants and Harkis. In 
the decade following the Algerian War, the conflict was still fresh in the minds of the 
participants. Michel Roux has argued, moreover, “If the extreme proximity between migrants 
and auxiliaries stricken by marginalization and exclusion theoretically incites solidarity, it in fact 
exacerbates rivalries.”25 Harkis resented what they saw as the privileged employment status of 
immigrant workers. Roux quotes one Harki activist as proclaiming, “You say that we are French 
and yet you confuse us with Algerian workers, those of the FLN, our former enemies, who are 
treated better today than we are.”26 Another point of contention centered on the question of the 
“right of return” to Algeria, also known as “free circulation” between the countries. Several 
Harkis had attempted to return to Algeria in the 1970s, but most were refused entry. Their French 
passports marked them out as Harkis.
27
 Pierret has argued that this experience of being rejected 
at the border symbolized the Harki’s “banishment” from Algerian society, since he could no 
longer return to his land of origin.
28
 Immigrants, with their Algerian passports and French work 
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permits, were allowed to move freely, including with their families after the reunification policy 
that was implemented in 1975, between the two countries. 
At this historical moment, Harki children erupted in protest. Their activism began with a 
series of hunger strikes in 1974. Then, in April and May of 1975, Harki children occupied two 
camps—Bias and Saint-Maurice l’Ardoise. On June 19 the movement turned more violent as 
protestors took two secretaries and the director of the Saint-Maurice l’Ardoise camp hostage. 
This phase of the revolt clearly constituted a reaction to the Harkis’ isolation in the camps and 
their lack of integration into French society.
29
 The next period of the movement was aimed at 
attracting the attention of the Algerian state. On August 6, Harki children abducted four Algerian 
workers after they heard that the son of a Harki had been detained in Algeria.
30
 Ten days later 
other protestors kidnapped the secretary of the Amicale des Algériens en Europe. Through this 
act, second-generation Harkis were demanding that their fathers be able to return to Algeria.
31
 
Manifestations of Harkis and their children continued into the next year. Their efforts were, in 
large part, successful. They raised awareness of their situation,
32
 the camps were closed the 
following year, and the state created a ministerial position, the Secrétariat d’Etat Chargé des 
Rapatriés, filled by Raymond Courrière, to assume responsibility for their affairs.
33
 The Harkis 
have still not, however, been awarded the “right of return” in Algeria. 
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When President François Mitterrand was elected in 1981, his socialist government 
implemented a multicultural integration policy aimed at combating anti-Arab racism and anti-
Muslim discrimination. By affirming immigrants’ “right to be different,” immigrants would be 
allowed to integrate into French society without renouncing their specific cultural heritages.
34
 
This policy extended to the Harkis. Rather than insisting on a one-size-fits-all policy for 
rapatriés, a status that the Harkis and their families shared with Pieds-Noirs, Courrière 
proclaimed the Harkis’ “Right to be considered as a citizen equal to others, a citizen who has a 
particular culture, a particular religion, a particular past, but who is a French citizen.”35  
The rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen’s far-right party, the Front National, in the mid-1980s 
marked the failure of Mitterrand’s approach to immigration and cultural reform. Le Pen’s 
blatantly racist, anti-immigrant stances appeared to resonate with French of European origin who 
ascribed to a singular, unitary republican vision of French culture and who preferred an 
assimilationist approach to immigration. Rather than carving out a place for immigrants in 
French society and identity, then, affirming their difference seemed to further isolate them. In 
response, the state stressed the value of the republican ideal, arguing that anyone who 
highlighted distinctions between French citizens, including groups representing immigrant 
interests, was, in effect, strengthening the Front National. 
It was during the period of Mitterand’s “droit à la différence” policy and Le Pen’s 
challenges to it that second-generation Harkis and Algerian immigrants were most closely 
allied.
36
 After the son of a Harki was injured by police in 1983, six Harki children and four 
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immigrant youths united around a common cause and organized a “March for equality and 
against racism.”37 The protestors began in Marseille and six weeks later arrived in Paris, where 
60,000 people gathered for a demonstration. The March was successful for the children of North 
African immigrants, who acquired a more secure citizenship status as a result. Harki children, 
however, did not obtain any particular measures in favor of their community. The protest can 
even be considered a failure for second-generation Harkis since, following the March, they were 
equated with second-generation immigrants and their specificity was denied.
38
 While it was the 
Harki children who took the initiaive in organizing the March, it has since become known as the 
“Beur March,” after the slang term for North African immigrants in France.39 The period of 
rapprochement appears to have ended shortly after the event.  
During the 1991 Harki protests, which began in the cité des Oliviers in Narbonne and 
spread throughout the south of France, Harki children asserted both their specificity from 
Algerian immigrants and their desire to integrate into French society. During this series of 
demonstrations, second-generation Harkis, the majority of whom had been born in France, 
occupied the town hall of Saint-Laurent-des-Arbres, the town where the Saint-Maurice l’Ardoise 
camp was located, and the Direction Départmentale du Travail et de l’Emploi in Carcassonne.40 
They sought to bring attention to the Harkis’ continued exclusion from French society, despite 
their special historical relationship to France. Their efforts were rewarded in 1994 when the 
French state passed a law stipulating, “The French Republic shows its recognition toward the 
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repatriated former members of the auxiliary forces, assimilated or victims of captivity in Algeria, 
for the sacrifices they bestowed.”41 It was accompanied by financial compensation for those who 
had been held prisoner in Algeria following the war because of their status as Harkis. 
First Generation Memories 
“We have recently been reunited and, of course, we talked about the past, about everything we 
have lost and haven't found again.”42 
 
 The phenomenon of paternal silence has constituted a main focus of studies on the 
Harkis. The “deafening silence” described by Mohamed Kara, appears to have been pervasive 
among Harki families.
43
 Scholars have identified a number of reasons for this refusal to discuss 
the past. Harkis may have felt guilty about any violence they had committed during the war or 
ashamed of their failure to protect their families from the exactions of the FLN and/or the French 
army and their forced exile in France. Harkis may also have preferred not to make waves in 
France, where most people wanted to forget the Algerian War, by bringing up the divisive 
conflict. Some scholars have explained their silence as a product of Algerian masculinity. 
Vincent Crapanzano has argued, “The Harki’s silence is, perhaps, the one token of masculinity 
they would not lose. Silence before hardship is a masculine virtue among traditional Algerians. It 
is one of the characteristics of sabr- one their most important values. Sabr is usually translated as 
patience, perserverance, forbearance, or endurance, but can also mean “resignation,” 
“submission,” and even “renunciation.”44 This idea is supported by research demonstrating that 
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fathers who fought for the FLN likewise refused to discuss the past.
45
 In spite of these reasons 
for silence in the familial sphere, there were some Harkis who wished to discuss the past 
publically, either by participating in associations with fellow Harkis or through publishing 
memoirs about their personal experiences. This chapter identifies some of the ways in which 
these Harkis constructed and transmitted their memories. 
Associations of rapatriés from Algeria were formed immediately upon their arrival in 
France, as the rapatriés quickly realized the necessity of organizings themselves in order to 
defend their collective rights.
46
 These associations, the most famous of which were the 
Association Nationale des Français d’Afrique du Nord, d’Outre-Mer, et leus amis 
(ANFANOMA) and the Front National des Rapatriés (FNR), were created in order to address the 
practical concerns of the entire repatriated population. Yet, they were overwhelmingly led and 
dominated by Pieds-Noirs. While the organizations recognized and concerned themselves with 
the problems of “our Muslim brothers,” it was clear that the Harkis constituted a distinct subset 
among this group, distinguished by their religion and ethnic origin.  
The Harkis therefore decided, in the early 1970s, to form their own organizations that 
would focus on the specific challenges they faced. This occurred at the moment of increased 
racism in France, which had highlighted the difficulties of Harki integration. Most of the early 
Harki associations did not publish journals and many disappeared by the end of the 1970s. The 
number of associations grew exponentially, however, following the rise in collective 
consciousness prompted by the 1975 protests and with the participation of second-generation 
Harkis in these groups. “Although there were only forty such associations in 1973, by 1991 up to 
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400 were believed to exist and the most recent surveys put the total at over 540. This new-found 
visibility has been overwhelmingly inspired and led by the second generation.”47 Indeed, second-
generation Harkis carried out a veritable “revolution” in the Harki associative movement. Yet the 
proliferation of associations also highlights some of the main challenges that the Harki 
community has faced in its activism: “the heterogeneity and incapacity of repatriated French 
Muslims to steadfastly unite in the defense of a cause.”48 
Since this chapter explores the first generation’s memory practices, it focuses on one of 
the earliest associations, the Union Nationale des Anciens Combattants Français de Confession 
Islamique (UNACFCI), which was created in 1973
49
 and had approximately one hundred 
members at its inception.
50
 A former French army captain of North African origin, Rabah 
Kheliff, headed this organization.
51
 As such, the UNACFCI has maintained close ties to former 
veterans’ associations and reflected, to a large extent, the ideology of the French army.52 Yet, it 
also sought to promote a particularly French Muslim culture, as the name of its journal, Français 
Musulman, indicates. While the ideas expressed by one association cannot be considered 
representative of the Harki organizations at this time, its journal offers a glimpse into how some 
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first-generation Harkis identified themselves, what they were concerned with, and how they 
understood the past. 
As I demonstrated in Chapter 1, the question of the Harkis’ motivations for supporting 
the French army has become the linchpin of Harki history. Did the Harkis make a deliberate 
choice to help maintain French Algeria? Chapter 4 demonstrates how Harki sons and daughters 
have been divided over how to interpret the Harkis’ decision. Among the Harkis themselves, 
there was a similar lack of consensus. The spectrum of positions on this question ranged from an 
affirmation of the Harkis’ ideological commitment to France, expressed in the Français 
Musulman journal, to repeated declarations of sympathy for the nationalist movement and anti-
colonialist sentiments in Ferdi’s memoir. On the whole, these Harkis appeared generally 
ambivalent about their “choice,” particularly in light of the consequences of this decision for 
themselves and their families.  
It is unsurprising that the UNACFCI, with its close ties to other associations of veterans, 
asserted the position that the French state and army supported, which was that the Harkis acted 
out of patriotic attachment to France. They expressed this view through republishing statements 
by veterans, Pieds-Noirs, and French politicians. For example, they cited a speech by Defense 
Minister Charles Henru in 1984 in which he declared, “I'm thinking in particular of those 
Muslims who have made the most difficult choice, the one to stay loyal to France.”53 In 1984, 
then Prime Minister Jacques Chirac stated, “We are, indeed, determined to ensure our fellow 
citizens from Overseas territories, who have made their choice, in order and security, their future 
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in France, a France that, without them, would be far from what it is today.”54 He went on, as 
President of the Republic, to institute the National Day of Homage to the Harkis in 2001. 
Raymond Courrière, likewise observed, “During Algerian independence, the Harkis chose 
France as their homeland.” Yet, he also pointed out, “Back in metropolitan France, these 60,000 
Frenchmen have most often been forgotten and disadvantaged.”55 
When the Harkis themselves raised the question of their motivations in Français 
Musulman, it was always in response to an experience of discrimination in France. Interestingly 
enough, France’s injustices towards the Harkis prompted both affirmation and questioning of 
their decision. The president of the UNACFCI, Rabah Kheliff, declared in 1985, “As for French 
Muslim veterans from North Africa, everybody recognizes their sacrifice. I will simply say that 
these dark skinned Frenchmen paid very dearly and keep paying for their engagement with to 
serve France. […] This Homeland that they chose despite all oppositon, often with tears and 
blood.”56 The specific trigger of this affirmation of French loyalty and sacrifice was an attempt 
by “some people, more stupid than racist, who would like to forbid them the right to practice the 
religion in which they were raised and that France has always respected.”57 In this way, Kheliff 
invoked the Harkis’ ideological commitment in order to support their right to have their cultural 
differences respected.  
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Yet the association’s position on the question was not unequivocal. In early 1986, when 
discussing the problems of unemployment and other challenges facing the second generation, 
Kheliff expressed some ambivalence about the Harkis’ decision, as he noted that some Harki 
children “reproach their parents for having served France.”58 Another article, published in 1983, 
explored the “paradox” of being both French and Muslim. In light of French injustices towards 
the Harkis, including “discrimination in hiring; almost total indifference by the media; 
permanent hypocrisy in the manipulation of the electoral cattle that we are; segregation in 
housing; educational segregation that leads our youth to a deliberate under-education; permanent 
racism and insecurity,” the author questioned his own decision. “If it had to be done again, I 
would do it again... Not so sure! What use is an unconditional patriotism in the face of almost 
total ingratitude?”59 
The UNACFCI generally approached the question of the Harkis’ motivations by speaking 
about the Harkis as a collectivity. The memoirs, however, reveal the diverse set of conditions 
that framed individual Harkis’ decisions. A common thread through these texts is that none of 
the memoir authors expressed a clear ideological commitment to French Algeria. Brahim 
Sadouni declared that he was “too young to understand and get involved in politics”60 and that he 
“remained ignorant of all the reasons for the war.”61 Abdallah Krouk, the oldest of the memoir 
writers, had enlisted in the French army at age twenty, two years before the Algerian War began. 
In his memoir, though, Krouk did not identify any patriotic motivations for this action. Saïd 
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Ferdi actually expressed clear anti-colonial sentiments. He described how, in school, “We read 
poems that we had written ourselves and that evoked the liberation of our land and the necessity 
for our people to take charge of their own destiny.”62 Two of his brothers fought for the FLN. 
Ferdi recounts how father explained “that it was normal for each family to participate in this 
fight if we wanted to be free [...] It was better that they defend a fair cause by helping the 
revolutionaries.”63  
Two of the memoir writers presented economic motivations for joining the French side in 
the conflict. Sadouni explained that he ended up as a Harki because he took a job fixing vehicles 
for the French army when he needed work. He did not consider, or was not aware of, the 
implications of this decision. Messaoud Kafi also attributed his actions to the necessity of finding 
employment. He explained, “Now it was my turn to provide for the family since my father 
couldn’t take it anymore. I had to find a job. Therefore, I introduced myself to the captain who 
was in charge of the military post.”64  
In their texts, the memoir writers identified factors that limited their agency in making 
this “decision.” Sadouni ultimately blamed his actions on fate. In a poem that prefaced his 
memoir, he exclaimed, “I am here, I don't have a choice anymore, I could have gone 
underground, Alas, fate wanted me to be a HARKI!”65 Like Sadouni, Kafi also demonstrated that 
ultimately he was not responsible for this decision. He explained, “I became a harki because my 
father was a harki. If he had fought on the opposite side, I would no doubt have done as he 
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did.”66 His father had not made the decision to fight out of loyalty to France either. He had 
become a Harki because his brother, Kafi’s uncle, registered him without his knowledge, 
“knowing that given a choice, he would have refused.”67 For his part, Ferdi blamed his youth, 
arguing that without maturity, “one cannot choose freely.”68 Ultimately, according to Ferdi, 
people did what they needed to in order to survive during the war. He wrote, “The climate of fear 
in which we lived dictated our actions in this or that direction and it was often the instinct of self-
preservation that reigned over us.”69 
Based on his oral interviews with Harkis, Vincent Crapanzano has observed, “I have 
never met a Harki who admitted that he had made a mistake, although, when I asked Yamina 
whether she thought her father regretted his decision, she reluctantly said yes. The old Harkis, 
however, said stubbornly that they would not hesitate to make the decision again. Most of them 
did add—and quickly—that they were not against Algerian independence, only against the 
FLN.”70 Krouk did not profess regret over his decision, but he did admit, “I have experienced 
doubts, did I make the right choice? […] I was fighting for a country that was mine only through 
annexation, wasn't Algeria my motherland?”71 In this way he showed that he too was not 
necessarily against Algerian independence. Yet his narrative also contained an explicit refusal of 
the FLN’s tactics of violence. When the conflict started, the FLN had targeted Krouk because of 
his service in the French army. He was later offered an opportunity to join the FLN, but he would 
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have had to prove his loyalty by killing a Pied-Noir. When Krouk refused, he and his father were 
condemned to death by the FLN and thus, he declared, “my choice was made.”72  
Sadouni, in contrast, expressed nearly immediate regret at finding himself on the side of 
the French. He confessed, “In this moment of suspense, regret consumed me”73 and he continued 
to question his decision. “After all, wasn't it a bad path that I had taken?”74 Yet when his cousin 
approached him with an offer to join the FLN, he ultimately refused because such a move would 
have required him to betray his French comrades and participate in an attack on the base where 
he was stationed. He declared, “Fully, in body and soul, I was revolted by the idea that I could be 
the instigator of such carnage. How could I live, being responsible for so many deaths, my 
conscience stained with their blood?”75 Thus, while Sadouni was sympathetic to the nationalist 
cause, he too rejected the FLN’s approach. 
Ferdi appeared even less comfortable with his status as a Harki and in fact does not self-
identify as such in his memoir.
76
 The back cover of his text describes him as a “traitor in spite of 
himself.”77 At first he had assisted the FLN as a boy, having been introduced to the local leaders 
through his brothers. In addition to expressing his nationalist sympathy, he described how French 
“savagery” led people to join the FLN.78 In the end, however, he too ultimately rejected the 
FLN’s methods. Ferdi declared, “Of course I wanted freedom for our people, but after realizing 
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what methods the fells were using to be heard and respected, I was sickened and I had absolutely 
no desire to become their accomplice.”79 
The Harki memoir writers conveyed through their narratives that their ability to make a 
choice was constrained by a number of factors during the Algerian War. They ultimately chose 
France not out of patriotic attachment, but rather as the lesser of two evils, taking the path that 
required them to contribute to the least degree in the brutality of the conflict. They also explicitly 
responded to the accusation that they were traitors. Ferdi declared that he never denounced 
anyone to the French.
80
 Sadouni proclaimed, “No doubt, I witnessed fighting, but no one has 
ever killed a man before my eyes. I am not a murderer, believe me!”81 Krouk likewise asserted, 
“As for me, if I participated in actions against the enemies of France, I never accepted missions 
that targeted civilians, like the day when I refused to throw a grenade into a mosque.”82 In this 
way, they revealed themselves to be both victims of the situation and honorable men.  
The question of choice and other engagements with the past were often linked to the 
Harkis’ place in French society. Their ambivalence regarding their decision thus reflected an 
uncertainty over how to position themselves in relation to Algeria, to which many continued to 
profess an attachment, to France, who had offered the Harkis a less than warm welcome, and to 
the influx of Algerian workers who arrived in France following independence.  
The fact that the memoir authors deemphasized their own role in the violence and 
expressed their support for Algerian independence may indicate a desire for reconciliation with 
Algerians. Ferdi stated that he did not hold a grudge, either against Algerians or the French, over 
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what occurred. He explained,  “I would also speak to those who have seemed to me more 
responsible or guilty to tell them that I have no hatred against them. Certainly I condemn their 
actions, their violence, and the injustices they have committed, but I don't hold it against them, 
knowing that they were then oblivious and not responsable.”83 The Harki concern at this time 
with the problem of free circulation likewise demonstrated a continuing attachment to Algeria 
and a desire to be welcomed there.
84
 In Français Musulman, Kheliff declared, “we don't have 
any score to settle, neither with Algeria, nor with Algerians, let that be clear and definitive. 
However, we ask the Algerian rulers, good Muslims as they are, to turn the page, as we ourselves 
did regarding members of the FLN who are well established in France, and to quickly grant free 
movement between France and Algeria to all French Muslims and to all “Pieds-Noirs” no matter 
what their past was during the Algerian War.”85 
Yet for some Harkis, the symbolic, and literal, rejection of Harkis who were denied the 
“right of return” confirmed their break with Algeria. Sadouni decried the “injustice” of the issue 
after he was refused at the border.
86
 Kroux expressed complicated feelings towards “Algeria, this 
beautiful and vast country, the one of my childhood, of my teenage years, of my adult life, the 
one which because of my choices has rejected me, disowned me, sentenced me to death, forced 
me into exile.”87 Moreover, in decrying the violence of the FLN, the Harki memoir writers 
criticized the Algerian government, which had been dominated by the FLN since 1962. 
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The Harkis’ memory narratives also reflected their uncertain place in French society 
during the 1980s. Not only did the memoir writers fail to declare their support for France, they 
also described numerous instances of French brutality during the war. Their focus on their 
abandonment by the French army in Algeria also conveyed their disappointment in and 
frustration with France. Vincent Crapanzano has argued that “as products of colonial paternalism 
as well as the paternalism fostered by the military, the Harkis found themselves particularly 
dependent on the French and, therefore, suffered their abandonment and betrayal with 
exceptional intensity. As they described how they had been sent back to their villages unarmed, 
with a small bonus and the assurance that they had nothing to fear, they could barely contain 
their rage and give adequate expression to their disillusionment.”88 Sadouni expressed this 
disenchantment when he observed following the French army’s withdrawal, “It's a real pity to 
have believed in such a powerful country that preaches liberty and equality transcending narrow-
minded beliefs.”89 Krouk vented similar frustration by wondering, “Have we been used as tissues 
that can be thrown away once used, are we only fit for History's trash?”90 Even in Français 
Musulman, which published articles on the French state’s efforts to aid the Harkis, Kheliff 
catalogued the mistreatment of the Harkis: “In spite of all they have suffered, when they have 
been deceived, betrayed, then abandoned to their sad fate, they have still survived only to better 
love and continue to serve France.”91 It is important to note that the theme of abandonment is 
such “an insistent leitmotif” in Harki narratives because “It also buffers, in complex ways, the 
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subjacent theme of betrayal. They trusted the French, and the French breached that trust as they 
themselves were accused of doing. (It should be remembered that some Harkis betrayed the 
French by secretly abetting the FLN.)”92   
Through Français Musulman, members of the UNACFCI also conveyed a contradictory 
attitude towards Algerian immigrants. During the 1980s, in line with Mitterand’s “droit à la 
différence” policy, the journal proclaimed its Algerian culture and Muslim heritage. As one 
article announced, “The Muslim Community, French by its civil status, in no way renounces its 
ancesters' religion, quite the opposite, it intends to keep its spiritual and moral heritage.”93 Even 
the selection of the name “Français Musulman” as the title of the publication fit with this policy. 
It is one of the many names that the French state used to categorize this population and that the 
Harkis and their families themselves employed before the term “Harki” became widespread 
following the second generation’s 1991 protests.94 Self-identifying as French Muslim brought the 
Harkis closer to Algerian immigrants, who shared the same culture. At times, however, articles 
in the journal asserted their disdain for their fellow French of Algerian origin. One title 
proclaimed, “What Arab junk, these immigrants.”95 Another article, written by an active 
supporter of the Harki cause, André Wormser, affirmed the differences between Harkis and 
immigrants. He declared that his organization, the Comité National pour les Musulmans 
Français, “has strongly stood up, and will continue to do so, against racist and xenophobic 
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intolerance that makes no distinction between those who have chosen our Homeland and the 
foreigners, that judges not by the hearts but by the skin and the hair.”96 
“Les oubliés de l’histoire” 
“We are and always will be those who are forgotten by history.”97 
The second-generation activists who participated in the 1975 and 1991 protests have 
framed their demonstrations as “the Harkis’ emergence from oblivion.”98 As Hacène Arfi, who 
led the occupation of the Saint-Laurent-des-Arbres town hall in 1991 has explained, “We broke 
the wall of silence [surrounding the Harkis].”99 Why did these activists explain their actions 
through a discourse of memory? It is true that before this time, most French citizens were 
unaware of the existence of the Harkis and their suffering. The state, however, was not. The 
measures that they implemented addressing the Harkis’ situation indicated their awareness of the 
Harkis’ plight. I do not wish to challenge the notion that France “forgot” about the Harkis. 
Rather, I want to highlight the fact that second-generation Harkis selected this term because they 
found it an effective way of articulating their grievances. It has enabled Harki children to express 
their desires for inclusion, consideration, and validation without employing a politically sensitive 
language of race or religion. Following the protests, scholars took to labeling the Harkis “les 
oubliés de l’histoire” and it “remains the phrase most frequently employed to describe the harkis, 
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[even if] it is, historiographically speaking, no longer accurate”100 As second-generation activist 
Boussad Azni declared in 2006, “the appellation of ‘oubliés de l'histoire’ sadly remains accurate. 
This psychological dimension is the foundation of our community’s identity.”101 This section 
explores why it has remained synonymous with the Harki community. 
 The timing of the protests offers one key to understanding why protestors and analysts 
have employed a language of memory to describe these events. The first occurred in 1975, at the 
height of anti-immigrant sentiment in France. “Breaking the silence” about the Harki past meant 
insisting on their specificity. By declaring themselves “les oubliés de l’histoire,” Harki children 
distinguished themselves from Algerian immigrants with whom they had been linked, on the 
basis of their race and religion. The next round of protests, in 1991, came in the aftermath of 
Mitterrand’s failed “droit à la difference” policies. While the decade of the 1980s saw some 
solidarity among second-generation Harkis and Algerian immigrants, Harki youth remained 
more disadvantaged in terms of education and employment than their peers of European origin. 
When it became clear that embracing their particular heritage would not lead to acceptance, 
Harki children chose to focus on their unique past. Recognition of their particular history offered 
a way of differentiating themselves once and for all from other French of North African origin.
102
 
We can understand their selection of the term “Harki,” rooted as it was in the Algerian War, as a 
way of deemphasizing their cultural and religious differences in favor of proclaiming their 
historical specificity. 
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Portraying the Harkis as “les oubliés de l’histoire” also helped challenge the notion that 
their fathers were disloyal to their Algerian brothers. The image of “the forgotten ones,” an 
image of victimhood, replaces that of traitors.
103
 First-generation Harkis had deflected 
accusations of their own treachery by depicting France’s behavior towards the Harkis as a 
betrayal. The 1991 protest slogan, “After betrayal, abandonment; after abandonment, exile; after 
exile, oblivion,” reveals how second-generation Harkis framed “oblivion” as a new form of 
treason.
104
 Describing them as “les oubliés de l’histoire” thus fit neatly into a narrative of 
France’s failed obligations to the Harkis. It has also allowed them to make demands, including 
for reparation, from the French state.
105
 Harki children continue to employ this phrase to express 
their disappointment in the French state’s failure to deliver on electoral promises and what they 
perceive as political betrayals. On the website Monharki.com, one article declared, “Harkis, 
neither the right nor the left has resolved the question of these oubliés de l'histoire...” in the lead 
up to the 2012 French presidential election.
106
 Another proclaimed, in reference to Nicolas 
Sarkozy’s un-fulfilled 2007 campaign promise to officially recognize France’s role in the post-
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independence violence against the Harkis, “Harkis, deceived then forgotten in 2007 but 
definitely not in 2012!”107 
 The realm of memory, then, constituted yet another place where the French failed the 
Harkis. As one participant in the 1991 protests explained, “They have stolen our past and our 
memory, France has made us bastards of history.”108 It also, however, provided a way for Harkis 
and their descendants to regain control of their situation. Whereas the first generation had been 
betrayed and subjected to the will of the state, second-generation Harkis could exercise agency 
by “breaking” France’s silence. While Harkis have had reason “to fear the judgment of 
History,”109 Harki children can exonerate their fathers through their memory work and carve out 
for them a dignified place in history. Indeed, their protests have been presented as narratives of 
redemption. Claire Eldridge has written, “Tired of being les oubliés de l’histoire, the children of 
the harkis were determined to gain recognition on behalf of their parents for the sacrifices they 
had made for France and the suffering they had endured as a consequence.”110 Abderahmen 
Moumen, a second-generation Harki, has similarly declared, “The big exploits undertaken by the 
French Muslims, at that time ‘les oubliés de l’histoire’, brought them to the forefront of the 
national stage.”111 Régis Pierret has explained why resisting forgetting has remained such a vital 
task for second-generation Harkis. Their own identity is tied to how the Harkis are remembered. 
As Pierret observes, “Allowing forgetting would mean validating the official versions regarding 
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the harkis, assigning them forever the role of traitors. This designation, besides, is not without 
consequence because it means the children and grandchildren [of harkis] will forever have to 
bear this despised image.”112 
The aim of “preventing forgetting” has also played an essential role in uniting the 
community, which is especially significant given the diversity of second-generation Harki 
experiences. The Harki identity does not reflect an internal “sameness.” It is based on a shared 
past, yet the personal relationships of Harki children to this past varied widely depending on 
whether they experienced the war and whether they were part of the “hinge generation,” those 
Harki children who grew up in the camps.
113
 In her memoir, Harki daughter Zahia Rahmani 
described the differences between her experiences, as a Harki child born in France, and those of 
her older sister, whom she called “a forgotten one. A time bomb. A child of war, timid and 
fearful, suffocated by her desires.”114 Karim Brazi, the son of a Harki, framed his novel as a 
comparison of the lives and opportunities of two Harki sons, one who found it relatively easy to 
integrate in France and the other who was confined to a camp and remained isolated.
115
 Yet, the 
experience of having been “forgotten by history” allows Harki children to rally around a shared 
cause. Their status as victims of France’s neglect strengthens the bonds between members of the 
community. 
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Conclusion: Postmemory 
Marianne Hirsch’s concept of “postmemory” is useful for understanding how the Harki 
past was “transmitted” to Harki children. Hirsch has explained that “Postmemory describes the 
relationship of the second generation to powerful, often traumatic, experiences that preceded 
their births but that were nevertheless transmitted to them so deeply as to seem to constitute 
memories in their own right.”116 Harki children did not receive coherent collective memory 
narratives of the Harki past through the first generation’s organizational and cultural vectors of 
memory, or from official and scholarly carriers, as I demonstrated in Chapter 1. Their fathers 
also did not transmit personal memories within the family sphere. Second-generation Harkis 
nonetheless inherited the weight of this past. As Vincent Crapanzano has phrased it, “They have 
suffered from the consequences of their father’s decision and from the effects of their father’s 
wounds—a silent but emotional transfer—without knowing what they were.”117 The notion of 
“postmemory” helps explain why second-generation Harkis care about the Harki past. They may 
not have experienced the traumatic events, but these events continue to shape their identity. 
There is convincing evidence that second-generation Harkis have been motivated in their 
memory work by the silences of their fathers and the state about the Harki past. It is useful, 
however, to complicate the notion of complete institutional and parental silence before the 
1990s. Examining two sets of sources, Harki association journals and the memoirs of young 
Harkis, reveals that debates about the Harkis’ motivations have a long history in the Harki 
community. It also allows us to consider why it has been useful for the children of Harkis to self-
identify as the victims of these silences. 
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CHAPTER 3: OFFICIAL COMMEMORATIONS AND HARKI RESPONSES, 1990-2013 
The state employs official carriers of memory, including legislation, court cases, 
monuments, ceremonies, and other forms of commemoration, to impose a hegemonic 
interpretation of events of national significance. The purpose of official memory is to reinforce 
the unity of the national community through a shared orientation to past events
1
 and this function 
is particularly essential in the aftermath of defeat.
2
 In the case of the Algerian War, and the 
colonial period more generally, however, the French state has been unable to forge a national 
consensus. Harkis, members of the FLN, drafted soldiers, Pieds-Noirs, former colonial subjects, 
and their descendants have expressed differing perspectives on this period.
3
 Commemorative 
activity has become further politicized as parties on the left and right have aligned with various 
groups and their memorial causes. To some scholars and politicians, especially those who 
privilege a single shared national narrative, this lack of agreement on how to interpret the past 
has indicated a troubling new degree of social polarization in France.
4
 It has also prompted them 
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to employ the “memory wars” paradigm to interpret competing commemorative acts.5 Yet, as 
John Gillis has observed, even when commemorative activities seem consensual, “they are in 
fact the product of processes of intense contest, struggle, and, in some instances, annihilation.”6  
I am the first to study how Harkis and their descendants have responded to official 
commemorations of the Algerian War and to analyze what this reveals about their evolving 
relationship to the national community.
7
 Their reactions are more apparent on Harki websites 
than in other sources.
8
 Indeed, they employ cyber carriers precisely in order to express their lack 
of ideological consensus. It is through these sites that we can observe the extent of their 
resistance and examine how they have used the Internet to publically contest official memory 
practices. The Harkis and their descendants constitute a dispersed community and have restricted 
access to financial and political resources as well as limited visibility in France. The Internet has 
served as an indispensible communication medium for them. They have used the web to organize 
and promote collective action. Cyber carriers have enabled Harkis and their children to 
participate more actively in the process of negotiating a collective memory of the Algerian War. 
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I also examine how and why Harki children have borrowed from French Jewish memory 
narratives and practices when articulating their collective memories. Other scholars, including 
William Cohen and Régis Pierret, have identified some of the parallels that Harkis and their 
descendants have drawn between their own experiences and those of Jews during the Holocaust.
9
 
I argue that these multidirectional invocations have proved most productive for Harkis and their 
children in understanding and constructing their relationship to the French state. Their actions fit 
within a larger pattern of cross-referencing in the histories of Holocaust and colonial memories 
that Michael Rothberg has observed.
10
 The case of the Harkis seems to confirm “the rhetorical 
and cultural intimacy of [these] seemingly opposed traditions of remembrance.”11  
This chapter explores state commemorations and Harki reactions to them in a 
chronological fashion. In the first section, I analyze the state’s attempts during the 1990s to 
celebrate the Harkis’ military service to France. This interpretation of the Harkis’ place in French 
history corresponded with the French republican memorial model, in which citizens were 
honored for their sacrifices to the nation.
12
 This designation, however, did not accurately reflect 
the Harkis’ status during the war or their motivations for supporting the French, and did not meet 
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the needs of their community. Second-generation Harkis have instead positioned themselves and 
their fathers within a competing memory model in France, a “victim-memorial regime,” in which 
groups are memorialized as the nation’s victims.13 This commemorative framework emerged 
during the 1970s to 1990s as French Jews prompted the state to engage with its complicity in the 
Holocaust. The historian Serge Barcellini has described a commemorative shift from honoring 
“those who died for France” to “those who died because of France.”14 The status of French Jews 
as victims of the state provided them with political and social capital that they could leverage for 
material and symbolic concessions. This model has appealed to the Harkis and their children, 
who have felt that they have been isolated, rejected, and “forgotten” by the rest of the French. 
Instances of Harki multidirectional memory began in the 1975 protests, during which activists 
used the platform of Holocaust memory to articulate their experiences of suffering. In particular, 
they drew comparisons between the camps Harkis had been relegated to by the French and the 
Nazi concentration camps. 
The second section details a crimes against humanity case that a group of second-
generation Harkis filed in 2001 against France for its role in the post-independence reprisal 
violence against the Harkis and their families. This case occurred in the context of France 
bringing perpetrators to justice for WWII crimes. It demonstrates how second-generation Harki 
activists have positioned the Harkis within the republic. I argue that, paradoxically, their charges 
against France, as opposed to against the Algerians who did the killing, indicate their attachment 
to French society. At the same time, focusing on the responsibility of the French provided a 
potential basis for reconciling with Algerian immigrants, who have also experienced 
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discrimination and injustice from the French state. In addition, the crimes against humanity case 
points to an evolution in how Harki children have framed their memory practices. After this 
point, second-generation Harkis focused their activism on the post-independence violence 
against the Harkis and on France’s neglected responsibilities that led to this tragedy. The case 
constituted the first time that they had presented the violence as a collective, shared event. It 
broadened the Harki identity to include not just the men who supported France during the 
Algerian War, but all who were threatened in the aftermath. This shift has carved out a larger 
place for Harki wives and daughters in their collective memory narratives and commemorative 
practices. Some second-generation Harkis also began to employ the term “genocide” during the 
case. Framing the violence as such solidified their victim status and buffered against accusations 
that Harkis were “traitors.” In sum, this case was designed to afford the community a dignified 
place in French society.  
In the third section I analyze the French state’s attempts to establish a hegemonic national 
narrative of French Algeria and the Algerian War in the first decade of the 21
st
 century. Their 
efforts to create annual commemorations for the Harkis and veterans of the Algerian War as well 
as the infamous 2005 law designed to impose a normative, positive interpretation of colonialism 
have met with considerable resistance in France. The polemics that these projects, and this last 
endeavor in particular, have sparked have prompted some scholars to employ the “memory wars” 
paradigm. Yet this paradigm cannot explain the Harkis’ reactions. It is more useful instead to 
think in terms of shifting memorial affiliations. With respect to commemorating March 19
th
 as 
the end of the war, Harkis and their descendants have been united with Pieds-Noirs, the right, 
and far-right in opposition to this date. Scholars have positioned them the same way for the 2005 
law, yet they have been among the most outspoken against the law, which has created a 
109 
foundation for solidarity with colonial subjects and the left.
15
 These incidents reveal how the 
Harkis and their families do not fit neatly into political struggles over commemoration.   
The final section explores how Harki children have responded to what they see as the 
continued failure of the French state to officially acknowledge the Harki massacres and to 
apologize for France’s role in this violence. While French presidents Nicolas Sarkozy and 
François Hollande each promised to do just this during their respective campaigns, second-
generation Harkis have spoken out in newspapers and on websites and have organized boycotts 
of the annual commemoration for Harkis to express their frustration that these promises have not 
been satisfactorily fulfilled. They have also organized their own counter-commemoration on 
May 12
th
, the day in 1962 on which Pierre Messmer, then Secretary of the Army, sent an order to 
prevent French officers from helping the Harkis escape to France. This commemoration 
conflates France’s original betrayal in abandoning the Harkis with the continuing lack of apology 
for this treachery and has evolved from an intimate, solemn event in 2010 to a mass protest in 
central Paris in 2013. The Harkis’ quest for recognition and official apology from France serves 
as the main unifying cause for their community. Ultimately, Harki resistance to official 
commemoration has been designed to ensure their understanding of their place in France is 
reflected in this commemoration.  
Official Memories of the Holocaust and the Harkis, 1970s-1990s 
 During the 1970s to 90s, Jewish memory of WWII in France underwent an “awakening,” 
as Henry Rousso has described it.
16
 While the French state had emphasized a collective narrative 
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of resistance to Nazi Occupation in the immediate postwar period, French Jews sought to hold 
the state accountable for its role in the Holocaust. They also challenged the republican model of 
a single shared national memory by proclaiming their right to express their own particular 
collective memory, which they called their devoir de mémoire, and to form their own memory 
community. In a sense, this move fractured the national narrative and changed the relationship 
between citizen and nation, but it also ensured their memory was not annihilated. Since they 
focused on France’s responsibility, their memory work ultimately affirmed their attachment to 
France. 
 The efforts of French Jews produced a number of commemorative measures in their favor. 
In addition to constructing monuments and plaques around France, the state enacted the Gayssot 
Law in 1990, which prohibited Holocaust denial and protected against anti-Semitic or 
xenophobic attacks. This legislation enabled French Jews to bring suit against anyone who 
disparaged their community. Then, in 1995, President Jacques Chirac officially apologized for 
the state’s compliance in the deportation of French Jews during the Occupation.17 In his speech 
at the Vel d’Hiv, the site of a massive round up of Jews in 1942, he acknowledged a “collective 
fault,” saying that France had betrayed its own “values, principles and ideals.”18 He declared, “It 
is no longer only a government (Vichy) who is judged responsible for the Deportation of French 
Jews, but through it a whole state apparatus (local and national police, magistrate, civil 
service…) is incriminated.” Chirac thus shattered the idea that the majority of French were 
resistors and only a handful of Vichy politicians were actually responsible for the deportations. 
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These symbolic gestures were important because they established French Jews as victims 
of state violence. Moreover, these commemorative developments significantly altered the politics 
of memory in France.
19
 Johann Michel has argued that within the current memorial context, “The 
construction of a victim position allows us to recognize past events as traumatic and to translate 
these traumas into political demands for the given group. These demands for recognition not 
only concern material claims (indemnities, restitution of lost goods…) but also touch upon the 
symbolic construction of individual and collective identities, with the aim of restoring self-
esteem.”20 Official victim status was appealing for the Harkis who had both financial concerns as 
well as an ambiguous place in French society.  
From early on, then, the Harkis, their supporters, and their descendants have used the 
framework of Holocaust memory to formulate their demands for recognition and retribution from 
France. During the 1975 and 1991 protests, second-generation activists compared the treatment 
of the Harkis to that of Jews during WWII, referring to the camps as both ghettos
21
 and 
concentration camps.
22
 This parallel seemed particularly fitting, given that some of the Harki 
camps had previously held French Jews during WWII. This analogy had a long history as well. 
French use of “regroupment” camps to resettle the Algerian population during the Algerian War 
had prompted remembrance of Nazi use of camps. Harkis in turn invoked the memory of Nazi 
camps to articulate their own experiences and expresses the gravity of the situation and their 
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demands. It proved to be an effective strategy, as they drew national attention to the Harki cause 
and forced the state to close the camps. It is important to note, however, that their rhetoric 
“grossly overstated the number of harkis who resided in [the camps]. Focusing the protests on 
these spaces, which housed only 16,000 of the 180,000 harkis in 1974 (not the “vast majority” as 
the leader of demonstrations in summer 1975 claimed), and making parallels with Jews during 
the Second World War resulted in essentializing the plight of all harkis.”23 Over half of the 
Harkis and their children never lived in the camps and the experiences of those who did varied 
significantly.
24
 They thus constitute a problematic focal point for Harki collective memory. Yet 
these comparisons, and the vivid images they evoke, continue to be employed today. As one 
Harki son remarked when he returned to Bias in 2006, “the images that march through the mind 
are truly atrocious ... humiliation, oppression ... a concentration camp.”25 
After decades of relative public silence, the French state’s first symbolic gesture towards 
the Harkis came in 1989, when it issued a commemorative postal stamp that read, “Homage to 
the harkis, soldiers of France.” Eleven and a half million of these stamps were sold.26 The French 
state had recognized the Harkis’ status as veterans in 1974, despite their rather loose attachment 
to the army, as many had not participated in direct combat. French soldiers who fought in 
Algeria also received official veteran status this year, even though the Algerian War was still 
formally considered an “operation to maintain order,” and would not be classified as a war until 
1999. The move to officialize the Harkis’ status had been taken to help distinguish them from 
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Algerian immigrants and to award financial compensation to the Harkis and their widows. At the 
issuing of the stamp, an official from the Ministry of Defense recognized the “difficult 
circumstances” under which the Harkis were repatriated to France, but emphasized the Harkis’ 
military service, declaring, “By this ceremony the Government of the Republic wishes to thank 
the veterans, tell their children and grandchildren they should be proud of their parents.”27 Thus, 
France situated the Harkis in a tradition of military sacrifice. Many Harkis were undoubtedly 
pleased to be recognized as veterans by the state, but others were likely uncomfortable with this 
status, given the diversity of motivations for “enlistment” and their restricted agency in making 
this choice. This type of commemoration also ascribed to the Harkis a form of martial 
masculinity that was undermined by their inability to protect their families following Algerian 
independence. One Harki association demonstrated their ambivalence towards this status in 1992 
when they unveiled a plaque at the Harki camp Saint-Maurice l’Ardoise that read, “Homage to 
the Harkis 1954-1962 – morts pour la France.”28 The language of the plaque echoed that of the 
1989 stamp, meaning it was republican in spirit, yet it was placed in a location that symbolized 
France’s mistreatment of the Harkis and highlighted their victimhood.  
Following the second-generation Harkis’ 1991 protests, during which they self-identified 
as “those forgotten by history” and demanded greater public recognition of the Harki past, the 
French Parliament unanimously passed law n94-488 in June 1994.29 This measure officially 
acknowledged French gratitude towards the Harkis for their military service. It read, “The 
French Republic shows its recognition toward the repatriated former members of the auxiliary 
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forces, assimilated or victims of captivity in Algeria, for the sacrifices they bestowed.”30 While 
this law was accompanied by more material assistance for the Harkis and their descendants, it 
did not address the particular situation in which many Harki families found themselves. The 
Harkis had been honored by the state for their sacrifices as French soldiers, yet they and their 
children continued to face systemic discrimination in France based on their appearance and 
origins. Even those who had not grown up isolated and scholastically disadvantaged in the Harki 
camps had difficulties finding employment and housing. Indeed, in 1999 Martine Aubry, 
Minister of Employment and Solidarity declared it was time to translate France’s “recognition” 
in the law of 1994 into results for the Harkis.
31
  
A Crime Against Humanity: Representing the Harki Massacres in France, 2001  
 
The French state, not fully prepared to confront the meaning of the Algerian War, thus 
relied on the traditional, republican commemorative model to represent the Harkis and situate 
them into a national historical narrative. In August 2001 the disconnect between how the state 
positioned the Harkis and how second-generation Harkis understood their relationship to France 
came to a head when nine individuals, supported by a coalition of 50 Harki associations, brought 
a case against France for having committed a crime against humanity.
32
 The Harkis’ case was 
designed to hold France responsible for its role in the massacres following the Algerian War and 
to insist on the Harkis’ status as the nation’s victims, rather than its protectors. They accused the 
French state of having abandoned the defenseless Harkis, prevented their escape to France with 
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their families, and refused to intervene to protect their former auxiliaries, even though they were 
aware of the retribution violence.  
This act was prompted by a series of trials and public debates about how to contend with 
the legacy of WWII and the colonial past on a judicial level. In 1998, Maurice Papon was 
convicted of crimes against humanity for deporting 1,600 French Jews in his capacity as 
secretary general for police in Bordeaux during WWII. The crimes against humanity legal 
precedent had been established in 1945 in an attempt to address the particularly atrocious nature 
of the crimes committed during the Holocaust. A crime against humanity was defined as 
“murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane act, directed against any 
civilian population, before or during war, or persecution on political, racial, or religious 
grounds.”33 It has been reserved for particularly atrocious situations, in which offenders have 
denied the humanity of their victims. The charge was applied retroactively to the Nazis and has 
been very sparingly applied outside the context of the 1939-1945 period.
34
 
Papon’s trial constitutes an important example of the interrelated histories of Holocaust 
and colonial memories. Papon had also been police chief in Paris during the Algerian War and 
was considered responsible for an attack against Algerians protesting peacefully in Paris on 
October 17, 1961 in which at least forty were killed. Although he was not charged with this 
crime, his trial for crimes against humanity during WWII brought the event into French 
consciousness and stirred up memories of the Algerian War. Following a number of revelations 
about the systematic use of torture by the French army during the Algerian War, a debate sprang 
up in France about whether perpetrators of this violence could be tried for having committed a 
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crime against humanity. Those who advocated bringing this charge against French military 
officers were spurred on by the publication of General Aussaresses’ memoir in 2001, in which he 
boldly and unapologetically described the practice of torture he had inflicted in Algeria. The 
post-Algerian War amnesty laws ultimately protected Aussaresses and other members of the 
French army from being persecuted for their actions during the war, but Aussaresses and his 
publishers were tried and fined for publically defending the practice of torture.
35
 The state 
avoided intervening on the question of establishing fault in the Algerian War, but in May of 2001 
the French Parliament passed the Taubira Law, recognizing slavery as a crime against humanity. 
This piece of memorial legislation highlighted the racialized nature of slavery and the slave trade 
during the colonial period.  
In filing their case of crimes against humanity, the Harkis were undoubtedly influenced 
by the public debates about whether and how to hold the French army accountable for its actions 
during the Algerian War. The case may have been designed to deflect discussions of the Harkis’ 
role in the torture carried out by the French. Some Harkis had translated during the interrogations 
and therefore could have been seen as complicit in the violence. Harkis who served in Paris had a 
reputation for having been particularly brutal during the war. These perceptions informed the 
way Harkis and their families were treated in France. We can understand this case as an attempt 
to buffer against accusations of Harki treachery and cruelty by focusing on France’s betrayal. 
Another factor motivating this coalition of Harki associations was a visit to France by 
Algerian President and veteran of the Algerian War, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, in June of 2001. 
When asked whether the Harkis would be granted the right to return to Algeria, as Bouteflika 
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had invited Pieds-Noirs to do, he replied by comparing Harkis to Vichy collaborators during 
WWII. He declared, “It is exactly as if,” he continued, “one were to ask a French resistance 
fighter to shake the hand of a collaborator.” Bouteflika thus drew a parallel to WWII that was 
antithetical to the one Harkis and their descendants imagined and were trying to establish in 
French memory. This comparison confirmed their fears that they were perceived as torturers and 
collaborators, rather than as victims, and Bouteflika’s remark was as a defining moment for 
second-generation Harkis. His insult via historical analogy appears to have compelled many 
Harki children to become involved with the Harki cause. Vincent Crapanzano has observed that 
Harkis and their children mentioned Bouteflika’s comments in nearly all of his conversations 
with them.
36
 Second-generation Harki activist Fatima Besanci-Lancou declared in her memoir 
that she had essentially forgotten that she was the daughter of a Harki until the Algerian 
President’s remarks.37 
Bouteflika’s insistence that the Harkis were not welcome to return to Algeria reinforced 
their symbolic “banishment”38 from Algeria and, I would argue, affirmed their attachment to 
France. Crapanzano has explained that after Bouteflika’s insult, “The Harkis were furious at the 
Algerian president and, if one can compare levels of fury, even more so at the French president 
for not having responded immediately to Bouteflika’s insult—‘an insult addressed to French 
citizens,’ several of the Harkis said. […] Chirac’s failure seemed to be a replay of their 
abandonment by France.”39 It is significant that in pursuing the case against France for crimes 
against humanity, Harki children did not demand retribution from Algerians, the actual 
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perpetrators of the post-independence violence, but rather from the French.
40
 The failures of the 
French Fifth Republic are of greater concern to them than those of the FLN government in 
Algeria, just as today the descendants of deported French Jews direct their attention to the 
French, not the Germans. Second-generation Harkis thus asserted their French identity by 
insisting on their rights as aggrieved French citizens. 
 Through this case, Harkis and their descendants simultaneously demonstrated that they 
shared an experience with Algerian immigrants in France—that of having been mistreated by the 
French. The Harkis claimed that the French had abandoned and betrayed them in 1962 because 
they were Algerian and therefore not seen as fully French. The case followed a short-lived period 
of joint militancy among second-generation Harkis and Algerian immigrants for the rights of 
North Africans in France during the 1990s and it acted as a means of bringing the populations of 
Algerian origin together. While they might disagree about whether the Harkis more closely 
resembled Vichy collaborators or Jewish victims, both groups were comfortable with positioning 
the French as the Nazis in this analogy between WWII and the Algerian War. 
The crimes against humanity case was unsuccessful for several reasons. Not only did 
amnesty laws protect the French army, but also it was difficult to charge the French with 
complicity in violence carried out by Algerians. The legal claim on which the case was based 
was also weak. Boussad Azni, a Harki son leading the coalition, argued that the Harkis had been 
killed because of their political views, which fit with the criteria established by international 
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tribunals to define a crime against humanity.
41
 However, this charge has mainly been applied to 
acts in which victims were targeted based on race, religion, or nationality. This premise was also 
problematic because evidence suggests that many Harkis did not support France for political or 
ideological reasons. The claim had thus, ironically, been predicated on the understanding of the 
Harkis as patriotic supporters of France, which the French state supported, but many second-
generation Harkis rejected. The highest court in France dismissed their case in 2003, but they 
continued to pursue it at the European level.
42
 In March of 2012, Harki children organized a 
conference on how and whether they might be able to proceed with the help of Licra, the 
International League Against Racism and Anti-Semitism, which promised to take up their cause.  
The way that second-generation Harkis argued the case and explained their motivations is 
significant. The children of Harkis were consciously followed the Holocaust memory model in 
France and they drew clear parallels between the extermination of Jews during WWII and the 
post-independence attacks against the Harkis. During the case, Harkis began to employ the term 
“genocide” to describe the nature of the violence. In a book published on the case, Azni justified 
their use of this term, which he admitted, “might seem strong.” He repeatedly pointed to a “logic 
of extermination,” or an “extermination attempt,” which suggested the violence was systematic, 
organized, and cohesive.
43
 Not all Harkis, including second-generation Harki activist Fatima 
Besnaci-Lancou and scholar Abderahmen Moumen, are comfortable with applying the term 
“genocide.”44 Yet some Harkis and their children have continued to describe the attacks against 
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the Harkis and their families as such and to make comparisons with the Holocaust in order to 
solidify their claims to victimhood. As the president of the association 3H, Nasser Sahour, 
declared on the group’s website, “Memory binds us, reminds us, and orders us not to forget evil 
and to fight so it is not repeated. I am thinking of the Holocaust, of these men, these women and 
children who had to endure Nazism, I am thinking of the resistance fighters who rose up and 
refused the human chaos. […] Our desire: that everyone knows the Honor of the Harkis, the 
History of these men, and of all who have suffered from genocide!”45  
Historian Régis Pierret has observed that drawing these comparisons has afforded a 
certain dignity to the Harki community.
46
 I argue that it has also indicated their desire to have 
legal protection against defamation and denials of their victimhood, as French Jews had acquired 
under the Gayssot Law. Since the term “Harki” did not correspond to a religion, ethnicity, or 
nationality, they did not constitute a legally recognized minority group. This left them vulnerable 
to insults such as the one made by the Bouteflika and his comment reminded the Harkis that 
these accusations remained prevalent. Despite their lack of success with the crimes against 
humanity case, second-generation Harkis have continued to seek their own form of the Gayssot 
Law.
47
  
It is also noteworthy that an understanding of the attacks against the Harkis as a shared, 
historical event emerged for the first time in the context of this case. Previously the post-
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independence violence had rarely been discussed in memory accounts, and then only on an 
individual level. Brahim Sadouni’s 1985 memoir offered one of the first public expressions of 
this violence. In his text, he recounted rumors of attacks against Harkis and their families and 
described one incident that he personally witnessed, in which a Harki was dragged behind a 
car.
48
 He refers to these as “acts of vengeance” and “reprisals,” never using the word “massacre” 
in the plural or singular. The violence is not referenced at all in the journal Français Musulman 
for the Harki association UNACFCI.  The Harkis’ fragmented approach to recalling the violence 
reflected how it was likely experienced at the time. There is little evidence of organization 
behind the attacks, which were sporadic, inconsistent, and varied widely according to the 
region.
49 
 The severity and scope of the threats that the Harkis faced depended on the social and 
political dynamics in each individual village and changed over time.
50
  
 This case and the way it was argued turned inchoate experiences of violence into 
politicized memories that extended to the post-independence attacks the collective sense of 
injustice they already felt about the camps. To make their case, children of Harkis created a 
repertoire of representations for this event, presenting the violence as a single massacre. The 
associations collected eyewitness accounts of assaults, particularly against Harkis’ wives and 
children, as well as several photographs of mutilated Harkis, which served to symbolize the 
massacre. Azni included these in his text and they have since been reprinted in other texts and on 
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Harki websites.
51
 Particularly terrible anecdotes of violence have become central to Harki 
collective memory—not associated with individual victims, but presented as if done to any and 
all Harkis. Vincent Crapanzano has observed this phenomenon, which I argue emerged with the 
crimes against humanity case, in the course of his oral interviews with Harkis. “The individual 
stories that are subsumed in the Harki story have become what the Harkis themselves refer to as 
testimonies, témoignages, evidence of what they experienced that they use in the demands they 
make on the French government (and, often enough, in justifying their own particular 
circumstances).”52  
 A number of the stories and images that came to represent the Harki massacre depict acts 
of sexual violence against the Harkis.
53
 The perpetrators of these acts sought to emasculate and 
humiliate the Harkis in front of their families. The fact that second-generation Harkis transmit 
accounts and illustrations of this violence, including a particularly graphic photo of a decapitated 
Harki with severed genitals in his mouth, attests to how important it is to them that the Harkis are 
established as victims. The nature of this violence contrasts sharply with the state’s celebrations 
of the Harkis’ martial masculinity and remembering the Harkis through these representations is 
designed to upset viewers and evoke compassion. 
 The Harki massacre has become the focus of Harki collective memory practices. Nearly all 
Harkis felt threatened following the Algerian War—it is, after all, why most ended up in 
France—even if they did not personally witness or experience violence. Concentrating on the 
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Harki massacre has also expanded the meaning of the Harki identity to include family members 
of the soldiers who were vulnerable in the aftermath of the war. This move has enabled Harki 
wives and daughters to become far more active in the Harki memory community.
54
   
State Commemorations and Harki Reactions, 2001-2005 
In the wake of the announcement of the crimes against humanity case, Jacques Chirac 
made a symbolic overture to the Harki community by declaring September 25, 2001 a National 
Day of Homage to the Harkis. It has since become an annual commemoration.
55
 This act was 
clearly aimed again at honoring the Harkis’ sacrifices for France. Ceremonies were held in 
twenty-eight locations in France, including in Paris, where the eternal flame was relit in the 
Harkis’ honor at the Arc de Triomphe. Chirac decorated one hundred and fifty Harki veterans at 
the Invalides while he unveiled a commemorative plaque with the text from the 1994 law that 
had acknowledged France’s gratitude towards the Harkis for their military service.56 Chirac 
praised “the proud and courageous combatants” who fought for France and for the ideals she 
represents.
57
   
While the ceremonies officially focused on the Harkis’ status as soldiers, Chirac alluded 
in his speech to what the Harkis had suffered. He declared, “France wishes to pay homage, a 
solemn homage, to those of its children who were so cruelly battered.’ […] ‘Separated from the 
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land in which they were born, they found refuge only in their loyalty to this France of which they 
had dreamed before they knew it, but which did not give them the place that was their due.”58 He 
also expressed regret that “France had failed to save its children.”59 In this way Chirac suggested 
that the Harkis had been victims, but did not officially recognize the responsibility of the state or 
offer an apology as he had done for French Jews at Vel d’Hiv six years earlier.60     
Harkis and their children expressed mixed reactions to the event. While hundreds of 
Harkis participated in the ceremonies, others were likely uncomfortable with this public tribute 
to the Harkis’ status as soldiers, given the recent discussions of the army’s brutality during the 
Algerian War. Mohammed Haddouche, son of a Harki and president of the organization AJIR 
(Association, Justice, Information, Reparation) pour les Harkis, reflected a common concern 
when he declared in Le Monde, “This commemoration is welcome on condition that it represents 
an explicit recognition of the abandonment, disarming and massacre of harkis with the 
complicity of France.”61 Ultimately the event did not meet this demand and while Besnaci-
Lancou and Moumen have argued that Chirac “hints at a first admission of responsibility on the 
part of the rulers at the time by these words: ‘France failed to save its children,’”62 many Harki 
children expressed frustration at this missed opportunity.
63
 Azni took issue with Chirac’s focus 
on commemorating the Harkis’ sacrifices as soldiers at the exclusion of the rest of the 
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community. He observed, “A solider dies with honor. But his wife, his children, his parents, did 
they ask to have their throats slit by ‘resistance fighters’?”64 This observation highlights the 
distance he saw between the republican memorial model and the case of the Harkis.  
Chirac and his government selected September 25
 
as the National Day of Homage 
because it was a date that lacked any commemorative significance for the Harkis. They were 
attempting to avoid the type of controversy that had arisen over the choice of the date on which 
to commemorate the Algerian War. The positions on this issue had become fairly well 
entrenched and it seemed to epitomize the perpetual failure to agree on how to remember the 
conflict. To some scholars, this question has constituted a central example of the “memory 
wars,” because it has highlighted “the virulence of ‘symbolic battles’ around the memory of 
conflicts in North Africa.”65  
Since the 1970s, an association called the Fédération Nationale des Anciens Combattants 
en Algérie, Maroc et Tunisie (FNACA), which had been created by former drafted soldiers in 
1958 “to oppose a continuation of the war,” has commemorated the 19th of March as the end of 
the war and the granting of Algerian independence.
66
 March 19, 1962 was the day on which the 
cease-fire between the FLN and the French state went into effect. FNACA has organized a 
ceremony at the Arc de Triomphe each year and proposed that streets be named in honor of this 
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date.
67
 In general, the left supported this commemorative date. While Socialist president François 
Mitterrand never officially recognized the date, he did send a representative to the Arc de 
Triomphe commemoration.
68
 In 2002, for the 40
th
 anniversary of the end of the war, the left 
submitted a proposal to adopt the March 19
th
 date as a national commemoration. It was passed by 
the National Assembly, but not by the Senate.  
Those on the right have opposed this commemorative date because it represented a 
defeat. President Charles de Gaulle vehemently rejected the choice and President Giscard 
d’Estaing also “declined to send military detachments to the Arc de Triomphe” when he was in 
office.
69
 The far right has been more strident in its opposition. Jean-Marie Le Pen of the Front 
National established an “anti-19 March committee”70 and the Harki association journal Français 
Musulman printed a story in 1986 of a FN deputy who tore down the plaque from the Place du 
19 mars 1962 in the city of Villefranche-sur-Saône. He explained that, “for him, ‘this date of 
mourning and shame’ did not deserve to be commemorated in this way.”71  
Pieds-Noirs and Harkis have remained united in vehement opposition to this date. Tens of 
thousands of Pieds-Noirs were killed after March 19
th
 and it marked the loss of French Algeria, a 
traumatic event for them. Likewise, the defining moments for the Harkis—French withdrawal 
and abandonment as well as the post-independence reprisal violence—occurred after then. 
commemorating this date thus occludes recognition of the Harki massacres, which is key to their 
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victim position. The Français Musulman journal declared in 1983 the UNACFCI’s “refusal of 
the choice of the date March 19 to commemorate the ‘end of the Algerian War.’”72 The Coalition 
Nationale website proclaimed in 2010 that it “is hostile, in an unequivocal and entrenched way, 
to the treacherous celebration of March 19 1962, for obvious reasons, namely, the massacre of 
150,000 harkis that occurred after this date and, the particular commemorations on the part of 
associations of former French soldiers (FNACA, ...), are considered, by our group, as an attack 
on the memory and dignity of the former auxiliaries (no less French soldiers).”73 Hacène Arfi, a 
leader of the second-generation protests in 1991 announced in the newspaper Midi Libre in 2011, 
“Commemorating March 19 as the end of the Algerian war is an insult to the harki 
community.”74 In the comments section following this article on the Midi Libre website, Arfi 
entered into a dispute with a reader using the pseudonym “le jeune,” who expressed his support 
for this date. Arfi declared, “Today you celebrate the end of the Algerian War with great pomp, 
whereas on this date the harki genocide began; you are men without honor, you are cowards.” To 
which le jeune responded, “Well, the war continues!!!!!!!!” This interaction attests to the fact 
that tensions surrounding this issue have remained high. 
In an effort to resolve the dispute over an appropriate date to commemorate the end of the 
war, Chirac employed the same strategy that he had with the Harkis—he selected a day without 
any special significance. On December 5 2002, he dedicated a monument near the Quai Branly 
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to the 24,000 soldiers who died in the Algerian War and the wars of decolonization in Morocco 
and Tunisia between 1952 and 1962. The next year he announced that an annual “National Day 
of Homage to those who died for France in North Africa” would take place on December 5. As 
the newspaper Libération observed, the selection of December 5 was “simply due to the fact that 
Jacques Chirac was free this day!”75 Many of those invested in the commemorative conflict, 
particularly members of the FNACA, rejected this compromise and Robert Aldrich has observed 
that “A date meant to be consensual and neutral immediately proved conflictual.”76  
 Whereas the Harkis and their descendants fit into a clearly defined position on the issue of 
March 19
th
, this is not the case for the 2005 law. On February 23
rd
 2005, the National Assembly 
ignited controversy when it passed a law defending France’s colonial project. The polemic 
centered on Article 4 of the law, which stipulated that school curricula would “acknowledge in 
particular the positive role of the French overseas presence.”77 This law was a product of Pied-
Noir lobbying and efforts on right to court this electoral group. By institutionalizing a normative, 
pro-colonial version of the past, lawmakers on the right also sought to quell the fierce debates 
that had sprung up in France about the colonial legacy.
78
  Rather than diffusing social tensions, 
however, this legislation triggered such uproar among anti-colonialists on the left, descendants of 
colonial subjects, and educators, who objected at being told how to teach this history, that the 
government repealed the offending article in November of 2005. Throughout the fierce debates 
over the 2005 law, polemical issues of immigration and insecurity were deliberated through the 
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discourses of memory and history.
79
 The memory disputes thus not only reflected lingering 
colonial tensions in French society,
80
 but also appeared to exacerbate and reinforce them.
81
  
 In analyses of the conflicts over the February 2005 law, some scholars have positioned the 
Harkis in the “camp” of those who, like many Pieds-Noirs, support a positive interpretation of 
French Algeria.
82
 Harkis have participated in Pied-Noir organizations, including those that have 
expressed “nostalgia” for French Algeria, particularly in the period immediately following their 
arrival in France.
83
 Pied-Noir associations were the first to emerge and most claimed to represent 
the interests of all rapatriés, including the Harkis and their families. Even after independent 
Harki organizations started to develop in the 1970s, Pieds-Noirs often invoked the Harki case in 
their memory work and pursued causes of joint interest, including opposition to March 19
th
 as a 
commemorative date.
84
 
 Article 5 of the February 2005 law was also specifically designed for the Harkis. It forbade 
“all insults or defamation committed against a person or group of persons because of their real or 
supposed status as a harki” and “all apologia of crimes committed against the harkis et members 
of auxiliary forces after the Evian Accords.” This article was the result of Harki associations’ 
lobbying efforts, particularly on the part of the association AJIR pour les Harkis and the scholar 
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Mohand Hamoumou.
85
 The Harkis’ desire for this type of legal protection dated back to the 
passage of the Gayssot Law and the crimes against humanity case.  
 Despite their connection to Pied-Noir associations and their own work to get Article 5 
passed, many Harki children have voiced discontent with the law on their respective websites. 
Their first concern was that the law did not provide strong enough judicial protection for the 
Harkis because it did not establish repercussions for violations of Article 5. Khader Moulfi 
denounced the 2005 law and its “arbitrary application” on his Coalition Nationale website.86 
These concerns seemed to prove founded in 2006, when the Socialist mayor of Montpellier, 
Georges Frêche, called Harkis “subhuman,” yet attempts to charge him with defamation under 
Article 5 were dismissed by French courts. As the Monharki.com website declared, “the law in 
its current form unfortunately is and will be of no use to the harki community and most 
especially to the children.”87 This later point constituted another source of disappointment for the 
Harki community. The moderator of Monharki.com, le petit harki, denounced the fact that Harki 
children were “completely excluded from this measure, despite the efforts of Harki associations 
and the promises of politicians.”88  
 Second-generation Harkis were also among the most outspoken opponents of the law’s 
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pro-colonial stance.
89
 Nine association leaders, led by Fatima Besnaci-Lancou, signed the “Appel 
d'enfants de Harkis contre les articles 4 et 13 de la loi du 23 février 2005.” This document 
proclaimed, “We, daughters and sons of parents of Algerian origin, descendants of harkis […] 
declare that: colonization is an indefensible enterprise; wanting to dominate a population, even in 
the name of a “civilizing” project, is contrary to any notion of human rights.” These Harki 
children thus emphasized their Algerian background and affiliated themselves with descendants 
of colonial subjects who were critical of the colonial project. They also presented the Harkis as 
casualties of colonialism. Responding to Article 4’s insistence on the “positive” role of 
colonialism, the Appel asserted, “the harkis, against their will, are the products of colonial 
history […] The abandonment, by the French state, of the harkis at the moment of Algerian 
independence and their confinement in the camps, are, also, living proof of the “negative” 
aspects of colonization.”90 This understanding of the Harkis’ role in the colonial project 
challenged the idea that they were ideologically motivated, patriotic defenders of France. 
 Second-generation Harkis also expressed frustration that Article 5, for which they had 
fought so hard, was embroiled in the polemic over Article 4.
91
 They saw it as an instance of their 
case being instrumentalized by Pieds-Noirs and by the right in order to gain electoral support for 
their own cause. Besnaci-Lancou’s association, Harkis et Droits de l'Homme, declared, “After 
the camps, behind the barbed wire, the harkis and their families are now being imprisoned in a 
despicable law voted by those who are nostalgic for French Algeria. […] The parliamentarians 
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associate the harkis, against their will, with the promotion of colonialism.”92 They thus situated 
the law in a narrative of continued betrayal by the state.  
 These reactions reveal two important features of Harki collective memory. First, the 
different positions on the law hint at deep divisions among the Harkis about how to interpret and 
commemorate the Harki past. The Harkis and their children do not constitute a unified memory 
camp. The incident also highlights the fact that, despite their affiliation with the right over the 
issue of March 19
th
, Harkis and their families have felt politically marginalized since their arrival 
in France. They have been portrayed as collaborators by the anti-colonial left, “betrayed” and put 
in camps by the Gaullist right, and touted as “good” Algerians by the Front National for their 
supposed support of French Algeria. No party in power since 1962 has recognized France’s role 
in the Harki violence. Yet, the Harkis and their descendants have been promised this and 
generally solicited by the various parties, who consider them a significant potential electoral 
group. As a result, they have felt used by those in power, including politicians, Pieds-Noirs, and 
the Army, then continually betrayed and “forgotten.” This sense of political marginalization is an 
important feature of their collective memory and helps define their relationship to France. It also 
accounts for why websites have become an important memory vector for them. Since they are 
not represented by a political party, they have sought other means of expressing and defending 
their own memorial causes. 
Harki Resistance: Commemorative Acts, 2005-2013 
Harki commemorative activity in the aftermath of the 2005 law has been designed as a 
response to this continued political “betrayal.” In March 2007 Nicolas Sarkozy made a 
presidential campaign promise, announcing that if elected, he would recognize France’s role in 
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the Harki massacre, “so that our forgetting does not assassinate them a second time.” When 
Sarkozy invited the Harkis to the Elysee Palace for his first December 5 commemoration of 
Algerian War veterans as president, the press announced that he would be following through on 
his commitment, effectively raising the Harkis’ hope.93 During his speech, Sarkozy declared that 
the Harkis deserved “the nation’s solemn homage," again invoking the republican memorial 
model. He also referred to the suffering that the Harkis had experienced in the aftermath of the 
Evian Accords and announced that France “must make amends for the mistakes that were 
committed.” Yet he stopped short of officially acknowledging the Harki massacre and 
apologizing for France’s responsibility.  
Harki children were disappointed and outraged. In an article entitled, “The harkis and N. 
Sarkozy: the promises of a candidate compared to a weak-willed President,” which she posted on 
her association’s website and was reposted on other sites, Fatima Besnaci-Lancou denounced 
“the affront inflicted on the harkis and their family.” She explained, “At the end of the ceremony 
at the Elysee Palace, it’s a cold shower. A certain disillusionment reaches the French harki 
community.”94 Others pointed to Sarkozy’s apparent tendency to make competing promises to 
different groups.  On the Coalition Nationale website, Khader Moulfi had observed a few months 
earlier that in public Sarkozy said, “the Harkis were victims of a genocide…” but in front of a 
“FLNist” audience, he says that “the Harkis chose their camp and they lost…’ (meaning they 
deserved what they got !)”95 A few days before Sarkozy’s December 5th speech he had made a 
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trip to Algeria, during which he “acknowledged the injustices of the colonial system before he 
quickly denounced the violence on both sides during the Algerian War.”96 The next day, he and 
Bouteflika “signed major contracts for over 2.8 billion euros worth of investments in Algeria by 
French oil, gas, and engineering companies.”97 The timing of this visit was not lost on the 
Harkis
98
 and it points to the difficulties Sarkozy may have perceived in satisfying competing 
memorial claims. 
As Sarkozy failed at every conceivable opportunity to fulfill his promise, Harkis and their 
children continued to voice their discontent. In 2009, two Harki sons and a Harki daughter 
created a group called Mouvement Resistance Harki and traveled throughout France organizing 
protests. The trio finally settled in front of the National Assembly in Paris, where they camped 
out for nearly two years in an effort to hold Sarkozy accountable for his promise. The 
Mouvement Resistance Harki advertised their progress on their website and displayed signs with 
provocative slogans around their camp site in order to attract attention to their cause.
99
 On some 
of the posters they attached photos of mutilated Harkis alongside an image of Sarkozy, thus 
conflating the original betrayal with his.  
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Every September 25
th
, on the National Day of Homage to the Harkis, Harkis and their 
descendants anticipated that Sarkozy would use the occasion to follow thorough on his promise, 
yet most years he did not even personally attend the ceremonies. The Harkis exasperated with the 
state’s insistence on the republican model of commemoration and refusal to establish the Harkis 
as its victims. On September 25, 2010, Besnaci-Lancou’s association passed around a tract that 
declared, “YES to Sarkozy keeping his promise” and “NO to medals; NO to nice speeches.”101 
The following year, Harki Serge Carel expressed his frustration that “rather than keeping his 
commitment, president SARKOZY prefers to repeat a medals ceremony for the umpteenth time 
in response to the expectations of the harkis and their families.”102 Carel declared to the 
newspaper Libération, “Now we are fed up with these medals!” and announced that he would be 
returning his own Legion of Honor medal. He said, “I am putting this medal back at the disposal 
of the republic until the state recognizes its responsibility in the tragedy experienced by the 
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harkis.” The association Harkis d’Ile-de-France commended this gesture, proclaiming, “After 
such a truthful perspective from a former harki on the current attitude of the highest authorities 
of the state, an umpteenth medals ceremony next September 25 will not be able to hide the real 
face of Nicolas SARKOZY: he seriously deceived the rapatrié electorate in order to get himself 
elected to the presidency of the Republic.”103 
That same year, which was the 10
th
 anniversary of the commemoration and the eve of the 
2012 presidential election, there were calls from numerous associations to boycott the ceremony 
entirely as a form of resistance. Their actions highlighted the disconnect between the recognition 
Harkis received as soldiers and the type of acknowledgement they really wanted—as victims. 
Harkis du Loiret.com declared, “It would only be logical for the harkis not to participate in the 
next September 25 ceremony in order to indicate their discontentment and to demand the vote, 
before the presidential elections, of a law recognizing the responsibility of the French state in the 
abandonment and massacre of the Harkis.”104 The site Monharki.com republished their proposal, 
adding their agreement, “Indeed, we cannot help but agree with this resolution not to participate 
in the official ceremony to show our dissatisfaction with our situation.”105 The Besnaci-Lancou’s 
association, Harkis et Droits de l'Homme, was the most forceful, urging Harkis to boycott this 
event that had become devoid of meaning and through which the state was trying to “lull them to 
sleep and manipulate them with a medal, a trip to Paris, and little cakes.”106 Following the event, 
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137 
the association directed this message to those who had participated: “To all those who attended 
this masquerade with great pomp, the association Harkis et Droits de l’Homme asks them to 
remember their honor, the honor of the harkis and their family, sadly besmirched by the images 
of this day.”107  
During the 2012 presidential campaign, which coincided with the 50
th
 anniversary of the 
end of the war, Sarkozy’s opponent, François Hollande, likewise pledged to recognize France’s 
responsibility in the Harki massacre. He announced, “As I promised, if the French people give 
me their trust, I promise to publicly acknowledge the responsibilities of the French governments 
in the abandonment of the Harkis, the massacre of those who remained in Algeria and the 
conditions faced by the families transferred to the camps in France.” He capitalized on the fact 
that Sarkozy had not kept his promise to do the same, referring to “this recognition long hoped 
for and long-awaited, that the outgoing current president refused to bring about.”108  
Hollande revisted the Harki question four months after being elected on the occasion of 
the National Day of Homage to the Harkis. Like Sarkozy, he did not personally attend the 
ceremony, but rather he composed a letter to be read by his Deputy Minister of Veterans Affairs, 
Kader Arif. In the document, he observed that “France abandoned her own soldiers, those who 
had trusted her, those who had placed themselves under her protection, those who had chosen her 
and had served her. Then the harkis and their families were received and treated in an often 
disgraceful way on French soil.” Hollande added that “France always improves when she 
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recognizes her mistakes.”109 The Harkis and their children were yet again dissatisfied, arguing 
that he did go so far as to actually recognize these mistakes. A representative of the Harki 
association Comité de Liaison National des Harkis was quoted in Le Monde as proclaiming, “All 
we got were empty words that don’t mean anything; it’s a missed opportunity.”110 He asserted 
that such a speech should be accompanied by “a law or decree that recognizes the responsibility 
of France, as was done for the Jewish community.” Besnaci-Lancou and her association reacted 
to Hollande’s message by wondering, “Are we headed towards a remake of Sarkozy’s 5-year 
tenure?”111 
Following Serge Carel’s symbolic gesture the year before, Harki son Hacène Arfi 
declared he would return his Knight of the National Order of Merit medal in protest. He had 
received this honor from Chirac on the first National Day of Homage to the Harkis for “services 
rendered to his community,” including his leadership in the 1991 demonstrations. In a letter to 
Hollande, Arfi explained:   
Once proud of this distinction, I have no desire to brandish this medal in the current 
context […] you have deliberately ignored the massacre, abandonment and sacrifice of 
these valiant soldiers who paid for their enlistment under the tricolor flag with their lives. 
Today I am not proud of France, I’m ashamed for you, Mr. President, and yet my father 
fought for the French values: liberty, equality and fraternity.
112
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In this way, Arfi managed to blend images of the Harkis as both defenders of the state and its 
victims. On their website, the administrators of Monharki.com declared their support: “please 
know Monsieur Carel, Monsieur Arfi, that you deserve all our respect and all our admiration.”113  
 In the absence of an official commemoration that reflects their understanding of the Harki 
past and represents their relationship to the French state, first and second-generation Harkis have 
created their own counter-commemoration. Since 2010, they have observed the 12
th
 of May as 
the “Day of the Harki Abandonment.” On this date in 1962, Pierre Messmer sent a telegram 
sanctioning officers who had taken it upon themselves to evacuate groups of Harkis to France 
and ordering them to be sent back to Algeria.
114
 To the Harkis and their children, this document 
proves the state’s willful intent to abandon the Harkis and ultimately enabled the Harki 
massacres to occur. As the Collectif de la Journée de l’Abandon, which has been joined by over 
forty Harki and veterans’ associations, explained in an announcement sent out to other 
associations and websites, “Even if Pierre Messmer was not the only one responsible for the 
tragedy of the Harkis, this telegram, which he signed, is a symbol.”115 To illustrate France’s 
betrayal, the Collectif contrasted an image of the telegram with photo of Messmer personally 
arming a Harki during the war. May 12 thus symbolized France’s failed obligations to the Harkis 
and commemorating this date has reinforced the Harkis’ perceptions of themselves as victims of 
the French state.  
 For the first three years, the association Harkis d’Ile-de-France led the May 12th ceremony, 
which was held at a monument to the victims (soldiers, civilians, and Harkis) of the Algerian 
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War in the Butte au Chapeau Rouge Park in Paris. On this occasion, the president of the 
association, a Harki son, flanked by a few former Harkis, read Messmer’s telegram and then the 
men placed a wreath of flowers on the monument.
116
 It was an intimate ceremony, attended by 
approximately thirty Harkis and their families. In 2011, a conference on the theme of “Justice for 
the Harki Drama” that was held before the ceremony gave the event an additional layer of 
significance. A banner that read, “Mr. President, respect your commitment to the Harki 
families!!!” was displayed during the conference and then affixed behind the monument, 
effectively linking the ceremony to the French state’s continued failure towards the Harkis.  
117
 
 In 2013, Hollande’s failure to recognize France’s responsibility in the Harki massacres 
became a focal point of the May 12
th
 commemoration. It was at this moment that the Collectif de 
la Journée de l’Abandon was formed and members organized a march in central Paris designed 
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to hold Hollande accountable for his promise.
118
 At the event, a Harki daughter led the 150 
participants, approximately half of whom were women, in a chant, “Abandonment, betrayal, the 
Harkis are marching on Paris!” The protesters carried two large banners and many small flyers 
with the words, “Mr. Hollande, keep your word!” accompanied by a photo of Hollande and the 
text of his campaign promise. Another large banner displayed the image of Messmer’s telegram. 
In this way, the commemoration essentially fused the French state’s past and present betrayals.   
119
 
Conclusion  
It has been difficult for the Harkis as a dispersed, heterogeneous, and politically 
marginalized “community” to construct their own monuments and other official carriers of 
memory. Until recently, their memories were grafted onto those of other communities, including 
Pieds-Noirs and veterans, with greater resources and visibility.
120
 Since 2005, they have used 
cyber carriers as means of organizing resistance to official memory narratives and as platforms to 
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establish their own interpretations. These websites have not replaced the Harkis’ other memory 
practices, but rather open up more spaces for commemorative, memorial acts.  
Harki associations have started to use websites to publicize their practices and activities, 
enabling them to reach a wider audience of fellow Harki children than ever before. The sites also 
offer new ways to create or recreate connections based on the idea of a shared past as second-
generation Harkis can meet and communicate regularly in discussion forums. This technology 
increases the number of occasions for commemorative activity as well as the number of 
participants, thus building, reinforcing, and sustaining the Harkis’ community of memory. 
Meanwhile, Harki associations have started to create sites of memory dedicated to 
commemorating their suffering in France. They have put plaques at the sites of former Harki 
camps and have contributed to the construction of a permanent exhibition in the town of Ongles, 
where there had been a sizeable Harki settlement, making it the first Harki museum. They have 
also joined with historians to create a museum at the Rivesaltes camp, which had held refugees 
from the Spanish Civil War, French Jews in World War II and members of the FLN captured in 
France before the Harkis arrived in 1962. 
As the French state has sought to establish a monopoly on the memory of colonialism and 
the Algerian War, it has positioned the Harkis as soldiers and commemorated their sacrifices to 
the nation. Yet the state’s authority has been challenged in the second-half of the 20th century, 
not least by the Harkis and their descendants, who remember this past differently. The Harkis’ 
pursuit of French recognition for their role in the massacres has become their central, uniting 
cause.
121
 While the Harkis and their children are adamant about holding France responsible for 
the post-independence violence, they are also, paradoxically, indicating their continuing 
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attachment to France, their desire to be represented in the French political system and their wish 
to construct a positive historical legacy for Harkis and their families in French collective 
memory. They would like an official apology, and protection from defamation, as French Jews 
have acquired, yet what they ultimately seek is the complete acceptance and full integration into 
French society that they have been denied as French of North African origin.  
144 
CHAPTER 4: COMPETING MEMORIES, GENDERED NARRATIVES, 2003-2013 
In their edited volume The Gender of Memory, Sylvia Schraut and Sylvia Paletschek 
posed the question, “Do women remember differently than men?”1 While they were careful not 
to assume “an essential dichotomy in memory culture,” they were interested in the “historical 
effectiveness of gender topoi and their impact on memory politics.”2 I explore this question in 
the case of the Harkis by identifying and analyzing competing narratives about the Harki past 
transmitted by Harki sons and daughters.
3
 “Harki” is a male-coded identity, created in the 
context of a war of liberation. War has historically been gendered male and in Writing War, 
Lynne Hanley has argued that “women are robbed of the authority to express themselves on the 
subject of war because they are assumed not to be in war.”4 Indeed, Harki wives and daughters 
originally occupied a marginalized place in Harki memory narratives. Yet since the early 2000s, 
Harki daughters have become important architects of Harki collective memory. The ways they 
have disseminated their memories and the aspects of the past that they have chosen to focus on 
differ significantly from those of Harki sons.
5
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Harki children are conflicted over two key historical questions: the nature of the French 
colonial project in Algeria (also the focus of the February 2005 law) and the Harkis’ motivations 
for supporting France during the war (the keystone to Harki memory narratives). Through 
cultural carriers such as memoirs, Harki daughters have taken an anti-colonial stance and 
portrayed the Harkis as casualties of France’s exploitative regime in Algeria. Sociologists James 
Fentress and Chris Wickham have found an “absence of emphasis on choice” in women’s war 
narratives, which appears to hold true in the case of the Harki daughters as well.
6
 They explained 
this phenomenon by observing, “women, however powerful, have tended to live their lives in 
environments whose public, external power structures have been under the control of men.”7 In 
their accounts these women have stressed the lack of agency of their mothers, whose marriages 
bound them to the fate of the Harkis. Yet they have extended this vulnerability to their Harki 
fathers as well. Harki sons, however, have employed cyber carriers to express their 
understanding that Algeria was French and that the Harkis chose to defend their nation, and its 
values, against the FLN terrorists.  
Debates among second-generation Harkis about how to interpret the past indicate that 
Harki sons and daughters have inherited a different relationship to the Harki identity. Both 
narratives are designed to challenge the traitor connotation of this identity, which was the source 
of rejection from Algerians, Algerian immigrants, and even the French. Yet Harki daughters 
have maintained greater distance from the Harki identity and expressed more ambivalence 
towards it. Fentress and Wickham found in their research that few women “had any ideological 
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stake in the (male) self-image of the fighter.”8 In their texts, Harki memoir writers considered 
whether their fathers were indeed traitors before ultimately exonerating them. Harki sons, on the 
other hand, have appeared far more invested in the legacy of their fathers as soldiers and have 
proclaimed their pride at being the offspring of Harkis.  
Harkis and their descendants do not constitute a unified memory “camp,” as historians 
who employ the “memory wars” paradigm have suggested. Their competing narratives are 
accompanied by outright disputes over how to interpret the past. These narratives also, however, 
reveal the productive work of memory for the Harkis. Both interpretations are aimed at 
establishing affiliations with parts of French society based on a shared past. Harki daughters 
have appealed to Algerian immigrants as joint victims of colonialism. They have focused on 
their experiences of racism and discrimination in France and displayed a lingering attachment to 
Algeria. Harki sons have sought acceptance and admiration from the French for the Harkis’ 
service. They have clearly distinguished themselves from Algerian immigrants and remained 
critical of the current Algerian regime.  
In the aftermath of Bouteflika’s insult towards the Harkis in 2001 and the crimes against 
humanity case, women have become more involved in the Harki cause. Since 2003, they have 
produced a number of memoirs designed to make the Harki past known to the rest of French 
society. As cultural vectors of memory, these texts present individual narratives of the past, with 
the goal of contributing to a collective memory.
9
 Dalila Kerchouche and Fatima Besnaci-Lancou 
paved the way with their respective memoirs, Mon Père, ce Harki (2003) and Fille de Harki 
(2005). These Harki daughters have become public representatives of the Harki community, due 
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to the significant media coverage their works received in France.
10
 Kerchouche, a journalist at 
L’Express, followed up this memory work by contributing to a collection of life histories from 
Harkis, their wives, and children,
11
 as well as producing a memoir based on her sister’s life.12 
The latter was made into a TV film, entitled Harkis.
13
 Since 2005, Besnaci-Lancou has published 
three collections of Harki life stories,
14
 founded the association, Harkis et Droits de l’Homme,15 
organized conferences, and edited scholarly works on the Harkis. Other Harki daughters have 
followed in their footsteps. Novelist Zahia Rahmani wrote her own memoir in 2006
16
 and 
socialist politician Saliha Telali published her memoir in 2009 through the major French 
publishing house, L'Harmattan.
17
 Two Harki sons
18
 and three Harkis
19
 themselves have 
published memoirs, either privately or through smaller publishing companies, but these works 
have received little to no media coverage.  
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Since 2005, some Harki children, mainly Harki sons, have used the Internet to transmit 
their understandings of the colonial past.
20
 There are different types of Harki websites. All of the 
sites aim to increase historical understanding of the Harkis. Some are connected to a memorial 
association, such as the website for Fatima Besnaci-Lancou’s association Harkis et Droits de 
l’Homme, and provide information about the association’s activities. Others, including the site 
for the Mouvement Résistance Harki campaign, are intended to encourage participation outside 
the site in protests and demonstrations. In this chapter, I focus on websites that have been 
designed for discussion and participation directly on the site. These sites either have an open 
discussion forum or invite potential participants to post articles or comments, and are run by a 
moderator or webmaster who regulates the content. The four Harki discussion-oriented websites 
examined are Harkis.info,
21
 Le Blog de Harkis,
22
 the “Coalition Nationale des Harkis et des 
Associations de Harkis” [hereafter Coalition Nationale]23 and Monharki.com.24 All four sites are 
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run by male descendants of Harkis who either describe themselves as apolitical or are equally 
critical of leaders from both sides of the political spectrum. They have created these sites 
precisely because no political organization or party has addressed their needs and concerns. The 
number of visits to each site varies widely and it is impossible to distinguish how many different 
people access the sites.
25
 Even if that figure were relatively small, however, the sites’ 
significance is rooted in the ways they publicize dissenting views of Harki history and can be 
used to mobilize Harki children. 
History of French Algeria: The “Independence” Narrative  
The February 2005 law sparked debates in France about how to interpret the nature of the 
French colonial project in Algeria. The pro-colonial law emphasized the positive impact of the 
French presence in Algeria, featuring improvements in agriculture, medicine, education, and 
infrastructure. Opponents described the French presence as exploitative, arguing that European 
settlers took the best land from the indigenous population for their own profit and offering 
statistics that show adult literacy rates actually declined in French Algeria from 40 percent in 
1830 to 10 percent in 1962.
26
  
The history of French Algeria is of fundamental importance to the self-conceptions of 
Harki children, whose fathers played a part in maintaining this system. They have proposed 
competing narratives of this period that parallel wider arguments in France. A key disputed issue 
has been the initial relationship between France and Algeria. The anti-colonial narrative of 
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French Algeria posits France as having conquered Algeria in 1830. This narrative depicts France 
as a foreign, invading power and situates French Algeria within the traditional patterns of 
colonization. It highlights the French invasion and occupation of Algiers and surrounding 
territories, as well as the brutal, protracted campaigns in the countryside to gain control and quell 
resistance. On the whole, the Harki memoirs as a genre have focused more on conveying 
personal experiences of decolonization than on exploring the origins of French colonialism in 
Algeria. Yet in Fatima Besnaci-Lancou’s memoir, Fille de Harki, she began her chronology of 
Harki history in 1830 with the “Conquest of Algeria by France,” thus ascribing, at least 
superficially, to the anti-colonial position.
27
   
Participants on all four of the websites have explicitly challenged this narrative by 
arguing that Algeria did not exist as a country before the French arrived and, as the moderator of 
Harkis.info summarized, “Algeria was a French creation.28 Khader Moulfi, the moderator of the 
Coalition Nationale website, expressed an essentialist understanding of the past when he 
confronted the conquest narrative by arguing that “The falsification of History resides precisely 
in considering Algeria as a sovereign and constituted country that was invaded and occupied by a 
colonial power.”29 In an article on Monharki.com, one Harki son asserted that “Algeria never 
existed as a nation-state before the French colonization” and argued that not only was it “France 
that fashioned the Algeria of today as a country, it is she who […] gave Algeria its body and soul 
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and allowed its administrative organization.
30
 On Le Blog de Harkis one participant pointed out 
that even the name “Algeria” was given to this territory by the French.31 While historians would 
generally agree with this statement,
32
 Martin Evans and John Phillips have argued that it was the 
Ottoman period (1529-1830) that ”defined the territorial identity of the country and created the 
basis for the Algerian nation state as a geopolitical entity.”33 
The website participants have also emphasized that after France created Algeria, this 
region was integrated into France as three departments in 1848, making it a unique case in 
France’s colonial history.34 On Le Blog de Harkis, one contributor explained that, “Algeria was 
like Alsace, Brittany or Corsica today. No one thought it was a separate country. People who 
were born in Algeria at the time were French, their parents were, and their grandparents as 
well.”35 Their main point was that “Algeria was France, one and indivisible!!!”36 Although the 
Second Republic extended department status to the coastal regions of French Algeria and 
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claimed “Algeria was France,” the administrative category of “Muslim” excluded most French of 
North African origin from exercising the same rights as “Europeans” in these departments.37 
Ultimately, these Harki sons have constructed a historical narrative of colonization that 
was designed to refute the idea that Harkis were traitors. If France created Algeria and Algeria 
was part of France, then the Harkis could not be considered to have betrayed their country by 
fighting with the French army. As one participant on Monharki.com explained, “We do not 
believe our parents were traitors because Algeria was a French department at the time and they 
put themselves on the side of order to defend their lives and those of their families.”38 An article 
on Le Blog de Harkis echoed the same idea: “That is why the harkis fought for France. It was 
their country. It’s normal to fight for your country against those we call ‘terrorists.’”39 
Another key question in the 2005 debates that has also divided Harki children concerns 
the quality of life in French Algeria. When Harki daughters discussed the colonial period in their 
memoirs, they tended to stress the wretchedness of life under colonialism. Saliha Telali 
described “the suffering of a people that lives under the domination of another country.”40  She 
challenged the idea that colonialism had a positive effect on the population. Telali wrote, “If 
there was a ‘civilizing mission,’ it was not apparent in the living conditions of families in the 
countryside.”41  This theme was also present in the testimonies that Fatima Besnaci-Lancou 
collected from Harkis themselves. One Harki declared, “It is the injustice done to Algerians, for 
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130 years, that is responsible! We walked with bare feet and were starving throughout all the 
years that Algeria was French.”42 Another blamed colonialism for the tragedies all parties 
experienced during the Algerian War. “Without the colonization of Algeria,” he argued, “there 
never would have been all these misfortunes.”43  
Participants on the Harki websites almost never went so far as to praise colonialism. A 
notable exception was Kader Hamiche, the son of a Harki, who occasionally guest authored 
articles for the website Harkis.info. In his memoir, one of only two written by Harki sons, 
Hamiche argued that “Many [Harkis] understandably thought in 1955 that Arabs were not 
capable of governing Algeria, which those in power have worked hard to prove true through 
forty years of neglect, dictatorship et pillage. It seems to me that no one today questions France’s 
civilizing mission in Algeria, except for the Arabo-Islamist fanatics.”44 
Most Harki children posting on the websites, however, defended the colonial period only 
in contrast to the current state of Algeria, arguing that Algerian misery under the rule of the FLN 
was worse than any that existed in French Algeria. Khader Moulfi asserted that the Harkis and 
their families were not victims of French colonialism, but rather “victims of decolonization,” as 
it was carried out by the FLN. He expressed the belief that Algerians today have the FLN, and 
not France, to blame for their current misfortunes.
45
 Massi agreed, declaring, “If Algeria 
presently suffers (unemployment, misery, massacre…), it is no longer the fault of France and the 
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harkis, 43 years after the end of hostilities, but that of the ‘pseudo heroic resistance’ of the FLN, 
who spoiled all the riches of the country. They live like billionaires…while the people suffer all 
kinds of harm.”46  
We can situate the Harki children’s conflicting interpretations of the colonial period 
within a longer history of the decolonization narrative. Historian Todd Shepard has argued that, 
“From the 1830s on, French officials maintained that Algerian territory was part of France and 
that Algeria’s inhabitants were all French subjects.”47 After 1961, however, “French bureaucrats, 
politicians, and journalists rewrote the history of imperialism and anti-imperialism so that 
decolonization was the predetermined end point.”48 Thus, “In the last years of the Algerian War, 
French discussions transformed this descriptive term into a historical category, an all but 
inevitable stage in the tide of History.”49 This discursive move allowed the French to avoid 
confronting problems of racism and religious discrimination in their empire.
50
 By labeling their 
former Muslim subjects “Algerians,” the French could use nationality to articulate what made 
them different from French citizens of European origin.  
The argument that decolonization was inevitable has been reflected in the Harki 
daughters’ memoirs. They have suggested that most Algerians wanted autonomy because, in the 
words of Saliha Telali, “How could one not imagine an independent Algeria?”51 The texts have 
maintained that some of the Harkis actually supported Algerian independence. In the film 
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Harkis, for which Dalila Kerchouche co-wrote the script, Saïd Benamar, a Harki, declared that 
even though he fought with the French, he was not “for French Algeria.”52 Besnaci-Lancou has 
corroborated this assertion by presenting the testimonies of numerous Harki soldiers who 
explained that they were generally in favor of Algerian independence. The reason they ended up 
supporting the French, however, was that they disapproved of the way in which the FLN was 
fighting for this independence. As one Harki stated, “Of course I wished for Algerian 
independence. Only, I refused the violence, especially toward civilians.”53 Another Harki 
explained, “We weren’t against independence, but against the injustices and abuses.”54   
Some Harki children have used the Internet as a forum for challenging the dominant post-
1961 narrative of decolonization that situates decolonization as “the predetermined endpoint.”55 
These second-generation Harkis have contested the notion that most Algerians favored 
independence by comparing the number of Harkis with the number of FLN fighters. The 
moderator of Harkis.info, Massi, warned, “don’t let yourself be seduced by the popular myths of 
the Algerian revolution spread by the FLN and all the Algerian people. The harkis, far more 
numerous than the members of the FLN, are the proof that this myth is false and that’s what 
bothers them. Know that up until ’61, everyone was behind France.”56 He further argued that “no 
one had this notion of independence” and that, out of ten million Algerians, only a few thousand 
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decided to act in favor of it.
57
 Historians do not have reliable statistics on the amount of 
indigenous support for Algerian independence, although the figure is certainly higher than 
several thousand. In the absence of historical consensus, participants in the war and their 
descendants have employed figures that support their particular ideological stances. The 
Ministère Algérien des Anciens Combattants has advanced one of the highest estimates, 
declaring that 132,290 Algerians fought in the ALN, the military branch of the FLN, and 
204,458 Algerians supported the FLN in a civilian capacity.
 58
 In contrast, a contributor on the 
Coalition Nationale website stated that there were four times as many Muslim soldiers in the 
French ranks than there were members of the ALN
59
 and another on Le Blog de Harkis argued, 
“There were more than 250,000 harkis and not more than a thousand members of the FLN, that’s 
where we can see the great lie of the FLN being founded on national unity.”60 An additional 
participant on Le Blog articulated the significance of these figures. “It’s true that colonization is 
worthy of criticism and fighting for one’s independence is legitimate, but you know that in the 
beginning the nationalists were less numerous, which clearly means that the French presence 
wasn’t all that terrible...”61 
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Harkis’ Motivations: The Choice Question  
The second debate has centered on the Harkis’ reasons for supporting the French army. 
Since Algerian independence, the question of the Harkis’ motivations for “enlistment” has been 
the cornerstone of most Harki memory narratives. The Harki identity is tied to the decision to 
fight for France. The motivations of individual Harkis, however, have remained largely 
inaccessible to historians, due to a lack of written sources and the Harkis’ hesitancy to speak 
about their past. Did the Harkis make a deliberate choice to help maintain French Algeria? This 
question moves beyond interpreting the colonial legacy to understanding the Harkis’ particular 
role in the colonial project. The ways in which children of Harkis have sought to answer it 
inform how they have related to the colonial past and situated themselves in the postcolonial 
present.  
In their memoirs, daughters of Harkis have engaged with this historical question through 
an interrogation of their particular family’s past: why their father supported the French and how 
this decision impacted their own life and identity. They highlighted how their father’s silence on 
this subject prompted them to search for an answer. By the end of their memoirs, most of these 
Harki daughters have absolved their fathers of the traitor charge by arguing either that the Harkis 
had no agency, and therefore could not make a deliberate choice of their own free will, or that 
they had been forced to fight for France in order to protect their families.
62
 They demonstrated 
that this “choice” was not made under normal circumstances and that portraying the Harkis as 
having “chosen” France deceptively implies that viable alternatives existed. Talila repeatedly 
referred to her father’s decision to support the French as a “non-choice.” She blamed colonialism 
for constructing a situation that restricted her father’s agency. “I watched him, he who did not 
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have a choice, born in a colonized country, rallied to the harki formation during the conflict. He 
had lost all form of liberty. When he had to take refuge in France, all he had left were his 
courage and his dignity.”63 Kerchouche echoed this sentiment saying, “Because he ‘chose’ 
France, my father has since been considered as a traitor by the Algerians, and has been suspected 
of becoming one by the French […] Now, in hindsight, I realize [that he] perhaps didn’t have a 
choice.”64 
When the daughters did give a justification they entertained a variety of possible 
motivations. The most common explanation was that their fathers fought with the French in 
order to defend their families. They described a situation in which civilians were caught between 
the violence of both the FLN and the French army. Historians of the Algerian War, Francois-
Xavier Hautreux, Mohand Hamoumou and Abderahmen Moumen have considered enlistment in 
response to FLN violence to be the principal factor.
65
 These historians also note that some 
enlistments were forced or brought about through “pressures” applied by the French army.66 
Besnaci-Lancou cited the work of Hautreux in her memoir and identified “Harkis” as Algerians 
who had either been “veterans of previous wars or became harkis to protect their families from 
exactions of the French army or from those of the FLN.”67 She has also asked whether the Harkis 
could be condemned for having fought with the French if they were acting out of necessity to 
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protect their children. She pondered, “A question haunts me: just how far must one fight for a 
country? Is it better to defend one’s children or one’s land?”68 Besnaci-Lancou concluded that 
while the FLN members were good independence fighters and Algerian nationalists, the Harkis 
had no choice if they wanted to be good fathers. Her explanation offered a morally acceptable 
justification: since the Harkis were acting as good fathers and husbands, they are exonerated 
from the traitor stigma.  
In addition to “fear for one’s life” and “forced enlistment in response to threats against 
one’s family,” Telali offered additional motivations: economic necessity and family solidarity. 
She presented “military pay enabling survival in the context of misery” and “enlistment of a 
family member and family loyalty” as reasons given by the Harkis themselves.69 Although 
historians have found that enlistment for economic reasons was the most rare, it fit into the 
memoir writers’ narrative of fathers doing what was necessary to provide for their families.70 
The contention that Harkis may have enlisted due to family or clan solidarity is relatively new 
among scholars. Hamoumou and Moumen have argued that “Obligations of loyalty encouraged 
the enlistment of entire families, and even entire villages or tribes, when one of its members were 
assassinated or when the head of the family, or village, or tribe, enlisted against the FLN.”71 This 
cultural limitation on Harkis’ agency calls into question whether we can consider particular 
Harkis as having made a decision to support France.  
In most of the memoirs, the patriotic explanation, which presents the Harkis as having 
been motivated by their love of France, was conspicuously absent. Telali explicitly rejected 
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arguments that Harkis chose France for ideological reasons, arguing, “It is easy today to 
construct a simple history, limiting actors to two camps with ideologically entrenched 
convictions.”72 She claimed, “If certain harkis’ enlistments were the result of a conscious 
ideological choice, this was not the case for the majority of enlisted volunteers.”73 Besanci-
Lancou too declared that the Harkis were not politically motivated when fighting the FLN.
74
  
Their understandings of their fathers’ motivations enabled the authors to challenge the 
historical barriers that have existed between the Harkis and Algerian immigrants. They suggested 
that the Harkis and other Algerians were not ideological enemies during the war, but rather 
compatriots struggling in the same tragic situation. This interpretation painted the Harkis and 
their families as victims of the colonial system, a status that gains traction in the current politics 
of memory in France. Their narratives also blurred the lines between the categories of “Harki” 
and “independence fighter.” Historians have argued that thousands of men fought first for the 
FLN and then became Harkis because they refused to participate in violent attacks against 
Muslim civilians or Europeans.
75
 Besnaci-Lancou affirmed this idea, writing, “During the 
Algerian War, with the blind terror of certain independence fighters, each Algerian was a 
potential harki.”76 In her collection of Harki testimonies, one Harki admitted to having initially 
fought for Algerian independence before switching sides. He explained, “I was very enthusiastic 
about leaving to join the combatants of the FLN. For me, this struggle was a chance to retake in 
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hand our country and to get out of the permanent humiliation that the Arabs and Berbers 
endured.”77 This Harki declared that he and his fellow combatants did not have much 
ammunition and lacked weapons but were “supported by our belligerent determination to end 
colonialism.”78 He concluded, “I could have continued to fight like that until independence, but 
unfortunately I was disgusted by the behavior of some of my companions.”79 In her memoir, 
Kerchouche retraced her family’s past in an effort to determine why her father became a “traitor” 
to Algeria, only to find that he had actually been aiding the FLN as well. Her family’s story and 
those of the Harkis interviewed by Besnaci-Lancou thus suggested that the Harki history was too 
complex for a simple Algerian/Harki dichotomy. Their interpretation has carved out a space for 
the Harkis in an Algerian collective memory of colonial injustice. 
In the discussion forums on the websites, Harki descendants have expressed a wide 
variety of ideas about why Harkis enlisted, including many of the same motivations discussed in 
the memoirs. Website moderators, however, have insisted that the Harkis made a decisive choice 
to fight for France, both in response to FLN violence and for ideological reasons. These Harki 
sons have tended to speak generally about the Harkis, not evoking their own family’s particular 
case, and they have based the Harki identity on the deliberate decision to defend France and 
French values. On a page entitled, “Who are the Harkis?” the website Harkis.info described the 
Harkis as “those who chose to remain French.”80 The site’s administrator, Massi, stated that 
claiming the Harkis did not make a conscious political choice for France, as some of the memoir 
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writers have, is “an insult to our ancestors.”81 According to Massi, “you cannot say that the 
harkis are simply mercenaries. They fought for their families, their villages and their security. 
And they loved this country that was France.”82 He suggested that no one forced the Harkis to 
serve, but rather they courageously rose to the occasion and fought to defend both their families 
and their country. One Harki son posting on this website agreed, explaining that a central aspect 
of the Harki identity was the ideological decision to defend France. He stated that “Harki” means 
“being of Algerian origin, being French and having made a humane, responsible choice.”83   
Some Harki children posting on websites have justified the Harkis’ decision by arguing 
that not only did they make a clear choice in favor of France, but also, based on the course of 
Algerian history, it is apparent that they made the right choice. They have drawn attention to the 
high numbers of Algerian immigrants who came to France following the Algerian War for 
economic opportunities and suggested that in the end, these Algerians made the same choice for 
France. On Le Blog de Harkis, one participant wrote, “The harkis made a clear choice, one to 
come live in France; explain to me why there was a large wave of Algerian immigration in the 
1970s composed of former members of the ALN and FLN, the same ones who wanted Algerian 
independence came to France later. There is really something illogical in this process.”84 On the 
blog Monharki.com, a Harki son declared that the Harkis were smart to have chosen France 
earlier than their compatriots because they avoided the serious integration problems that North 
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Africans face in France today. He proclaimed, “In light of what is going on in France today with 
the problems created by immigration, I can say that they were visionaries, and that by their 
enlistment in the French Army, they anticipated the course of History, which has proven them 
right.”85 Of course, this argument does not take into account the Harkis’ own integration 
problems, especially for those who had been placed in camps. 
Just as the memoir writers acquitted their Harki fathers of the traitor stigma, children of 
Harkis posting on websites have challenged this label on the basis that they were defending their 
country, namely France. Some Harki children have also suggested that perhaps the Algerians 
who immigrated to France in the 1960s and 70s were the actual traitors. As the daughter of an 
Harki asked on Le Blog de Harkis, “Who are the real traitors? The Harki who saved his skin or 
made his choice for the good of everyone? [Or] the immigrant who abandoned everyone, 
including the most poor who are dying of hunger, to think only of himself.”86 A participant on 
the forum for the Coalition Nationale added, “I will remind you that the harkis are not traitors, 
but rather men who made a choice, whether or not this pleases the fugitives who deserted their 
country that had gained total independence!”87 Thus, they drew a clear line between Harkis and 
Algerian immigrants and their descendants in France.  
Some Harki sons have openly objected to Dalila Kerchouche’s memoir because its 
narrative runs completely counter to the image of the heroic Harki that they have tried to 
construct. Kerchouche argued in her memoir that, “Like my father, nearly 40% of the harki 
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soldiers, according to Michel Roux [a historian who has studied the harkis], helped the FLN 
fighters.” 88 One Harki countered on Coalition Nationale, “I know very few harkis (in fact, none 
at all), despite my constant presence in the field, who gave information, arms, and ammunition to 
the FLN, since their principle reason for enlisting, was precisely to fight these mafia, 
bloodthirsty terrorists.”89 Khader Moulfi responded to the text by saying that Kerchouche has 
“declared, with pride…THAT HER HARKI FATHER HAD BETRAYED HIS COUNTRY, 
FRANCE, IN GIVING ARMS, AMMUNITION AND INFORMATION TO THE FLN!!! 
Which makes him, in this context, A REAL TRAITOR, BUT TO FRANCE BECAUSE HE 
DOUBLE-CROSSED THEM!!!”90 Harki sons stressed repeatedly on the forums the degree to 
which this memoir did not accurately represent the Harki experience. 
Inheriting the Harki Identity 
 The memory work of Harki children has been designed to address the traitor connotation of 
the Harki identity. Through their memoirs and the websites, second-generation Harkis have 
described being actively rejected by their Franco-Algerian and Euro-French peers. Kerchouche 
explained that “Because he had ‘chosen’ France, my father was thereafter considered as a traitor 
by the Algerians, and was suspected of becoming one by the French.”91 She described the 
taunting she used to receive from Algerian immigrants when she was growing up, who yelled 
insults such as “Go away, you stupid hick, you harki!”, and wrote that “In front of me, these 
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exiles used the word ‘harki’ as an insult.”92 Other Harki children described similar experiences 
of name-calling and rejection. One daughter on Harkis.info described both the anti-Harki 
discrimination and the racism against French of North African origin that she faced: “I recall a 
period of my childhood when I was rejected by the “100% French” (to simplify) children 
because my last name wasn’t French and my hair was not straight; but at the same time I was 
also rejected by the children of Algerian immigrants (whose parents weren’t harkis) because my 
first name was French (my father wanted his children to have French first names).”93 Second-
generation Harkis commiserated about this continuing discrimination against their “community,” 
with one participant alerting the others that she had discovered a website from which Harkis 
were “banned.”94 The Harki identity has remained relevant for even the third generation because 
of this anti-Harki sentiment. Besanci-Lancou wrote that “Being harki is not hereditary. Alas, the 
unhappiness is transmitted (from one generation to the next).”95 Her son, the grandson of Harkis, 
has experienced forms of rejection in school. This perpetual exclusion has bound them as the 
descendants of Harkis.  
Yet second-generation Harkis have reacted differently to this rejection. Many of the 
female Harki memoir writers entertained the idea, particularly in the absence of any clear 
explanation or justification from their fathers, that perhaps the Harkis had indeed been traitors. 
Kerchouche began her memoir by writing, “During the Algerian War, my father, an Algerian, 
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fought in the ranks of the French army against the FLN, the National Liberation Front of the 
country. How could he support colonization against independence, preferring submission to 
liberty? I don’t understand. He has never spoken to me about it.”96 Since she learned from her 
French and Franco-Algerian peers to be ashamed of her Harki identity, she struggled to 
understand why her father committed the shameful act of defending the colonizer. As Telali 
wrote in her memoir, “I noticed that my father hid the history of his country. He never referenced 
the past and […] I held him responsible for our isolation. Wasn’t he responsible for this choice? 
Wasn’t he a traitor to his nation? Why this silence about the war?”97 In the film Harkis, the main 
character Leïla, who is a Harki daughter, questioned her father as to why he fought with France 
and then declared he must have been a traitor.
98
  
These women also expressed a certain ambivalence about their status as Harki daughters. 
Kerchouche confessed, “I am the daughter of harkis. I write this word with a lowercase ‘h’, as in 
honte [shame].”99 One Harki daughter explained, “We, the children, inherited from our fathers 
the identity of traitors, collaborators, harkis. These words hurt me. Now I don’t say (harki) 
anymore. People have taught me all too well that it means “traitor.”100 Their chagrin indicates a 
particular relationship to the Harki identity. Harki daughters seem to have inherited the weight of 
the Harki past, but appear less invested than Harki sons in the soldierly connotation of the 
identity. As women, they are visibly not Harkis themselves and this distance has allowed them to 
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more fully engage with the traitor accusation and be more critical of the Harki past. It may also 
have made them particularly well suited to ultimately pardon their fathers. 
Harki sons have employed a different approach in response to the exclusion they have 
experienced from other French and Algerians. They never entertained the idea that their fathers 
may have been traitors. Instead, they have used websites as public spaces in which to proudly 
self-identify as children of Harkis.
101
 For them, this act, coupled with their heroic interpretation 
of the Harki past has emptied the label of its shameful stigma. A common refrain on these 
websites has been, “proud to be the son of a Harki.”102 One Harki posted, “AS I OFTEN 
CELEBRATE, I AM BERBER, MY FATHER HARKI, AND I AM PROUD OF HIM AND 
HAPPY MYSELF AND I DON’T GIVE A DAMN ABOUT THE PREJUDICES OF 
OTHERS.”103 As an interesting counter-example, one Harki daughter, a frequent participant on 
Coalition Nationale, expressed this same pride. She explained, “to me, my father is the man with 
the most integrity, the most honest and courageous that I know and how could I repudiate him, 
since he has taught me honor, and has given me everything? In fact, I think that what bothers [the 
French and Franco-Algerians], all of them, is that we, children of Harkis, we are proud of our 
parents and ready to sacrifice in order to render them the homage they are owed.”104  
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This woman and the Harki sons on the websites have found the ambivalence of the 
memoir writers towards the Harki identity problematic. One contributor to Harkis.info posted 
with regard to Kerchouche’s memoir that “this book is shameful. She doesn’t give a damn about 
her father.”105 Khader Moulfi agreed that “We know that Dalila KERCHOUCHE is ashamed of 
being a “harki’s daughter’.”106 Moulfi also repeatedly described Kerchouche and Besnaci-
Lancou as the representatives of the “Harkis, malgré nous,” the “Harkis against our will,” a 
reference to the “malgré-nous,” a group of Alsatians who were drafted into the German forces 
during World War II.
107
 He argued that when Besnaci-Lancou appeared on France 3, a major 
French television station, and claimed that the Harkis were forcibly enlisted to support the 
French, she called into question the patriotism and loyalty of the Harki soldiers.
108
 He and Massi 
have asserted that by not proudly affirming the Harki identity and celebrating the Harkis’ 
decision to fight for France, these women have contributed to the image of Harkis as traitors.
109
 
As Massai explained, “We could behave like some and ask forgiveness from the executioners, or 
we could behave in a manner worthy of our fathers.”110 For them, the only way to fight exclusion 
and anti-Harki discrimination has been to publicly embrace their Harki history. 
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Emphasis and Affiliations 
The narratives that Harki children have constructed about the colonial past and the 
Harkis’ motivations indicate how they wish to situate themselves in postcolonial French society. 
This is also conveyed through the moments they have chosen to emphasize. In addition to 
denouncing French colonialism in Algeria, the memoirs concentrated on describing the 
internment camps and articulating the injustices Harkis suffered in France. For the Harki 
daughters writing memoirs, living in these camps constituted a defining aspect of the Harki 
experience. Kerchouche’s memoir focused on her family’s journey through different Harki 
camps and her second text, Leïla, took place entirely in 1972 in a camp. She only occasionally 
referenced what her family had experienced before they arrived there. The first feature film on 
the Harkis, Harkis, was based on Leïla and was also situated firmly in France. Kerchouche thus 
suggested that even if Harki history did not begin with their arrival in France, this period was a 
pivotal moment in their past.
111
 One of the two Harki sons who published a memoir, Karim 
Brazi, also focused on the post-1962 period and compared the fates of a Harki son who grew up 
in a camp with one who escaped that lot and was able to integrate more easily into French 
society.  
The memoir writers depicted the camps as reproductions of the colonial system, with its 
inherent structural racism, in mainland France. Their texts described the deplorable living 
conditions in these camps and on the hardships they endured. The Harkis and their wives that the 
memoir writers interviewed told stories of children and the elderly who froze to death in the 
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camps.
112
 They recalled dirty and humid barracks, full of cockroaches, and explained that they 
were subject to curfew and essentially imprisoned. One Harki evoked “the misery of the Harkis” 
and declared that “No one can live in such a place for long without losing some of there mental 
health there.”113  
Harkis, their wives, and their children also depicted the blatant racism of those in charge 
of the camps. Some of the camps were run by army officers, who instituted military-style 
discipline, and others were controlled by Pieds-Noirs, who spoke some Arabic and were 
considered to be “familiar” with Algerian culture.  The memoirs contain tales of being 
infantilized, mocked, and humiliated by the heads of the camps, their wives, and French police 
officers.
114
 In Brazi’s text, the Harki son growing up in the camps recalled “the harsh isolation of 
successive camps where he and those like him were concentrés (assembled). He told of how 
permanent mental slaver secluded and conditioned his community, how hard it was to mingle 
with the local population.”115 While he “just wanted to be normal, like everyone else, just a 
young Frenchman,” the girl he was pursuing was chastised for hanging around with “those 
people.”116 
The memoir writers devoted significantly more time in their works to criticizing the 
French state and its treatment of the Harkis in France than they did to condemning the FLN for 
the 1962 massacres that precipitated the Harkis’ departure for France. They stressed that it was 
the French who treated them unjustly on the basis of their appearance, names, and/or religion and 
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in this respect many Harki sons and daughters faced the same discriminatory practices as other 
Muslim North African immigrants. In her memoir, Saliha Telali explained that being the 
daughter of a Harki meant she too had immigrant origins and therefore faced similar challenges 
in France. “The feeling of rejection is part of me. Through our family’s history, I am the child of 
a Harki. I am the product of immigration. The way I am perceived remains stained by the 
colonial history despite the years that have elapsed.”117 Female memoir writers have thus 
identified with Algerian immigrants as common victims of colonialism in Algeria and continued 
discrimination in France. Seeking reconciliation with the Algerian immigrant community has 
proven challenging, given the historical legacy of the war and the climate of historical memory 
that positions memory collectives against each other. However, Harki daughters’ distance from 
the soldierly identity of their fathers has allowed them more freedom to successfully seek such 
reconciliation.  
The first-generation Harkis and their wives cited in these memoirs also tended to 
emphasize their Algerian identity more than the sons writing on Harki websites. Many Harkis 
referred to Algeria as “my country” or “our country,” and expressed the wish they had been able 
to remain there following Algerian independence. Dalila Kerchouche observed that her parents 
clung to their Algerian identity in the face of exclusionary practices in France. She explained that 
the “certainty of being Algerians never left them. Algerians who were humiliated and detested, 
but Algerians nonetheless. Better that than nothing at all.”118  
Harki wives in particular seemed more willing to admit a longing for and attachment to 
Algeria. For most, it was not due to their own actions, but rather those of their husbands, that 
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they ended up in France. One Harki wife, Khatidja, declared, “It was our husbands who waged 
war, not us. And yet we paid, like them.”119 Stéphan Gladieu described the Harki wives he and 
Kerchouche interviewed as “these women who were never able to choose” and explained how 
they “they told us of their suffering, their regrets, their private heartbreaks, their nostalgia for 
Algeria.”120 Saliha Telali spoke of her mother’s regret at having to leave her country that had just 
been liberated. Telali stressed the importance of understanding “the tragedy of all these women 
who never made a choice. They followed the choice of their husbands, which, as has been 
pointed out, was in most cases a ‘non-choice’.”121  
Harki wives also retained stronger ties to Algeria because they generally had a more 
difficult time integrating into French society than their husbands and children. They had fewer 
opportunities to leave their homes and the camps and to participate in French society. Telali has 
argued that “We rarely talk about the female experience of immigration. And yet, women paid 
the most for the barrier that was imposed between ‘us’ and ‘them’ […]”122 Harki wives were also 
not completely “banished” the way their husbands had been and could more easily return to 
Algeria. The first generation in many cases passed on this memory of, and nostalgia for, Algeria 
to their daughters. The importance of the “native country” created a link between these Harki 
descendants and Algerians that Harki sons writing on websites have not expressed.  
Harki sons have focused on a different moment in the Harki past on their websites.  For 
them, the defining event in Harki history occurred between April and September of 1962, when 
French troops pulled out of Algeria and left the Harkis vulnerable to the exactions of the FLN. 
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They have seemed far less interested in the experiences of the camps and French racism than in 
the crimes committed by Algerians. Website administrators explained that setting the film Harkis 
in 1972, for example, was misleading because it occludes the events that came before, thus 
leaving the novice French viewer uninformed about what they have considered to be the true 
“harki drama.”123 While Harkis stated that between fifty and eighty thousand Harkis and their 
families were died in the post-independence violence,
124
 the website administrators have claimed 
that one hundred and fifty thousand were killed.
125
 Also, unlike Kerchouche and Besnaci-
Lancou, these sons often referred to the massacres as the “harki genocide,” the term that came 
into use during the 2001 crimes against humanity case. In response to efforts made by memoir 
writers and their associates to speak out about human rights violations in the camps, a post on 
Harkis.info read, “On that day [in 1962], how many granddaughters did not have the privilege of 
going to the camps and were sent back to be massacred on the Algiers port? Where was the 
League of the Rights of Man then?”126 This renders members of the FLN, those who committed 
the “harki genocide”, as the clear antagonists in this narrative. 
The webmasters’ emphasis on the massacres was also reflected in the chronology of 
events they posted their mission statements and in their discussions about Harki identity on 
discussion board forums. On “Le site de la communauté harkie,” website administrators posted a 
timeline of events in Harki history. They highlighted in bold the entry, “July: Algerian 
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independence after 130 years of French presence – Beginning of the harkis massacres,” and 
provided a link through the word “massacres” to gruesome photos of mutilated Harki bodies. 
Administrators described the Harkis arriving in France and settling in camps and then ended their 
chronology in the winter of 1962.
127
 On Harkis.info, the webmaster Massai did not mention the 
camps in the sections entitled “Who are the Harkis?” or “Why create this site?”128 Similarly, 
besides a vague reference to the mistreatment of four generations of Harkis, the Coalition 
Nationale website virtually ignored the internment camps experience in favor of descriptions and 
passionate denunciations of the “harki genocide.”129   
Harki children posting on the websites proudly affirmed their French identity, despite any 
discrimination they may have faced in France. As one participant explained, “It’s true that 
France locked us up in harki camps, we did not go to school, we were discriminated against 
everywhere, we were treated as Arabs, but it’s France. It’s like a mother who hits her children, 
but she’s nevertheless our mother and we must pardon her and love her. This is what my father 
told me. This is why I love this country. Tomorrow will be better, God willing. Long live the 
harkis. Long live France.”130 For many of the second-generation Harkis writing on these 
websites, “my country” referred to France, and they even even more patriotic than their “native 
French” peers. On Harkis.info, Massi used an icon that included the tricolor flag. One Harki 
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child wrote, “I am happy to live, to have grown up on French soil (LAND OF THE RIGHTS OF 
MAN, HOMELAND OF VICTOR HUGO AND JULES FERRY).”131  
Unlike some of the Harkis and their families in the memoirs, these particular Harki 
children did not express a desire to be able to go back to Algeria, but instead sought more 
recognition for their services from France. One daughter of a Harki wrote that she was not 
interested in the Algerians and their “FLhaine,” declaring instead, “I am going to demand 
reckoning from MY country, this France that my father calls ‘the mother country.’”132 These 
second-generation Harkis have situated themselves firmly in France and renounced their 
Algerian identity. They have also distinguished themselves from Algerian immigrants, whom 
they argue have not earned the right to be French the way that the Harkis have. As one Harki son 
wrote, “Yes, I am proud of harkis […] the harkis remain the most courageous men and fully 
worthy of being French, not like those who want to be French, yet who don’t want to love 
France. The harkis spilt their blood, and through their spilt blood they proved their love for this 
country.”133  
Conclusion  
 The Harkis and their descendants do not act as a monolithic memory collective. Rather, 
children of Harkis have constructed rival interpretations of the colonial past based on how they 
would like to situate themselves in postcolonial French society. The fact that their competing 
narratives fall along gender lines indicates that the masculine Harki identity is transmitted in 
distinct ways to Harki sons and daughters. The Harkis are a particular group, but the different 
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content of their narratives raises important questions about the relationship between gender and 
memory.  
The case of Harki memorializing also calls into question the utility of the “memory wars” 
paradigm by revealing another level on which memory of the Algerian War has proven divisive. 
At the same time, it serves as a reminder of the reconciliatory potential of collective memory. A 
consistent feature of Harki collective memories is that they are not self-sufficient; their narratives 
are always formed in relation to wider French understandings of the colonial period and 
ultimately reflect a desire to belong. 
177 
CHAPTER 5: CYBER CARRIERS OF HARKI MEMORY, 2005-2013 
The Internet has offered new ways of producing, transmitting and accessing information, 
including narratives of the past. My project is the first to analyze how Harkis and their children 
have made use of this technology in their memory work. I argue that websites, discussion 
forums, and blogs constitute a type of memory carrier that is distinct from those—organizational, 
cultural, official, and scholarly—identified by Henry Rousso.1 Analyzing how Harkis and their 
descendants have employed cyber carriers, particularly in relation to other vectors, provides an 
opportunity to consider the role of media in the transmission of memory. Collective memory is, 
after all, “an inherently mediated phenomenon.”2 While Chapter 4 explored the different content 
of the narratives expressed through cultural and cyber carriers, this chapter compares the way 
these carriers have functioned and considers why they have been gendered in the case of the 
Harkis.  
 In writing memoirs and collecting oral histories, Harki daughters claim to speak for 
individuals. This is typical of cultural memory carriers
3
 and Sylvia Paletschek and Sylvia Schraut 
have found that women tend to “individualize their memories to a higher degree than men. 
Women say I when men withdraw to one.”4 The female memoir writers assert that Harkis and 
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their descendants are marked by diversity. For this reason, they are more comfortable with a 
plurality of memories, of co-existing, competing memories. On the Harki websites, however, 
webmasters claim to speak for a collectivity and seem to have stricter notions about what 
constitutes the “true” Harki history. Administrators establish a specific interpretation of the past 
on the site, which they update through various articles announcing the appropriate reactions to 
current events. They regulate what is posted in the discussion board forums both by removing 
offensive posts and policing diversions from the established interpretation. Webmasters do not 
provide information on their own family histories, which they may consider tangential to the 
collective history of the group. In fact, at times they contest the authority given to memoir 
authors as representatives of Harki collective memory, since they only offer individual 
experiences.  
 The structural logic of the Internet also influences the way memories are transmitted 
through cyber carriers. As Michelle Henning has observed, “technologies of data retrieval and 
now digital processing, make it possible to replace historical narrative by cross-referencing and 
the mere ‘co-presence’ of objects. A form of memory akin to computer RAM (Random Access 
Memory) replaces historical narrative.”5 Digital memory is accessed in a continuous and 
fragmented manner and this interface limits how participants receive, process, and imbue 
meaning in the information that is transmitted. It can be challenging for sons of Harkis to present 
a coherent and consistent narrative of their past online. Harki daughters’ memoirs, in contrast, 
offer relatively fixed texts for others to accept, reject or reinterpret. In many ways, the narrative 
quality of their accounts reflects the tradition of oral transmission within families, which has 
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often been a female-dominated practice. Nina Sutherland has argued that through their memoirs, 
Harki daughters have fused a European written cultural form with a North African ritual of 
storytelling.
6
 Their familial, personal stories differ greatly from the collective accounts expressed 
through websites. 
 The Harki children’s use of competing carriers has led to important, and often hostile, 
conflicts about authority and representation. Cyber carriers have allowed more children of Harkis 
to participate directly in building a shared memory. Using the Internet to share and construct 
traces of the past is a public memory performance devoid of traditional mediating influences 
such as those of institutions or publishers. As such, cyber carriers have fragmented authority on 
the past and democratized the process of collective memory formation. Yet, they also lack the 
legitimacy of older, more traditional carriers. Websites are often created by individuals and 
associations without access to the resources necessary to publish a memoir or make a film.  
Harki daughters have become particularly vocal, and popular, representatives of this 
community through their memoirs. These women have spoken for the Harkis and their 
descendants at conferences and colloquiums on the Algerian War, and have been most frequently 
interviewed on television and in print media about the Harkis. Whereas their memoirs have 
received national press and been celebrated by the French media, the Harki websites are not well 
known among non-Harkis. The reception of Harki daughters’ works reveals how the legacy of 
colonialism has continued to shape understandings of gender roles among French of North 
African origin. The French colonial administration justified its rule in Algeria by contrasting 
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‘”Muslim’ Algerian misogyny and backwardness” with “the moralizing and civilizing premises 
of French domination.”7 It portrayed the Algerian woman as “humiliated, sequestered, 
cloistered” by her husband and claimed to make her liberation their aim.8 Women of North 
African origin continue to be perceived as victims of Muslim patriarchy in postcolonial France.
9
 
Harki daughters’ narratives may therefore be embraced as acts of emancipation. Harki sons have 
remained aware of the greater popularity of the memoir writers’ works and have resented the co-
opting of this “male history” by female narrators. This has led to disputes over representation and 
contributed to the contentious process of constructing a collective memory. 
Harki children have used websites not only to challenge the authority of the memoir 
writers, but also as platforms for publicly contesting the narratives and interpretations of non-
Harkis. As I demonstrated in Chapter 3, Harki children have used cyber carriers to organize 
resistance to official commemorations. Through these sites, they have also objected to 
representations put forth by historians that do not conform to their own understandings. 
Webmasters appear to value scholarly carriers as sources of truth about the past, but also to 
blame scholars for the lack of historical knowledge about the Harkis and their experiences. 
Finally, they dispute the practices and narratives of other groups with a stake in the memory of 
the Algerian War. I focus on their reactions to two films that they consider to be ideologically 
oriented towards the FLN. Their posts reveal a sense of frustration over the fact that whereas 
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films are an important way of educating the French public about the colonial past, their own 
websites have remained less influential.  
Webmasters also seem to have borrowed the “memory wars” model, created and 
employed by scholars, to frame their relationships to the collective memories of these other 
groups. Harki children’s websites offer an opportunity to consider the role of the Internet in the 
emergence and popularity of the competitive memory framework in France. Conflicts over how 
to interpret the past are both revealed and exacerbated by the public nature of the Internet. 
Because of the superficial anonymity afforded by pseudonyms, online participants are often less 
inhibited in their speech and their exchanges take on a more aggressive tone. This phenomenon 
is compounded by the ability to react almost instantaneously, without the filters of time or 
institutions. Yet while the Internet affects the speed, tone and pervasiveness of confrontations 
over the past, it produces extreme versions of what are normal collective memory processes. 
Nature of Cyber vs. Cultural Carriers 
As cultural carriers of memory, Harki daughters’ memoirs and films offer highly 
individualistic memories and leave their past open to interpretation. In these texts, the authors 
have presented not only their own narratives, but also numerous other stories, which demonstrate 
the diversity of Harki experiences. For them, being a Harki, or the child of a Harki, is a very 
individual experience, full of complexities and contradictions. As Amar Assas observed in the 
post-face of one of Fatima Besanci-Lancou’s works, the question of “choice,” which is so central 
to Harki memory and identity, can only find its answer in each individual story. As we know, 
there was no autonomous and organized system of Harkis.”10 Each story included certain aspects 
of the Harki narrative (threat of massacre, abandonment, time in internment camps, 
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discrimination), but not everyone had or described all these experiences. Moreover, many 
Harkis, even within the same book of memoirs, had differing perspectives on their lives. Thus, 
instead of arguing that there was a single Harki past, the memoirs presented multiple 
interpretations of the past, and the overall effect was a very heterogeneous understanding of the 
Harkis. 
In Nos mères, Paroles blessées, for example, Besnaci-Lancou presented the varied stories 
and experiences of thirteen wives of Harkis. These women expressed views that ranged from 
gratitude toward France to hatred of the country. One woman believed that she and her family 
were fully integrated in France and two others claimed they were happy to be in France because 
there was running water and their children had access to education. Another Harki wife avoided 
criticizing the way France treated the Harkis and their families because she was simply grateful 
to have been saved from the massacres. Some of the testimonies, however, presented more 
ambivalent attitudes toward the French and the FLN. One woman said she just wanted to be 
accepted in France; another admitted that although the French looked after her and her family in 
the camps, they did not care for them well. A third blamed both the French and the FLN equally 
for her misfortune. Finally, two of the women placed all of the blame for their tragic lives and 
their unhappiness on France.
11
 By making public the diversity of Harki experiences, then, the 
memoir writers have challenged the existence of a single Harki collective experience. In 
response to the negative perception of Harkis held by many Euro-French and Franco-Algerians, 
they have refuted the idea that “Harki” means any one particular thing. They have generally 
presented the Harkis as victims, but they have also left room for other interpretations.  
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The websites, on the other hand, have actively promoted a far less nuanced version of the 
past. Webmasters have sought to educate Harkis and non-Harkis on the “right” version of 
history. Each site has provided a specific explanation of who the Harkis were and a single 
understanding of their history. This narrative served as the basis for their “apolitical and militant 
collectivity” and allowed little room for variation.12 Their interpretation entailed a rigid, 
Manichean understanding of the past in which the Harkis were the heroes defending their land, 
values and families against the evil members of the FLN. As one post explained, “the reasons 
why our parents enlisted in the French army were, as most of us on this site know, the barbaric 
acts of the FLN toward our brave parents, who took up arms to avoid falling into the yoke of 
despotism.”13   
Although Harkis and their descendants presented a range of views and interpretations on 
the discussion board forums, each site had a moderator who regulated what people posted. These 
moderators reserved the right to remove posts, usually made by visitors to the site, that they 
found offensive.
14
 One contentious interaction that was not removed took place between a person 
calling himself “de Gaulle” and the moderator Massi on Harkis.info. “De Gaulle” attempted to 
start a dialogue about General de Gaulle’s responsibility for the Harki massacres, arguing that it 
was not necessarily his fault that the FLN did not honor its promise to protect the Harkis as 
stipulated in the Evian Accords. Massi’s response was swift and harsh, declaring that “If you 
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wish to participate in this forum, then stop your paternalism and quit acting like we’re 
morons.”15 “De Gaulle” retorted that he had hoped there would be more freedom of discussion 
and openness toward non-Harkis on Harkis.info,
16
 but another Harki son congratulated Massi for 
regulating the nature, substance, and tone of the site.
17
 
Website administrators also regulated the views and memories that members of the site, 
predominantly Harki descendants, presented.
18
 When one Harki daughter, Nora, dissented from 
Massi’s narrative about the reasons why the Harkis enlisted, Massi made it clear how he 
understood the relationship between individual experiences and Harki collective history. Nora 
wrote, “No, our fathers or grand-fathers did not fight out of love for France or contempt for 
Algeria, far from it! No, I don’t believe it for a second!” on the Harkis.info site.19  Massi 
corrected her version of the past, replying, “You conflate all the harkis in reducing it to your 
particular case. But you are on a harki site and your History is ours.”20  He expressed a fear that 
presenting contradictory interpretations threatened the integrity of the Harki memory and identity 
as a whole. Massi added, “You don’t have the right to say, in taking the example of your father, 
that the Harkis did not fight out of love for France. You also don’t have the right to speak in their 
name. Everyone knows the motivations of one another, whether it be for love of France, for 
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reasons of security, through necessity. We don’t have the right to minimize their enlistments or 
their sacrifice.”21 Thus, the image of the Harkis sacrificing themselves for France reigned 
supreme over any individual experience that might undermine that of the collective.  
Website administrators controlled the discussions so that they did not challenge the 
collective Harki identity. When an anonymous participant on Coalition Nationale mentioned the 
role of the Berbers in the Harki past, the moderator Khader Moulfi strongly denounced the issue 
of the Harkis’ racial origins as “off-topic and suspicious.”22 Harkis came from diverse 
backgrounds and some Harki sons expressed pride in their Berber heritage on the websites. Yet 
Moulfi preferred to focus on the Harkis’ shared history, rather a potential source of division. As 
he explained, he saw this site as “a place of information and militancy, in favor of the Harkis and 
their Families, and not at all a place for group therapies of any kind.”23 According to him, the 
Harkis were a unified identity group and the site was only available for discussion on their 
common issues. He wrote, “We won’t let people take over our site who just want a forum (that is 
very popular among internet users) and who want to launch debates that have nothing to do with 
our profession of faith.”24 Furthermore, he warned the anonymous contributor, “don’t try to 
claim freedom of expression because when someone insults my parents and me in the street, I 
would rather correct him than discuss with him, and it’s the same thing on this site.”25 Thus, the 
forum was available for only a particular, limited discussion about the past.  
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Internal Memory Conflicts: Contested Representation 
Webmasters have objected to the texts published by Dalila Kerchouche and Fatima 
Besnaci-Lancou for a number of reasons. For one, they have found the individualistic quality of 
the memoirs problematic. Massi, for example, disapproved of the title of the film Harkis, which 
was based on one of Kerchouche’s texts, arguing it was “pretentious” to use the name “Harkis” 
in the plural since it focused on the story of a single family. In an article entitled “Harkis or 
Harki?” he deplored the fact that the only feature film on the Harkis was “simply an extended 
version of Kerchouche’s Mon Père, ce Harki and not the history of all the Harkis!”26 Similarly, 
Khader Moulfi on Coalition Nationale declared that if Besnaci-Lancou “had a conscience, she 
would stop usurping the name ‘harkis’” for her association Harkis et Droits de l'Homme because 
it served her own personal interests, rather than those of the Harkis as a collective.
27
  
Harki sons have also taken issue with the content of the memoir writers’ narratives, as I 
demonstrated in Chapter 4, and they have questioned the ability of women to represent the male-
coded category of “Harki.” Webmasters disapproved of the fact that the film Harkis was told 
from the perspective of a young woman, Leïla, and of how the Harki history was used as the 
background to a “coming of age” film. The film documented Leïla’s teenage rebellion and 
depicted her acting “French” by smoking, flirting, and reading adolescent magazines, which 
Moulfi found unsettling.
28
 Massi also regarded her romantic interlude with a young Frenchman 
in the film as distasteful because he felt it has no place in the Harkis’ serious history.29 
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Moreover, Harki sons posting on websites found it problematic that throughout the film, Leïla 
continually challenged her father’s authority. She disobeyed him by going behind his back to 
confront the head of the camp, having a romantic relationship with a Frenchman, and eventually 
running away. Leïla also declared that her father was a traitor during the war for supporting 
France. Moulfi wrote, “can you imagine that the daughter of a harki would dare shame her 
father by misbehaving in front of the whole camp…and by denouncing him to her own mother 
as a coward and a traitor?”30 Massi pointed out the hypocrisy he saw in the fact that Leïla 
treated her father “like a coward and a traitor between two cigarettes and a flirt.”31  
Interestingly, this conflict was not centered on religion. When denouncing Leïla’s 
adolescent behavior in Harkis, the Harki sons did not describe her as betraying the Muslim faith. 
They did not criticize the fact that unlike her mother, she did not wear a hijab in the film. In 
general, neither the memoir writers nor the Harkis writing on the websites evoked religious 
sentiment as part of their identity as Harkis. This may reflect either their successful integration 
into the French model of secular republicanism, or their desire not to alienate the rest of Euro-
French society, which adheres to this model.   
The main reason why the webmasters have objected to the works of the memoir writers, 
however, is that they have realized that these women have greater influence outside the 
community. The websites have constituted an important voice among self-identified Harkis, but 
Kerchouche and Besnaci-Lancou, through their memoirs with major publishers and reviews in 
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the national press and their feature film, have remained far more influential. Moulfi wrote, “I 
have nothing personal against Dalila KERCHOUCHE, but I argue that she brings disgrace to the 
community of harkis and their families by her positions and her unorthodox life because the 
media has the tendency to conflate her history with ours.”32 Moulfi also deplored the fact that 
people read Kerchouche but not “our writings here or on harkis.info or harkis.org to know what 
we think.” Massi expressed frustration that “our associations do not have any say in what is 
written on the harkis.”33 According to him, the media only gives voice to Harkis who “have 
atoned for their ‘faults’” and ambivalent Harkis who are not proud of themselves like “real 
Harkis.”34 Indeed, they suggested that the female memoir writers have been accepted as 
representatives of the Harki community because they gave in to the demands and expectations of 
Algerian immigrants and the rest of French society. Moulfi framed the dynamic as “The Harkis 
and their Families vs. the Mariannes of Diversity and the FLN !”35 Thus, their critiques of the 
memoir writers have resulted from the frustration that their own voices are marginalized in the 
process of collective memory formation.  
This frustration is reflected in how vehemently participants on the websites have 
denounced the Harki daughters’ texts and contested the right of these women to represent the 
Harki community. In reference to Kerchouche’s memoir, Mon Père, Ce Harki, one participant on 
Harkis.info wrote, “I see that you have read this shameful book, so…we the HARKIS can sleep 
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soundly knowing we are defended by this kind of people.”36 A contributor to Coalition Nationale 
described “the worthlessness of (Kerchouche’s) representation among the harki and pieds-
noirs”37 and Moulfi, the moderator of the site, expressed similar distaste for Kerchouche’s books, 
calling them “anti-harkis.”38 The websites contained equally vehement critiques of Besanci-
Lancou’s works. Moulfi claimed that Besnaci-Lancou hates the Harkis and accused her of 
carrying out an anti-Harki crusade.
39
 In response to Besnaci-Lancou’s efforts to reconcile with 
immigrants of North African origin, Moulfi declared that they should revoke her status as the 
daughter of a Harki “to make her a ‘beurette’40 she loves them so much!!!”41   
Webmasters and other participants have accused the memoir writers of “using” the Harki 
history for their own personal interests, including money and fame. On Harkis.info, Massi wrote 
that contrary to the memoir writers, “We don’t have anything to sell. No novels, no conferences, 
no phony films. Nothing to sell, anyway, to make dough off the 150,000 Harkis slaughtered.”42 
On the Coalition Nationale site, Moulfi declared that Kerchouche “does not care about the 
struggle of harkis and their families because her only goal is to get publicity to sell even more 
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copies of her bad book!!!”43 He called Kerchouche and Besnaci-Lancou “unscrupulous social 
climbers” who took advantage of the “harki drama” to benefit personally.44 Finally, he summed 
up his critique of the memoir authors by saying that the problem with these “megalomaniac 
characters (Dalila KERCHOUCHE, Fatima BESNACI-LANCOU, ...)” is that they “will do 
anything to get people talking about them and to satisfy their ego.”45  
Some participants on the websites held a more positive view of the Harkis film and 
Kerchouche’s efforts to make any version of the Harki history known in France. One woman 
posting on Harkis.info responded to Harkis by declaring, “it has the advantage of being the only 
film to deal with our history; what is more, it was shown in primetime.”46 She also explained that 
the film participated in “the transmission of our history” as it offered a way for her nine-year-old 
son to learn about his family’s past, and she was moved when it made him cry.47 Another woman 
posting on the site said that the film provided an occasion for her father “to break his silence of 
forty years” and finally speak about his experiences, and that he recognized himself in the 
character of Saïd Benamar, Leïla’s father.48 
The website moderators responded to these observations by explaining that poor 
representation is not necessarily better than a lack of representation. As Massi wrote, “Certain 
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people, just happy to hear the word ‘Harkis’ on TV, think that it’s better than nothing. I would 
answer that ‘better than nothing’ isn’t much.”49 This film portrayed the Harkis as 
“melodramatic” and defined them as victims of suffering in these internment camps. Massi 
proclaimed, “No, the Harkis are worth more than that.”50 He argued that the image of the Harkis 
that the French would retain from this film was potentially more damaging than if there had been 
no film at all.
51
 One Harki son declared that “We must no longer give the right to speak to this 
type of person who discredits us more than they bring anything positive to our cause.”52 Another 
Harki son agreed, lamenting that he was “impatiently waiting for another person who will really 
defend the Harki cause and participate in writing the real Harki drama.”53 
Challenging the Politics of Collective Memory in France 
The Harkis writing on websites have been concerned not only with correcting the claims 
made by members of their own community about the Harki past, but also with policing 
interpretations of this past produced by non-Harkis. Indeed, the reason representation is so 
important and contested is that Harkis writing on the websites have perceived they are engaging 
in a battle with the FLN over the interpretation of Harkis in French collective memory. When a 
Harki granddaughter questioned the logic of denouncing the work of Harki daughter memoir 
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writers on Coalition Nationale,
54
 her post elicited a very hostile and defensive response from the 
moderator, Khader Moulfi. He wrote, “I want to remind you that we are […] at the heart of a 
‘very arduous combat’ in which our detractors are ready to do anything to stifle the active 
militant movements.”55 As another Harki son explained, if the Harkis are not vigilant, and do not 
denounce anyone whose interpretations are against “the general interest,” they “will lose 
everything.”56 
In framing their memory work this way, it appears that the webmasters have internalized 
the competitive memory model, of which the “memory wars” paradigm is a product. Like the 
scholars who introduced this paradigm, Harki sons have deplored the threat that memory 
conflicts pose for national unity. Moulfi explained that this “war of memories” was also a war of 
propagandas and nationalisms, initiated by foreign and bi-national immigrants.
57
 He argued that 
in trying to influence how history is written, these “bi-national immigrants,” namely Franco-
Algerians, have been undermining the unity of the Republic. Moulfi proclaimed that “we’re on 
the brink of the disintegration of the republic” and feared that “soon history will be revised by 
polls and ‘pressure lobbies’ who make demands.”58 For Moulfi, this is evidenced by the fact that 
“there is a Franco-Algerian intelligentsia, a ‘beurgeoisie’ who is placed, thanks to its important 
networks, in our ministries, our administrations, our places of influence, which contributes to the 
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FLNisation of attitudes in our own country!!!”59 The website administrators have presented their 
interpretation of the Harki past as the true history, not the memory of a special interest group, 
and they have regretted the existence of this so-called “war.” 
This “war of memories” exists, according to the website administrators, because the 
French state and national education system have not done their job in establishing an official 
memory of the Algerian War. Since, “excluded memories don’t wait for historians to make them 
heard,” the survivors and descendants of both sides have been forced to mobilize their own 
versions of history.
60
 Yet Harkis sons writing on the websites have recognized that scholars act 
as important sources of authority about the colonial past. They have therefore sought recognition 
of their history by scholars who could in turn represent this history in public debates. However, 
they are suspicious of non-Harki scholars who might be influenced by the Franco-Algerian 
lobbyists. As one Harki son wrote, “it is scandalous that non-harkis are in charge of harkis. Our 
history is our own and no one has the right to modify it.”61 Therefore, they have most fully 
embraced the scholarly works of second-generation Harkis.  
One such scholar is Mohand Hamoumou, the son of a Harki, a doctor of sociology, 
founder of the association “AJIR pour les Harkis,” and the author of numerous books and articles 
on the Harkis. His monograph based off his doctoral dissertation, Et Ils Sont Devenus Harkis 
(1993), was one of the first important scholarly works on the Harkis. The website Harkis.info has 
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called him “a member of the elite of the Harki community”62 and on Coalition Nationale he was 
referred to as one of the Harkis’ “well-known intellectuals.”63 Yet Hamoumou’s research has not 
always confirmed the website administrators’ interpretations with the Harki past. For example, 
his treatment of the question of choice more closely resembled the perspective of the memoir 
writers, since he has described a diversity of experiences and motivations. He wrote, “The 
‘pressures’ of the French army and the injustices committed by the FLN were the major 
‘causes’…of the [Harkis’] enlistment.”  Other “motivating factors” in their decision to enlist 
included “the economic situation, the sense of honor in rivalries between clans, and even 
membership in a confraternity.”64 Harkis on the websites, however, have not denounced 
Hamoumou or his work as they did that of the memoir writers. This indicates that they have been 
willing to make concessions for a scholarly narrative, since they have considered it essential for 
their community to have that kind of representation. 
Perhaps precisely because the Harki sons have made these concessions, they have been 
especially offended when they thought Hamoumou was being discriminated against as a member 
of their community and was not being perceived as an objective historian. Moulfi was outraged 
when Hamoumou was excluded from an important colloquium on Franco-Algerian history in 
Lyon, supposedly because he is too “engaged” in the Harki community. He posted a letter from 
Hamoumou to the journal Le Progrès de Lyon accusing the conference organizers of not 
allowing him to participate because they did not want him to mention the Harki massacres and 
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were afraid of having a real debate.
65
 Hamoumou responded to their accusation that he was too 
“engaged” in his subject matter by arguing in favor of objective, non-ideological research and by 
citing the many scholars who praise the scientific quality of his work.
66
 Harkis writing on the 
websites were frustrated because they believed that despite his status as a scholar, Hamoumou’s 
influence in the public debate about the role of the Harkis in the Algerian War was being 
diminished because he was a member of the Harki community.  
Since they have recognized the significance of scholars in debates about the colonial past, 
the Harki children writing on the websites have contested the work of historians that they 
perceived as having an ideological bias towards the FLN. The main focus of their critique has 
been Benjamin Stora, arguably the best-known historian of the Algerian War. They repeatedly 
denounced him as “anti-harki” and called him “our official FLN historian.”67 Their first piece of 
evidence for this claim was Stora’s claim in an article on afrik.com68 that the Harkis “chose 
France and they lost.”69 One Harki son posting on Harkis.info saw this article as hinting at a 
justification of the Harki massacres.
70
 Moulfi agreed, explaining that Stora’s statement suggested 
that by making the choice to fight for France, the Harkis deserved the consequences, namely 
their “genocide” and their current marginalized place in metropolitan France. Moulfi further 
extrapolated from Stora’s comment to argue that by saying the Harkis chose their camp, he tried 
                                                 
65
 Coalition Nationale des Harkis (accessed September 21, 2008) « Colloque de Lyon : Mohand HAMOUMOU 
frappé de censure !!! » Posted by Khader Moulfi on 22-06-2006. 
  
66
 Ibid. 
 
67
 Coalition Nationale des Harkis (accessed September 21, 2008), « SARKOZY sait-il que le principal crime 
colonial fut la décolonisation ? » Posted by Khader Moulfi on 30-07-2007. 
 
68
 This forum is significant because the webmasters believed he was addressing himself to the Algerian population.  
 
69
 Harkis.info, (accessed September 21, 2008). « B. STORA, les Harkis : la France ‘reconnaissante’ mais pas 
‘responsable’ » Posted by Actus on November 8, 2004.  
 
70
 Ibid. 
 
196 
to “justify the unjustifiable,” suggesting “the harki genocide was (almost) ‘normal’,” and 
implying “that they deserved the massacre.”71 In response to Stora’s statement, Moulfi declared 
that his interpretation is a falsification of history and a misrepresentation of the chronological 
context.
72
 According to the websites’ narrative of the independence struggle, “When the harkis 
enlisted, Algeria was French and decided to stay that way, so harkis are neither traitors nor 
vulgar “mercenaries” but Frenchmen enlisted in the national army.”73 Thus, “the only [choices] 
in the conflict were France on one side (including Algeria) and the FLN on the other (which had 
no legitimacy among the Algerian people and acted out of terror and forced enlistment).”74 
Therefore, for Harki sons posting on the websites, the choice of France was clearly the right one, 
and deserved to be rewarded through official recognition, not through massacres and injustices, 
as they claim Stora suggested. Webmasters also contested Stora’s use of the term “Algerian 
War” to describe what they saw as the “pacification efforts” in Algeria.75 Even though Moulfi 
occasionally slipped into using this term himself, he proclaimed it to be a “revisionist and 
negationist term,” “a purely political and ideological intervention” whose use was unbefitting for 
an objective historian.
76
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Second-generation Harki webmasters denounced Stora’s lack of objectivity and refuted 
his version of history on their websites. In an article posted on Harkis.info, Moulfi claimed that 
“his sources are too unilateral to tell the absolute and definitive ‘truth’ on history.”77 He called 
on Stora to renounce his role as an objective historian and to take his place openly as a “quasi-
militant pro-FLN et anti-harkis” so as not to mislead the French public. He also encouraged other 
Harki associations to discredit Stora and to try to counter some of his influence.
78
 
These webmasters believed that they could not only engage with, but also alter, the 
interpretations of Stora and other historians through their sites. One participant on Coalition 
Nationale posted that he thought he recognized some of Moulfi’s ideas in Stora’s work, when, 
“contrary to his previous writings,” Stora rejected any comparison between the Vietnam War and 
the Algerian War.
79
 Moulfi responded that he was very happy to see Stora was “inspired” by his 
analysis.
80
 Moreover, Moulfi conveyed optimism about the his website’s influence when he 
observed that “since the creation of the Coalition Nationale des Harkis et des Associations de 
Harkis (including the contribution of your humble narrator!), on the Net and on ‘the ground’, 
things seem to be evolving in the right direction, because a number of ‘ideologist historians’ 
begin, little by little, to modify their antiquated, dubious positions.”81 He concluded by 
reminding the association Harkis that one must always remain “vigilant and reactive.”82  
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One explanation for Moulfi’s perception that he was participating in a dialogue with 
Stora lies in a minor media battle that the websites publicized. Two left-leaning newspapers 
wrote articles reacting to Moulfi’s critiques of Stora’s work. La Tribune, which Moulfi described 
as “one of the numerous FLN newspapers,” wrote an article saying that Stora was the target of 
the Harkis.
83
 Moulfi responded to this with an article entitled, “When the FLN comes to the 
rescue of Benjamin STORA!”84 The newspaper L’Humanité also wrote an article against Moulfi 
in response to his comments on Stora, rejecting Moulfi’s criticisms and referring to him as a “sad 
character.”85 Massi and the participants on Harkis.info came to Moulfi’s defense, re-posting his 
articles, declaring their support for his work, and encouraging Harki associations to write to the 
newspapers in protest. Although the articles outraged Moulfi and other Harkis on the websites, 
they also made it clear that people outside their community were reading his posts. 
Webmasters and other Harki children posting on their sites have also challenged what 
they see as pro-FLN narratives expressed through films. These cultural carriers are influential 
contributors to French collective memory of the Algerian War and second-generation Harkis 
have remained aware of their significance. Khader Moulfi and Boussad Azni, the Harki son who 
led a case against France for crimes against humanity, both scornfully observed that one had to 
make a film in order to be heard.
86
 The years 2006 and 2007 saw an influx of films dealing with 
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the subject of the Algerian War.
87
 The most popular of the six films to come out in this two-year 
span was the film Indigènes (in English, Days of Glory), about soldiers of North African origin 
who fought for the French during World War II.
88
 This film was nominated for several awards 
and created a stir in France as it raised awareness of the sacrifices of these soldiers who had 
never received their pensions. It caught the attention of President Jacques Chirac, who was 
reportedly very moved by the film and responded by ordering that full pensions be paid to these 
soldiers. 
Although the attention and support given to French soldiers of North African origin 
would seem to bode well for the “Harki cause,” Harki sons writing on the websites were 
suspicious of the film from the start and ended up denouncing it as a “Trojan Horse of the 
FLN.”89 Moulfi admitted that he believed it was both good and necessary to have a film that 
rehabilitated the history of soldiers in World War II who came from the former colonies, and 
noted that his father was one of these soldiers.
90
 Moreover, a film that shed light on this period in 
French history could benefit the Harkis because their participation in earlier wars (such as World 
War II and Indochina) demonstrated their patriotism. And yet, Moulfi denounced the film before 
he had even seen it. The problem, he explained, was that this film was made by a French-
Algerian director, had bi-national actors, Algerian and Moroccan silent partners, and was the 
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Algerian (aka FLN) submission at the Cannes Film Festival.
91
 Therefore, he claimed he did not 
have to watch it to know that the film would be a vehicle for the “misinformation and 
propaganda” of the FLN.92   
The particular issue that Moulfi perceived in this film was that “certain ‘sad revisionist 
and negationist’ (anti-harkis racists)” were trying to distinguish, arbitrarily, between supposed 
“just wars” (such as World War II) and the “pacification efforts” in Algeria between 1954 and 
1962 against the FLN.
93
 He used the terms “revisionist” and “negationist,” which have typically 
been ascribed to Holocaust deniers, to emphasize the injustice of this interpretation. Massi noted 
that the makers of Indigènes fabricated a myth, which was then accepted and perpetuated by the 
media, that Algerians spontaneously joined the army to liberate the Mother Country (France) 
from Nazism.
94
 Yet, he explained, people still did not believe that the Harkis had joined the army 
to liberate the Mother Country from the threat of the FLN. When he overheard spectators 
contrasting the indigènes in WWII and Harkis in the “Algerian civil war,” he responded by 
saying, “What are these people suggesting? That Algeria became independent in 1954?  That the 
indigènes are patriots for having defended France from the Nazis and that the Harkis are traitors 
for having chosen the side of French Nazis?”95 He argued that ultimately this film proclaimed the 
bravery of the FLN, not of the soldiers who fought loyally for France. As one participant on 
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Harkis.info phrased it, the film was “a new ‘thumbing your nose’ at the Harki community by the 
little immigrants from the banlieues.”96 
The Harki sons posting on the websites also saw this film as an insult because it was 
released on the “National Day of Homage to the Harkis,” September 25, 2006. When President 
Chirac and his Defense Minister evoked Indigènes during their speeches that day, Moulfi 
perceived that they had “snubbed” the Harkis by excluding them from their own commemorative 
ceremony.
97
 He declared that it was “shocking and indecent” that this date had been chosen and 
announced that the indigènes had “colonized” the Harkis’ day.98 Moulfi was also concerned that 
French audiences would end up conflating the Harkis and the indigènes, thereby “creating more 
trouble and confusion in public opinion.”99 His main contention, then, was that Chirac and his 
government did not make a distinction between the Harkis, who chose to fight for France, and 
the indigènes, who were forced to. Moulfi proclaimed that by letting their “Day of Homage” be 
hijacked by Indigènes, the French state had once again betrayed the Harkis. Moulfi argued that 
Chirac’s actions proved “the French State doesn’t care about the harkis, even during their own 
celebration, and is more concerned with serving “other interests.”100 In response to this affront, 
Moulfi called for the Harkis to boycott the 2006 commemoration, which had become “a day of 
national hypocrisy against the harkis.”101 Finally, he urged the Harki “collective” to remain 
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vigilant in the “competition of memories and prejudices” taking place and to not “just accept 
passively what we are given.”102  
The following year, these Harkis were offended again when the feature film L’Ennemi 
Intime was released in theaters during the same week as the “National Day of Homage to the 
Harkis.”103 This film was a dramatic account of the psychological effects of the Algerian War on 
French soldiers and was implicitly critical of French military actions, including those of the 
Harkis, during the war. One Harki son posting on Coalition Nationale declared that L’Ennemi 
Intime had the “Manichaeism of an American film.” He deplored the fact that the two Harkis in 
the film were presented as contemptible underlings, while the FLN fighters were portrayed as 
heroic and dignified.
104
 One of the Harkis in the film, he explained, was a former member of the 
FLN “who doesn’t hesitate to put his family in danger in order to get information.”105 The other 
Harki in the film was a veteran of the battle of Monte Cassino “who risks his life for his 
superiors but who is treated in return as less than nothing…We even see him kill a prisoner by 
shooting him in the back.”106 In contrast to these Harkis, the film depicted “dignified FLN 
combatants” who prayed before being killed by the French and one who lectured a Harki saying, 
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“you are no longer an Algerian, you will never be French.”107 Harkis children writing on the 
websites condemned what they saw as the biased portrayal of Harkis in the film. 
Khader Moulfi denounced this film as well before seeing it, this time because the 
screenplay was written by Patrick Rotman, whom he described as pro-FLN. He based this 
accusation on the fact that Rotman had also written the screenplay for the film Nuit Noire about 
the massacre of Algerians in Paris on October 17, 1961, which is an event of great historical 
significance for Algerians and immigrants of Algerian origin. Moreover, since Rotman is a 
historian and L’Ennemi Intime was based on a monograph and documentary that Rotman had 
produced, Moulfi endeavored to contest the film’s historical and journalistic value. He 
denounced Rotman’s research methods, proclaiming that “Interviewing the draftees does not 
constitute the ‘truth’ if the ‘harnessing of individual memories’ is not supported by authentic and 
proven facts. That’s where these very dangerous derivatives begin, these famous ‘memories’ 
because they only call on ideologies, misgivings, and ‘subjective slices of life.’” 108   
Moulfi was especially concerned with contesting the film’s historical objectivity when he 
saw that an article in Le Figaro, a popular right-leaning newspaper, declared that the film has 
“the moderation and impartiality of a well-researched documentary.”109 He feared the film’s 
interpretation of Harki participation in the Algerian War would influence “the very vulnerable 
targeted public” who are uninformed of the Harki history and who will mistake the film as 
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historical.
110
 He condemned L’Ennemi Intime as a “total misjudgment of the ‘History of France’” 
and compared it to “a toxic product,” saying that if it were “used improperly” and seen as 
historical instead of entertaining fiction, then it could be dangerous. Finally, he challenged 
Rotman and the director of the film to a debate about the real, factual history of Harki 
participation in the Algerian War.
111
 
These Harki sons received assistance in their protests against this film from French 
military officers. General François Meyer, who wrote a book honoring the Harkis and who 
rescued a number of Harkis at the end of the war, posted a response to Moulfi’s article on 
L’Ennemi Intime agreeing that the film falsified history. Meyer wrote, “It’s a militant untruth, 
disguised as a concern for morality, a fiction passionately hostile and unjust for French troops.
112
 
Furthermore, the Circle for the Defense of the Combatants in French North Africa (CDCAFN)
113
 
wrote a letter to Rotman detailing their objections to the film, which Moulfi posted on Coalition 
Nationale.  The letter said that the presidents of these associations decided unanimously that the 
film was “oriented preferentially against the French army and is manifestly harmful to France for 
the way it incites racial hate.”114 They explained that showing scenes of the French army 
massacring a village, and other acts of military misconduct, caused conflicts between the 
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grandchildren of both sides living together in France. They demanded specific examples of such 
massacres if Rotman wished to claim this film was based on historical truth. 
These former officers also defended the Harkis in particular, claiming that they were 
unfairly portrayed in a negative light. They declared that having actually fought alongside the 
Harkis, they could say definitively that they “were good soldiers, good Frenchmen incapable of 
committing these crimes that you attribute to them in the film.”115 Moreover, they explained that 
the Harkis “wouldn’t have just accepted killing women and children; they weren’t stupid or 
cowardly and you insult them by treating their wartime behavior that way.”116 Thus, the military 
officers acted as the Harkis’ protective allies in response to their unflattering depiction in 
L’Ennemi Intime. 
Conclusion 
The case of the Harkis reveals that collective memory is also not as cohesive as the 
concept might imply, and demonstrates the considerable potential for contestation inherent in 
Rousso’s carriers of memory. Communities transmit memories in a variety of ways, each of 
which can express not only different, but also conflicting memories. Websites constitute a 
particular kind of collective memory carrier, theoretically open to all who seek to make a post, 
unlike most traditional vectors. Enabling more members of the community to participate in the 
construction of a collective memory may naturally lead to more disagreements over how to 
construct this memory. At the same time, websites also offer historians the opportunity to 
observe the continuous policing of memory that can only be inferred in other instances. These 
sites make visible the intra-communal conflicts and reveal the full extent of contestation over 
representation.  
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Harki websites also allow us to consider the role of Internet in the dominance of the 
competitive memory model in France. Website administrators consciously engage in what they 
see as “battles” over how to construct a collective memory of the Algerian War in France. The 
ways in which the “memory wars” metaphor has been co-opted by the Harkis on websites 
reminds us of the close, reciprocal relationship between historians of memory and the 
communities they study. In the current context, the discourse of memory circulates in and out of 
academic and popular settings, acquiring new meaning in different contexts. Thus, what began as 
a heuristic device has become for these Harkis a framework through which they interpret their 
relationship to the rest of society. Although the antagonism began long before scholars gave it a 
name, it is arguably perpetuated through the language of “memory wars.” 
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CHAPTER 6: MAKING SENSE OF THE PIED-NOIR PAST: PIED-NOIR HISTORY, 
COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND HISTORIOGRAPHY, 1962-2013 
In the months following Algerian independence, French officials were caught off guard 
by the waves of French Algerians arriving in metropolitan France. Initially expecting four 
hundred thousand over four years, the state was overwhelmed by the challenges of housing and 
supporting the nearly one million former settlers who appeared in the hexagon in just three 
months.
1
 Many leaders and a large portion of the French population were also dismayed to find 
that so many French Algerians, whom they had come to consider as foreign, different, and 
dangerous during the Algerian War, were “returning” to France. The government expressed the 
hope that this migration was temporary; after their “vacations” in the metropole, French 
Algerians would go back to their now independent homeland, where they belonged.
2
 
The French Algerians cherished a similar desire. For a number of reasons, including 
concerns for their security, the destruction of their livelihood, and a wish to rejoin family 
members, these settlers had traveled en masse to mainland France in the summer of 1962. Yet 
many believed that once the situation calmed in Algeria, they would be able to go back to their 
beloved land. Most French Algerians had never been to the hexagon, half had descended from 
non-French Europeans, and the conditions of their reception made them feel rejected and 
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betrayed by France.
3
 Within a few years, however, it became clear to the French Algerians, the 
state, and the rest of French society that these former settlers had permanently “returned.” 
In this chapter, I analyze how the Pieds-Noirs, as the French Algerians came to be known 
following their migration to France, have understood their place in the French nation and its 
history since 1962. I explore the changing ways in which historians, the French state, participants 
in the Algerian War, and the Pieds-Noirs themselves have ascribed meaning to the Pied-Noir 
past. All have been informed by evolving understandings of the colonial project in France. As 
France’s empire has “turned from a point of pride to a source of shame,” Pieds-Noirs have 
served as unconformable reminders of France’s imperial past.4  
I also examine how the Pieds-Noirs have constructed their collective identity in relation 
to other groups in French society. Eric Savarèse, a prominent scholar of the Pieds-Noirs, has 
observed, “In colonial Algeria, perhaps more than anywhere else, issues of naming are issues of 
power.”5 Pied-Noir efforts to define themselves with regard to the Harkis, Algerian Jews, 
Algerian Muslims, and metropolitan French reveal the continuing significance of the politics of 
naming in postcolonial France. I argue that rather than diminishing their cultural and historical 
differences, as other populations from former colonies have done, the Pieds-Noirs have used 
memory practices and technologies to express their own particular collective memories and thus 
to resist complete integration in France.  
                                                 
3
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The final section of this chapter explores the lexicon of Pied-Noir collective memory 
narratives and tropes. While the Pieds-Noirs are a diverse group with a wide range of memories 
and experiences, certain narratives have become central to their shared memory because they 
serve essential functions for their community. Pieds-Noirs have perceived alternating apathy and 
antipathy in France towards themselves and their memories. They have sought, through their 
memory work, to challenge the historical narratives and colonial stereotypes that have formed 
the basis for their exclusion in France. In Chapters 7 and 8, I analyze the carriers they have used 
to transmit these memories. I show how their practices have changed over time in response to the 
evolving needs of their community.  
Phases of Pied-Noir Historiography 
1830 – 1962  
During the 19
th
 century, the French state advanced the myth of the “civilizing mission” in 
order to justify French imperial presence, particularly in Algeria. The Europeans who settled this 
territory were glorified for their influence on the land, which they cultivated, and its inhabitants, 
whom they educated and refined.
6
 French scholars lauded this mission; few challenged the 
supposed superiority of European culture. Historians constructed narratives that likened 
European settlers to the Phoenicians and Romans who had also brought European “civilization” 
to North Africa. Colonialism was also portrayed as politically and economically indispensable 
for maintaining France’s status in the world.7 At the same time, as Algeria was settled by poor 
Europeans and political exiles, Algeria also came to be seen as “a colonial dumping ground” for 
                                                 
6
 Michèle Baussant, “Caught between Two Worlds: The Europeans of Algeria in France after 1962,” in History, 
Memory and Migration : Perceptions of the Past and the Politics of Incorporation, ed. Irial Glynn and J. Olaf Kleist 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 87–105, 90-91. 
 
7
 Eric Savarèse, “Des récits à l’histoire. Penser la relation coloniale,” in L’Algérie dépassionnée : Au-delà du 
tumulte des mémoires, ed. Eric Savarèse (Paris: Editions Syllepse, 2008), 55–66, 56. 
 
210 
the undesirables of European society.
8
 French Algerians, in turn, harbored their own 
misconceptions about metropolitan French and resented Paris’s control over the political and 
economic affairs in their departments.  
Starting in the early 20
th
 century, scholars and other public figures became more critical 
of the colonial project and of the French Algerians, by extension. This period was marked by 
increased scholarly interest in the native Algerian population and sympathy for the “oppressed” 
Arabs and Berbers.
9
 French Algerians, in contrast, were portrayed in the French imagination as 
grands colons, powerful landowners who exploited their privileged political and socio-economic 
positions as French of European origin. The grands colons stereotype was misleading. Most 
European settlers were “poor whites,” as historian Benjamin Stora has termed them, 
predominantly industrial workers and civil servants.
10
 Agriculturalists made up only nine percent 
of the settler population in Algeria, as compared to twenty-six percent in metropolitan France, 
and most owned small properties.
11
 The standard of living was, on average, lower for French 
Algerians than it was for French in the metropole.
12
 Yet, the settlers’ privileged status in French 
Algeria was undeniable. With the aid of the French government, they had displaced and 
impoverished tens of thousands of Muslim Algerians in the process of establishing themselves in 
                                                 
8
 Baussant, “Caught between Two Worlds,” 89; Stora, “The ‘Southern’ World,” 230.  
 
9
 Shepard, “Pieds-Noirs, Bêtes Noires,” 154. 
 
10
 Stora, “The ‘Southern’ World,” 231. 
 
11
 Andrea L. Smith, Colonial Memory and Postcolonial Europe: Maltese Settlers in Algeria and France, 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 242. 
 
12
 Only three percent of French Algerians had a higher standard of living than metropolitan French. Seventy-two 
percent of French Algerians earned fifteen to twenty percent less than those in the hexagon. Stora, “The ‘Southern’ 
World,” 231. 
 
211 
Algeria.
13
 In the political sphere, French Algerians vigorously defended the rights that separated 
them from the native population and protected their advantaged positions.
14
 
During the Algerian War, metropolitan French horror at the actions of the Organisation 
de l’Armée Secrète (OAS), a French terrorist organization committed to keeping Algeria French, 
accompanied this shift. French media and politicians in the hexagon conflated members of the 
OAS, who numbered approximately three thousand, with French Algerians as a whole and 
blamed them for prolonging the brutal struggle for Algerian independence. Male Pieds-Noirs in 
particular came to be associated with “fascist terror.”15 Historian Todd Shepard has observed that 
in response to the violence of the OAS, Pied-Noir men were “accused of embodying abnormal 
masculinity in ways that recalled charges that orientalist writers and apologists of colonialism in 
North Africa long had leveled at ‘Arabs’ and ‘Muslims.’”16  
Thus, mainland French differentiated themselves from French Algerians during the war 
by demonizing them and portraying them as “not French.”17 Shepard has argued that the New 
Left and its historians, including Pierre Nora, led this process of vilifying and othering the 
French Algerians.
18
 Describing Nora’s 1961 monograph Les Français d’Algérie, Shepard 
explained, “Usually cited as a scholarly study, […] the book synthesized a racist and self-
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righteous anti-pied-noir discourse among French intellectuals.”19 Nora and others blamed Pied-
Noir fascism for French abuses, such as torture, during the Algerian War.
20
 Fiona Barclay has 
observed how French Algerians were also “othered” in print media, for example by celebrated 
left-leaning journalist Eugène Mannoni. Writing in Le Monde, Mannoni argued with regard to 
French Algerians “that this new people represent a profound otherness, a difference as much 
physical as it is behavioural.”21 These intellectuals contributed to the impression that French 
Algerians were wholly different from the French. Their perceived foreignness explains why the 
French government so underestimated the number of former settlers who would “return” to 
France.  
1962 – Mid-1990s 
For the first thirty hears following Algerian independence, the French generally pursued a 
policy of “active forgetting” regarding the Algerian War. Scholars who were interested in the 
French Algerians, however, generally concerned themselves with the conditions of repatriation.
22
 
In 1968 Bruno Etienne published the first important scholarly work on this group in France and 
focused on their migration to France.
23
 Twenty-five years later, historian Jean-Jacques Jordi 
analyzed the reception French Algerians faced in the city of Marseille, the main point of entry 
for most members of this population. He highlighted the weaknesses in the government’s 
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handling of the repatriation process and attributed its failings in part to the fact that the city was 
overwhelmed by the unexpectedly large influx of French Algerians.
24
 
Jordi also identified the rejection French Algerians experienced from metropolitan 
French. The significant financial and administrative challenges that their arrival posed made it 
difficult for French in the hexagon to sympathize with their forced migration.
25
 The hostile 
perceptions also stemmed from the fact that they were remnants of France’s now shameful 
colonial past and intimately associated with images of violence. It was during this historical 
moment that the derogatory term “Pied-Noir” emerged and was systematically applied to the 
French Algerians.
26
 Jordi documented accounts of how some Marseillais had insulted the Pieds-
Noirs and expressed a desire for them to return to Algeria. He has argued that even for the 25% 
of rapatriés who did not pass through Marseille, this city’s reception of the Pieds-Noirs became 
a symbol of their rejection and abandonment by France and the center of their traumatic 
collective memory.
27
 
The relative dearth of scholarly works during this period on the lives of Pieds-Noirs in 
Algeria paralleled larger trends of avoiding the colonial past in France.
28
 In the context of this 
general silence, however, the Pieds-Noirs themselves were highly active. They began organizing 
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into associations, first in order to address their practical concerns—including housing, 
employment, material indemnities, and amnesty—and then to meet their commemorative needs. 
Pieds-Noirs published historical accounts
29
 and collected testimonies of Pied-Noir experiences in 
French Algeria and during the Algerian War.
30
 These accounts reflected diverse backgrounds 
and political views—from members of the OAS to anti-colonial activists. All focused in some 
way, however, on documenting a lifestyle and place that had been permanently lost. The preface 
to Mon Algérie, a collection of sixty-two personal accounts published in 1989, explained the 
need to preserve the fading traces of the past: “Of their Algeria today, there remains only this 
emotional memory that ceaselessly recovers fleeting impressions and sensations.”31  
Women wrote a number of the popular Pied-Noir memoirs published at this time.
32
 The 
fact that Harki daughters have also employed this memory carrier suggests memoirs are a 
gendered genre. Women may draw on their roles as storytellers within families and feel more 
comfortable and better prepared to transmit personal, individual memory in the public sphere. 
Their reception is also informed by understandings of gender roles. Images of violent Pied-Noir 
men loomed large in metropolitan French imagination during and after the Algerian War. 
Women, however, cut more sympathetic figures. They were assigned less responsibility and guilt 
for the failed colonial project. Indeed, three memoir authors—Anne Loesch, Francine Dessaigne, 
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and Micheline Susini—framed their participation in, or support of, the OAS as an act of 
emancipation from the patriarchal colonial system. 
Late 1990s – Mid-2000s 
In the last decade of the 20
th
 century, important social and political developments in 
France contributed to renewed interest in the colonial past. Scholars began to analyze how Pieds-
Noirs created and transmitted a collective identity (and memory) in France. Ethnologist Jeannine 
Verdès-Leroux interviewed one hundred and eighty self-identified Pieds-Noirs to investigate 
both who the French Algerians were and why they had been regarded so “suspiciously and 
disparagingly.”33 She felt historians had “cast this problem aside.”34 Verdès-Leroux argued that 
the Pieds-Noirs posed no “integration” troubles for society as whole, but rather society posed 
problems for the Pieds-Noirs.
35
 Historian Joëlle Hureau pursued this issue of integration by 
analyzing French Algerian associations and published texts.
36
 She argued that following their 
exile from Algeria, some Pieds-Noirs fully integrated into French society, while others chose to 
exclude themselves in order to conserve a particular “algérianité,” a cultural mix of French, 
Algerian, and Mediterranean influences.
37
 Political scientist Eric Savarèse has interrogated the 
category of Pieds-Noirs and analyzed the “identity strategies” that the Pieds-Noirs employed to 
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produce a collective group that has been politically influential.
38
 He argued that they invented a 
shared memorial tradition—that of pioneers—to unite them. 
The most recent work on Pied-Noir memory and identity practices has stressed the 
heterogeneity of this group. Savarèse has argued that despite the attempts of certain Pied-Noir 
associations to present themselves as representative and in the face of efforts among politicians 
to win over a supposed Pied-Noir electorate, there is no such thing as a Pied-Noir vote, Pied-Noir 
culture or a Pied-Noir memory. Rather, Pieds-Noirs have expressed a wide variety of political 
views and competing memory narratives of the Algerian past.
39
 Anthropologist Andrea Smith 
has also challenged the notion that Pieds-Noirs have shared a common culture. She argued that 
the descendants of Maltese settlers in Algeria have constituted a subaltern group within the Pied-
Noir memory community and that the Maltese Pied-Noir social clubs in which she conducted her 
fieldwork reveal “the continued salience of intrasettler cultural distinctions.”40 
2005 – 2013 
Historians have argued that in contrast to the earlier “amnesia” about the colonial period, 
this past has, since the early years of the 21
st
 century, become “completely visible and recurrent 
in the heart of French society.”41 As groups have begun transmitting and commemorating 
different memories in the public sphere, scholars, politicians, and journalists have become 
concerned about the divisive potential of memory. They have argued that conflicting 
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interpretations of the colonial past, and the Algerian War in particular, have exacerbated social 
tensions.
42
 In Algérie, La Guerre Des Mémoires, Savarèse explained, “Harkis, pieds-noirs, 
descendants of slaves or grand-children of colonial subjects…The war of memories swells. Each 
community, real or self-proclaimed, demands a plaque, a monument, a law.”43 Savarèse, Stora, 
and others have increasingly come to rely on a competitive memory model, in which groups aim 
to supplant the memories of others with their own, to interpret memory practices.
44
 
These scholars have also understood the Pieds-Noirs as instigators of disputes over how 
to remember the colonial past.
45
 They note how, since the 1990s, Pied-Noir associations have 
vigorously demanded symbolic gestures from the state.
46
 Pied-Noir lobbying was at the root of 
the February 2005 law, which sparked fierce debates about the colonial past and prompted 
scholars to start employing the “memory wars” paradigm. Their monument and museum in 
Perpignan, which I will analyze in Chapters 7 and 8, also met with resistance from scholars, who 
have questioned the objectivity and historical accuracy of the narratives they transmit.
47
 
Jean-Jacques Jordi has accused historians of letting their ideological leanings and value 
judgments compromise the objectivity of their own scholarship. According to Jordi, historians 
have distinguished “between good and bad terrorism, between those killed on the right side of 
history and those killed on the wrong side,” essentially privileging victims who fought for 
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liberation over those who fought to keep Algeria French.
48
 As a result, historians have not 
studied the fates of European civilians and members of the OAS who disappeared, and were 
presumably killed, at the end of the war. Yet, Jordi has noted, these same historians have 
criticized the “memorial one-upmanship” that has occurred as memorial associations and witness 
testimonials have tried to fill this gap in historical research.
49
 The pro-colonial content of 
dominant Pied-Noir memory narratives has remained unpopular in France
50
 and this gap in 
historical research may indeed reflect the “politicization of history” that scholars have decried.51 
I am interested in how scholarship on the Pieds-Noirs has informed the way they understand 
their place in France. In Chapter 7 I show how the perception among Pieds-Noirs that they have 
been marginalized in academic literature contributes to their self-image as victims in the current 
memorial context. 
Naming the Pieds-Noirs 
Scholars have convincingly demonstrated that French Algerians constituted a 
heterogeneous group in Algeria and did not form a unified community until their arrival in 
France. Settlers brought different European cultural heritages with them to French Algeria and 
their countries of origin informed their status in the colony. Maltese, for example, occupied a 
liminal place in French Algerian society.
52
 Even after their migration to metropolitan France, 
some French Algerians formed associations and self-segregated based on the specific nationality 
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of their forebearers. In defiance of assimilation policies in both French Algeria and the hexagon, 
then, these French Algerians have retained their Spanish, Italian, and Maltese identities.  
The spatial reality of French Algeria also informed the different experiences of the 
settlers. The population of European descent was concentrated in urban areas, particularly around 
the coast. The four largest cities—Algiers, Oran, Constantine and Bône—contained over half of 
the settler population following WWII.
53
 Through much of the countryside, however, “French 
Algeria” was a remote reality for many native Algerians and the few Europeans who settled 
there.
54
 Travel was difficult in Algeria, even among the cities, and the settlers’ identities became 
closely tied to their municipality.
55
 Andrea Smith has demonstrated that following their arrival in 
the metropole, many French Algerians still thought “in terms of their colony-based 
sociogeographical coordinates.”56 French Algerian society was also stratified into different 
economic groups with workers employed in a variety of professions.
57
 Smith has argued that 
lower class whites actually constituted “a colony within a colony.”58 Lastly, French Algerians 
expressed diverse political views that “encompassed the whole political party spectrum.”59  
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“French of Algeria” was one among a number of different administrative labels used to 
refer to the descendants of European settlers at the time of the Algerian War.
60
 It was misleading 
to apply this term only to settlers of European origin because by 1958 the entire population in 
Algeria had been awarded full French citizenship.
61
 For the previous century, however, the 
official legal and administrative category of “Muslim” had excluded most French of North 
African origin from exercising the same rights as “Europeans” in these departments. A decree in 
July 1865 had given Muslims in Algeria French nationality, but not citizenship. According to this 
measure, “the Muslim native” held the status of “non-citizen French,” French deprived of voting 
rights,
62
 and “only by renouncing Islam could he ‘benefit from the rights open to a French 
citizen’.”63 In contrast, the law of June 26, 1889 had granted full French citizenship to 
descendants of Europeans in the colony.
64
 Civic and religious identities were thus entwined and 
important economic, social, moral and sexual barriers accompanied the administrative and legal 
divides.
65
 Members of these groups had opportunities to interact and develop connections, but, as 
Stora has explained, “only so long as each understood his place.”66 According to Savarèse, for 
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example, among French citizens and French Muslims in Algeria, “you could be comrades 
(frères), but not brothers-in-law (beau-frères).”67  
The Jewish Algerian population constituted a particular case. Jews and Muslims had 
experienced centuries of cultural exchange and close cohabitation in Algeria before the French 
arrived. The Décret Crémieux of 1871, which granted Algerian Jews full French citizenship, 
separated these communities on a legal level, yet they remained bound by their shared heritage. 
Meanwhile, European settlers, who sought to protect their superior status within the colonial 
hierarchy, continued to consider Algerian Jews as racially and religiously distinct.
68
 The Jews 
themselves remained suspicious of French anti-Semitism, particularly in the aftermath of the 
Dreyfus Affair.
69
 Thus, as historian Claire Eldridge has argued, this community was 
“characterized by plural identities and allegiances which defied simple categorization, causing 
the Jews of Algeria frequently to fall between, rather than within, the various binaries and 
hierarchies that the colonial system sought to impose.”70  
The migration of over ninety percent of Algerian Jews to the metropole following 
Algerian independence attested to their ultimate affiliation with French culture and society.
71
 
During the first thirty years following their arrival in the hexagon, they were generally subsumed 
within the larger Pied-Noir community. Scholars did not treat them as a separate group and 
Algerian Jews themselves did not assert their specificity. Yet Pied-Noir memory work from this 
period reflected a complicated relationship among Algerian Jews and the rest of the Pieds-Noirs. 
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The editors and many of the contributors to the Mon Algérie volume, for example, were Jewish, 
and most downplayed their religious identity. Indeed, one declared that the Algerian city of 
Constantine had replaced Jerusalem in his imagination.
72
 For others, their Jewish, Algerian, and 
French identities appeared inextricably linked. Among the non-Jewish contributors, one 
described his father’s anti-Semitism73 and another told of an interaction he and his wife had with 
Palestinian exiles in Algeria, who bonded with them over the loss of their land.
74
 Andrea Smith 
observed the social segregation of Christian and Jewish Pieds-Noirs during her fieldwork in 
France in the 1990s and described a distinct discomfort among Maltese Pieds-Noirs at the 
presence of Algerian Jews at their functions.
75
 According to Claire Eldridge, many of the same 
factors that produced a growing interest in the colonial past in France over the past few decades 
have prompted Algerian Jews to construct their own memory community.
76
   
The religious identity of French Algerians, then, was central to how they understood 
themselves in relation to the rest of the population in Algeria. In the face of Islam, the Catholic 
Church served as a bastion of French culture during colonial period.
77
 Catholic rituals also 
provided continuity for the settlers and “cushioned the shock of rupture with the native land.”78 
Ethnologist Michèle Baussant has demonstrated that religious practices have retained their 
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importance to French Algerians in the metropole.
79
 She analyzed their annual religious 
pilgrimage to Notre-Dame-de-Santa-Cruz in Nimes, arguing that this lieu de mémoire has served 
as an essential site of sociability for French Algerians and means of preserving their shared 
identity.  
Efforts to name the French Algerians following their arrival in the hexagon continued to 
reflect colonial politics of inclusion and exclusion. The French state initially labeled the French 
Algerians “rapatriés”—a term that suggested a population returning to their homeland or 
country—which it had also assigned to groups from other former colonies, including 
Indochina.
80
 Although most French Algerians had not actually originated from metropolitan 
France, the name was designed to emphasize their French identity, in contrast to the “othering” 
of French Algerians that had occurred in the metropole during the war. French Algerians 
officially shared rapatrié status with the Harkis and their families, but these populations were 
treated differently in practice. Some scholars have argued that the Harkis were imagined and 
handled as refugees fleeing their Algerian homeland, rather than as Frenchmen returning home.
81
 
Indeed, a certain “hierarchization of populations” was revealed through strikingly different 
conditions of arrival and the state quickly came to distinguish between French Muslim rapatriés 
and European rapatriés from Algeria in their policies.
82
 French Algerians included the Harkis in 
their rapatrié associations, although it was clear that they considered the Harkis a distinct subset 
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of this group. Eldridge has argued that the affiliation of the two communities served the interests 
of the French Algerians because the Harkis constituted a more conspicuous victim population. 
Indeed, European rapatriés often drew attention to the plight of the Harkis as evidence of the 
“folly of decolonization” and the state’s mismanagement of the repatriation process.83  
The label of Pieds-Noirs was originally applied to French Algerians as an “expression of 
rejection,” signifying their exclusion from rest of French society.84 The exact origins of this term 
are unclear. Some believe the native Algerian population invented it, possibly in reference to the 
black boots of the French soldiers who arrived in Algeria in 1830.
85
 Others argue that 
metropolitan French created it, either to describe poor, barefoot Algerian natives or the Algerian 
winemakers who trod grapes to make wine.
86
 No matter the specific root of the label, it was 
meant to connote backwardness and foreignness.  
The eventual decision among some French Algerians to embrace the name “Pied-Noir” is 
significant for what it reveals about how they understood their place in France. By the 1970s, 
most French Algerians were prospering and because of their socio-economic successes, 
European appearance, native French fluency, and familiarity with French culture, they could 
“pass” as metropolitan French. They were not subjected to the same discrimination that had 
accompanied their arrival in the metropole. Their “Frenchness,” so to speak, was no longer in 
question. At this point, then, French Algerians faced a choice as to whether to assume a separate 
identity or to reject it. Many fully assimilated into French society. To others, integrating, or 
“passing” as metropolitan French, could imply that they were ashamed of where they came from, 
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or suggest that they were choosing to deny their particular background.
87
 These French Algerians 
began to self-identify as Pieds-Noirs.
88
 Adopting this label allowed them to participate in the 
therapeutic process of proudly owning and reinventing the term and to avoid the risk of 
becoming too assimilated.
89
  
The Cercle Algérianiste: History and Objectives 
Assuming this identity also required the Pieds-Noirs to prove that they had a common 
history, including founding events, tropes and narratives, and shared traditions and values. Their 
collective exodus from Algeria, identified by Jordi as the foundational experience for their 
community, would not be enough to sustain the community in the struggle against integration. 
They needed to convince themselves and others that their identity and culture had a long history 
in order to overcome the diverse political and social and cultural backgrounds that had divided 
them in Algeria. Associations have played an integral role in giving fuller meaning to the Pied-
Noir identity. French Algerians have created as many as eight hundred associations, representing 
approximately ten to fifteen percent of the total French Algerian population, although many 
consist of only a few members.
90
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One of the most influential of these associations has been the Cercle Algérianiste.
91
 It is 
not representative of all Pieds-Noirs, as no organization could be, but the history of this 
association parallels wider developments in the Pied-Noir community. It has become the largest 
association of Pieds-Noirs in France and the most active in the public sphere in the past decade. 
The Cercle Algérianiste helped create and fund the controversial Mur des Disparus monument 
and the first colonial museum in France, the Centre de Documentation des Français d’Algérie, 
which I analyze in Chapters 7 and 8. It has transmitted the dominant Pied-Noir narratives since it 
was founded in 1973 and through its practices we can trace how Pied-Noir collective memory 
has changed over time. 
When the Cercle Algérianiste was established, its founders and adherents sought to 
develop a separate, provincial identity for the French who came from Algeria and to establish a 
lasting community based on the belief in a shared past and culture. These Pieds-Noirs declared 
that they were plainly different from the metropolitan French. As the first president, Maurice 
Calmein, explained, they must embrace being Pied-Noir, rather than “masking our specificity 
[and] trying clumsily to make ourselves into Parisians, Provençals, Bretons, or Auvergnats that 
we can never TRULY be.”92 At the same time, they expressed a fear that what made them unique 
was at risk of disappearing, due to the assimilation process. Their original mission statement 
read, “before our community completely dissolves, we are creating a cercle […] in order to give 
new life to the ‘French Algerian’ community” and to “save a culture in peril.”93    
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For members of the Cercle, affirming their difference entailed re-defining themselves. In 
the early years of the association, they discussed the label “Pied-Noir” and what it signified. 
Some were uncomfortable with the term’s negative connotation and sought a more “legitimate” 
name for their community.
94
 This sentiment was reflected outside the Cercle as well; as one self-
identified Pied-Noir declared in Mon Algérie, “I hate this expression.”95 Their ambivalence 
towards the name “Pied-Noir” led the Cercle’s adherents to choose a new label for themselves, 
that of “algérianiste.” Selecting a new name was appealing, particularly in the association’s 
formative years, because members could invest it with the meaning they desired. Calmein wrote, 
“If it is indispensible that we control our appellation, it, however, is not simply a question of 
changing the words. Imposing this new expression will be the first step in a collective 
restructuring of our Community.”96  
To members of the Cercle, being “Algérianiste” meant embracing a particular spirit, way 
of thinking, and lifestyle that were historically rooted in Algeria. The term was a reference to 
Algérianisme, a literary genre that emerged in Algeria in 1911 and was defined by a close 
connection to the land.
97
 Authors Robert Randau, Jean Pomier, and Jean Brun, who was later 
associated with the OAS, established the genre and gained acclaim in the metropole for their 
work. In the decades that followed its creation, Algérianisme became a movement that sought to 
further develop and celebrate a shared culture among the descendants of European settlers and 
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the native Algerian population. In 1920, Jean Pomier declared of the proponents of Algérianisme, 
“We are Algerians and nothing that is Algerian is foreign to us.”98  
By selecting the name “Algérianiste,” members of the Cercle constructed strong ties to 
their Algerian past and established the legitimacy of their claim to that heritage. They affiliated 
their organization with the founders of the genre, naming Pomier, who had passed away in 1962, 
Honorary President of the Cercle. The Cercle declared as one of its purposes “to diffuse the 
works of Algérianiste authors” and created a literary prize in the tradition of the Grand prix 
littéraire de l’Algérie.99 They also reinforced the idea that Algeria had, since the Roman Empire, 
been a “melting pot of civilizations, where East and West met” and affirmed the aim of 
Algérianisme to honor this distinctly Mediterranean culture.
100
 Calmein explained in 1973, 
“Algérianisme is not simply a literary movement, it is a state of mind, a human and historical 
reality, a blending of souls, a culture that has manifested itself in behaviors, a language, a 
folklore, a cuisine, that has been expressed, and continues to be expressed, in the arts, theatre, 
cinema, song.”101 He and the other members sought to recreate this culture expressed through the 
Algérianiste literature. 
The Cercle Algérianiste reinforced the meaning of this identity through various forms of 
cultural and communicative memory practices.
102
 The association created monuments, including 
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the reconstruction of the Sidi-Ferruch monument and Mur des Disparus, and members took part 
in commemorative ceremonies. The Cercle published a quarterly journal, L’Algérianiste, 
organized an annual national conference. Members produced and collected texts, objects, films, 
and artwork from and about Algeria. The association created spaces—a library, documentation 
center, museum, theatre, and website—in which to display and preserve the traces of their past. 
The Cercle’s adherents also gathered in these places to informally share their private, individual 
memories of life in Algeria. Through communicating their personal recollections at meetings and 
commemorations, members established the social basis of their community.     
Positively Colonial: Common Themes and Narratives  
Pieds-Noirs are bound by shared memories of suffering. Scholars have argued that the 
twin experiences of exile from Algeria and rejection upon arrival in France created the 
possibility of a unified Pied-Noir community. Jean-Jacques Jordi has explained, “It is not 1830 
that created the Pied-Noir, but 1962. The massive and tragic repatriation of that summer became 
the founding element of the exile community.”103 No matter how they felt about the colonial 
project or what their particular background was, all Pieds-Noirs experienced the loss of Algeria 
and most have resented carrying the weight of the colonial legacy in the metropole.
104
 A form of 
“nostalgérie,” a pathological nostalgia for the landscape, lifestyle, and sites of personal 
significance in Algeria, has dominated Pied-Noir collective memory.
105
 Many Pieds-Noirs, 
especially those who have returned to visit, have mourned the fact that “their” Algeria is gone 
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forever. Central to their shared memory, then, is their understanding of themselves as victims of 
exile and rejection following Algerian independence.  
The Pieds-Noirs’ memories of the Algerian War have proven more divisive and 
controversial for their community. In Chapter 7 I explore how Pieds-Noirs, and the Cercle 
Algérianiste in particular, have commemorated the deaths and disappearances of French Algerian 
civilians during the war. Pied-Noir efforts to portray these civilians as innocent victims of state 
violence have been undermined by the fact that many of those killed had supported or fought for 
the OAS. Pieds-Noirs have commemorated the French army’s repression of settler protests to 
keep Algeria French on March 26
th
 in Algiers and July 5
th
 in Oran in 1962. Some associations 
have also constructed plaques specifically honoring OAS members. Yet they have also 
recognized the degree to which their affiliation with the OAS, and its fierce support of the 
colonial project, has tended to alienate the rest of the French population from them and their 
memory work.  
It is useful to analyze the gender-specific meanings attached to Pied-Noir 
commemorations.
106
 Todd Shepard has demonstrated how the image of the violent OAS male 
informed how French Algerians were perceived in metropole during the Algerian War. He 
argued that one it became clear that the French Algerians would “return” to the hexagon 
following Algerian independence, the French state used depictions of the “mythic heterosexual 
family” to encourage metropolitan French to accept them.107 Shepard explained, “The family—
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above all the necessary place of males within it as fathers, brothers, and even children—was a 
privileged trope, mobilized to cleanse the pieds-noirs of the OAS stain and to guarantee their 
Frenchness.”108 We can understand Pied-Noir depictions of families migrating to the metropole 
in their memory work as a continuation of this practice; it constitutes an effort to gain 
acceptance, and even sympathy, by distancing themselves from the violent OAS male.  
Pieds-Noirs have also celebrated the contributions of the African Army, which had been 
composed of French Algerians and Muslim Algerians, particularly during World War II. In this 
way they have ascribed to the republican memorial model that honors citizens for their sacrifices 
to the nation.
109
 Pieds-Noirs have constructed plaques and monuments and have organized 
ceremonies for the anniversaries of the Allied invasion of southern France. These 
commemorative acts have enabled the Pieds-Noirs to assert their Frenchness and solicit respect 
from the rest of the French population. At the same time, they have provided an opportunity to 
proclaim their particular martial prowess; a common refrain among Pieds-Noirs has been, “It is 
we Africans who saved Europe” during WWII, a reference to the significance of colonial North 
Africa for the Allied forces.
110
 Commemorations of the African Army have thus offered a way to 
celebrate French Algerian soldierly masculinity without reference to the Algerian War. Finally, 
the inclusive composition of the army supports their narrative, which I discuss below, of 
fraternity and productive cohabitation among descendants of European settlers and the native 
population in French Algeria.  
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In their cultural memory carriers, many Pieds-Noirs have gendered Algeria female, 
echoing early colonial depictions of Algeria. Images of Algerian women who were “submissive, 
sensual, and inviting,” for example those painted by Eugène Delacroix, conveyed the message 
that Algeria was a fertile land, ripe for colonization.
111
 Algeria inspired orientalist fantasies in the 
metropole, where erotic postcards that featured the highly fetishized veil, were circulated.
112
 The 
metaphor of Algeria as a “voluptuous and voracious” woman, then, encouraged colonialists and 
added a sexual dimension to the conquest.
113
 Benjamin Stora has observed how Pieds-Noirs have 
portrayed Algeria as a mother or a beloved and lost woman in their memory narratives.
114
 The 
editors of Mon Algérie explained how Algeria has become “the land of paradise, the land of 
childhood, the land of a mother who nourishes them” in the memories of the Pieds-Noirs and 
“with her are associated all of the scents, all of the fragrances, all that link mother and child.”115 
One contributor to their volume described his relationship to Algeria as one to an ex-wife who 
has married another man. He proclaimed that while he continued to think of her often and 
remained faithful to her memory, the woman he once loved had become a stranger to him.
116
 
Thus, in their memoirs, novels, and films, Pieds-Noirs have continued to employ gendered 
colonial imagery. 
Pieds-Noirs have narrativized the colonial period in three distinct ways. Each narrative 
has served a particular function for the community. The first, the myth of the civilizing mission, 
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emerged during the colonial period. According to this narrative, the French settled in Algeria in 
order “to civilize, construct roads, ports, cities, railroads, to teach, [and] to heal” and its purpose 
was to legitimize colonialism.
117
 Scholars have thoroughly discredited the myth of the civilizing 
mission, which belied France’s more self-serving motivations and in which “the colonized” were 
noticeably absent.
118
 It has generally fallen out of favor with Pieds-Noirs as well, as its 
association with colonialism has tended to alienate metropolitan French. Yet Article 4 of the 
February 2005 law, which stipulated that school curricula would “acknowledge in particular the 
positive role of the French overseas presence,” reflected the language of the myth and 
demonstrated that it has endured.
119
 
Pied-Noir associations in the metropole, including the Cercle Algérianiste, invented the 
second interpretation, which Eric Savarèse has identified as the “pioneering myth.”120 According 
to this narrative, Algeria constituted an “empty space devoid of civilization,” much like the 
American West, before the French arrived.
121
 Then, through their “industrious and pioneering 
spirit,” European settlers tamed and transformed this barren landscape at great personal 
expense.
122
 The pioneering myth established a connection to a rural past that was wholly 
fabricated, given that most French Algerians had lived in urban areas and did not work the land. 
Still, it has allowed the Pieds-Noirs to memorialize their modernization of Algeria without 
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reference to colonialism, since this interpretation presented Algeria not as a colony, but rather as 
a French invention.
123
  
In response to growing French interest in the Algerian War, Pieds-Noirs have constructed 
a new narrative, which Romain Bertrand has called “the theory of the two phases of 
colonialism.”124 This interpretation contrasts the regrettable violence of the conquest and 
Algerian War with the generally harmonious and prosperous colonial period.
125
 Pieds-Noirs have 
stressed the importance of not reducing the history of French Algeria to short-lived periods of 
violence.
126
 In doing so, however, they have ignored the armed resistance to French presence that 
continued thought the colonial period. Moreover, the narrative is predicated on the idea of a 
fraternal relationship among European settlers and native Algerians that ignores the significant 
legal, economic, and social barriers erected between these populations. 
Conclusion 
The case of the Pieds-Noirs expands our understanding of postcolonial migration in 
France. Unlike most migrants from former colonial territories, including the Harkis, they did not 
face lasting problems of insecurity.
127
 Their repatriation was hectic and disruptive, and they 
faced rejection from metropolitan French. Yet the majority of the Pieds-Noirs encountered no 
serious socio-economic barriers to integration. Some scholars have argued, in fact, that they will 
“soon vanish as a subgroup in French society” and that “any sense of pied-noir distinctiveness is 
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now generated from within their community.”128 Pieds-Noirs, then, have faced the unusual 
challenge of trying to resist complete, successful integration. Of course, their “Frenchness” was 
never challenged on a legal and administrative level, as it was for the Muslim population in 
Algeria, thus giving them the freedom to explore and embrace their specificity.
129
 The case of the 
Pieds-Noirs thus highlights the salience of categories of race, religion, and cultural “difference” 
in debates about immigration.
130
 At the same time, the ways they have constructed narratives of 
the past reveal that many Pieds-Noirs ultimately desire and seek empathy in France for their 
plights. Although the Pieds-Noirs are often perceived by scholars as some of the most active 
participants in the “memory wars” over the colonial past, their memory work is most often aimed 
at gaining acceptance and recognition from the rest of the French.  
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CHAPTER 7: PIED-NOIR COMMEMORATIVE MONUMENTS AND CEREMONIES: 
FROM SIDI-FERRUCH TO THE MUR DES DISPARUS, 1973-2013 
If one considers collective memory as a narrative or set of tropes, then Pied-Noir memory 
has remained remarkably stable over the past forty years. The Pied-Noir community has 
cultivated the impression that their collective memory is static, both suggesting that the stability 
of a memory is evidence of its truthfulness,
1
 and employing it as a strategy for overcoming the 
diverse backgrounds and opinions that threaten to divide them.
2
 Although their memory 
narratives have indeed stayed relatively consistent, the discursive and material practices they 
have used to express their memory have changed. Examining the Cercle Algérianiste’s memory 
work since its creation in 1973 reveals that members have adapted their practices to meet the 
changing needs of their aging community and in response to the evolving politics of colonial 
memory in France. 
The founders of the Cercle Algérianiste declared their intention to “give new life to the 
‘French Algerian’ community” and to “save a culture in peril.”3 The reconstruction in 1986 of a 
monument commemorating the conquest of Algeria, originally built in Sidi-Ferruch to celebrate 
the centennial of this event, and an annual ceremony helped them pursue their aims. These 
memory practices served the dual functions of establishing a common historical narrative for the 
Pieds-Noirs and allowing them to honor their collective accomplishments in Algeria. It was 
                                                 
1
 Claire Eldridge, “Blurring the Boundaries between Perpetrators and Victims: Pied-Noir Memories and the Harki 
Community,” Memory Studies 3, no. 2 (2010): 123–36, 133. 
 
2
 Eric Savarèse, L’invention des Pieds-noirs (Paris: Séguier, 2002). 
 
3
 Cercle Algérianiste, “Le Cercle Algérianiste,” L’Algérianiste, special issue (1975); Alain Martin, “Un journal pour 
tous les Pieds Noirs,” L’Algérianiste, special issue (1977): 29. 
 
237 
through recollecting, celebrating, and commemorating an Algerian past together that they forged 
the social foundations of their community and resisted full integration into French society. 
Since the turn of the 21
st
 century, however, the Cercle Algérianiste’s memorial landscape 
has changed dramatically. The monument to Sidi-Ferruch no longer serves as an object that 
concretizes the group’s memory or a site where they perform their belonging. It has been 
replaced in the Cercle’s imaginary by the Mur des Disparus, a memorial to the French Algerians 
who disappeared during and after the Algerian War. Through this monument, Pieds-Noirs have 
understood themselves not as heirs of a pioneering, Algerian tradition, but as inheritors of a duty 
to mourn and defend the forgotten and missing. Collective performance of this duty has bound 
their community over the past decade. In this way, they have distanced themselves from the 
contentious colonial legacy.  
This change in the focus of their commemorative activity indicates a wider shift in the 
ways that Pieds-Noirs have used the past to secure their place in French society and ensure the 
future of their collective identity. As the Pieds-Noirs have aged, they have faced new challenges 
in sustaining their community. The original members of the Cercle Algérianiste have found it 
difficult to transmit their “algérianiste” culture and mindset to a generation that has never lived 
in Algeria and has no personal memories of this place. In order to make the Pied-Noir identity 
relevant and accessible to their children, and therefore to increase the chances of their 
community’s survival, they have been obliged to develop new memorial practices. These 
practices are designed to create different affective ties to the Pied-Noir history and to form 
additional social foundations for their community.  
Pieds-Noirs have been both restrained and helped in this endeavor by the pervasive and 
highly developed memory culture in France. The politics of memory have dictated the terms, 
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carriers, and ways of framing that they must use in order to gain the most social capital. In the 
post-World War II commemorative era, the “victim-memorial regime” has triumphed over the 
republican memorial model and victim status is highly sought-after.
4
 In this context, the Cercle 
Algérianiste has tailored its memory practices to a wider audience and has moved away from 
references to the controversial colonial past. Since the late 1990s, there has also been a growing 
interest in the Algerian War in France. The Cercle Algérianiste has responded to these shifts by 
constructing a memorial to the Pied-Noir casualties of this war, even though they understand 
their identity and history as beginning long before 1954.  
Pieds-Noirs have also been able to make use of the new memorial context to address their 
problem of transmission. The Cercle Algérianiste has begun to employ the scholarly and popular 
discourse of “mémoire” to articulate their right to commemorate their version of the past. 
Members have also internalized the competitive memory model and have adopted the “memory 
wars” paradigm for interpreting responses to their commemorative acts. Upon witnessing 
resistance to the Mur on the part of other groups with a stake in the colonial legacy as well as 
scholars, they have argued that their interpretations of the past are under attack and that their 
right to memorialize is being denied. Participating in what they perceive as the so-called 
“memory wars” has allowed the Pieds-Noirs to self-identify as victims of this “war.” Pieds-Noirs 
have understood themselves as civilian victims of the Algerian War and the move to decolonize, 
more generally. Shared memories of suffering, including exile from Algeria and rejection upon 
arrival in the metropole, have remained central to their collective identity. In the past decade, 
they have come to believe that they are again being betrayed and sacrificed, this time by French 
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efforts to write a “politically correct” interpretation of the colonial period. They have thus re-
deployed the trope of victimhood in a new context. 
The Mur des Disparus has enabled the Pieds-Noirs to commemorate their losses during 
the Algerian War and has offered the opportunity to merge past and present offenses against their 
community. Visiting the monument and observing attacks against Pied-Noir memory practices 
have allowed younger generations to share the experience and bond of victimhood. In the 21
st
 
century, then, members of the Cercle Algérianiste have become less concerned with establishing 
the content of their memory and more focused on proclaiming their right to have a memory. 
Defending their right to a memory is, after all, an act in which Pieds-Noirs of all generations can 
engage.  
Commemorating the Conquest: The Sidi-Ferruch Monument 
The Sidi-Ferruch monument was constructed in 1930 to celebrate the 100
th
 anniversary of 
French presence in Algeria. The location of Sidi-Ferruch, a coastal town 25km west of Algiers, 
was chosen because it was the point of landing for French troops, led by General de Bourmont, 
on June 14, 1830. Emile Gaudissard, an artist born in Algiers, designed the monument, which 
stood 15m high, on a pedestal of 3.5m
2
. Bas-reliefs in marble depicted the figures of two women 
embracing, symbolizing the union of French and Algerian populations. One plaque on the 
monument detailed the Sidi-Ferruch victory, while another read, “One hundred years later, the 
French Republic having given this country prosperity, grateful Algeria addresses to the 
motherland the tribute of its enduring attachment.”5 On the back of the monument an additional 
inscription quoted General de Bourmont’s words to his men before the landing: “The cause of 
France is that of humanity. Show yourselves worthy of your noble (belle) mission. Be just and 
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humane after the victory.” On June 14, 1930 the president of the French Republic, Gaston 
Doumergue, unveiled the monument between speeches by local leaders proclaiming the great 
accomplishments of French Algeria. The occasion of the centennial and its commemorative 
monument, then, were intended to celebrate the triumph of the civilizing mission. 
Following Algerian independence, many conspicuous symbols of French imperial rule 
were destroyed in the so-called “statue war” of the summer of 1962.6 A group of paratroopers 
from the 3
rd
 Marine Infantry Parachute Regiment endeavored to save the Sidi-Ferruch memorial 
from the same fate on July 5, 1962, the day of Algerian independence. Pied-Noir Alain Amato 
has recounted how the parachutists removed the marble plaques of the monument while 
surrounded by a mob of Algerians, who hurled insults at them and attempted to destroy the 
structure.
7
 The parachutists completed the task by dynamiting the pedestal and transporting the 
plaques to the metropole.
8
 
In the mid-1980s, two members of the Cercle Algérianiste, Hélène and Roger Brasier, 
undertook the project of reconstructing the Sidi-Ferruch monument. The bas-reliefs, which 
measured 5.5m high and 2.5m wide, were reassembled along with the inscriptions. A dedication 
to the African army was added to the monument. This new incarnation was placed in Port-
Vendres, a costal town in the Pyrénées-Orientales department of southern France. The Cercle’s 
first president, Maurice Calmein, found the setting “majestic and highly symbolic,” as the 
memorial was facing the sea and “new Algeria.”9 The Brasiers, along with the Cercle, also 
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constructed a small museum that contained photos and documents depicting life in French 
Algeria between 1930 and 1962. These visual records focused on subjects that are central to the 
civilizing mission and pioneering myths: education and agriculture. The museum also presented 
artifacts from the African army, including “weapons, insignia, and the military uniforms of 
African combatants from France’s different conflicts.”10 The reconstructed Sidi-Ferruch 
monument was unveiled on June 14, 1986, the 156
th
 anniversary of the conquest. The Cercle 
Algérianiste had established June 14
th
 as the date for their annual associative celebration and 
Port-Vendres became the site of this event for the next decade.
11
  
The new Sidi-Ferruch memorial occupied an important place in the association’s 
imaginary. From the 1970s to 90s, Algérianiste memory practices were insular, aimed at 
“reminding” a small population of who they were and preventing their assimilation. When 
introducing the plan to reconstruct the Sidi-Ferruch monument, the Cercle mentioned that others 
might consider the subject of their commemoration, the conquest of Algeria, “a bit 
provocative.”12 Indeed, the celebration of this event had fallen out of favor among the rest of 
French society. Yet, the leaders of the Cercle were predominantly concerned with how other 
Pieds-Noirs would interpret the monument. President Maurice Calmein, declared, “Because it is 
for our Community, for its honor, its history and its future that we fight, and it alone can tell us 
whether, through one action or another, we have succeeded or failed.”13 When the monument 
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was unveiled, Calmein asserted that it did, in fact, exemplify the association’s goals. He 
reminded members that “The Cercle Algérianiste was created to bear witness, to denounce lies, 
to make the real face of French Algeria known, through all possible means of expression.”14 This 
“real face” included the pioneering spirit of the original settlers and the success of the civilizing 
mission. Their addition of a plaque honoring the African army signified a desire to “bear 
witness” to the sacrifices of this organization. 
The reconstructed Sidi-Ferruch monument also represented the tragic destruction of their 
homeland in 1962. In 1979, Alain Amato published a text, entitled Monuments en Exil, that 
traced the fate of over one hundred and fifty commemorative symbols, including plaques, busts, 
monuments, and church bells, that had been rescued from Algeria. Amato explained how these 
monuments had been uprooted and exiled, “reinstalled far away from the places and spaces for 
which they had been initially conceived.” He suggested that the memorials had been degraded 
through the process: “Downgraded location, mediocre pedestal, destroyed pedigree, often all 
three at once, yes, these souvenirs live in exile.”15 Sidi-Ferruch and other monuments thus served 
as “bitter reminders” for the Pieds-Noirs of their lost homeland as well as symbols of their own 
exile and difficult repatriation.
16
  
Reenacting, celebrating, and remembering at this site also served key social functions for 
their community. In addition to representing the achievements of French Algeria, the conquest 
constituted the founding event for the French Algerian community. It was a reminder that the 
collective history of the Pieds-Noirs began long before their arrival in the metropole. In 1989, the 
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Cercle described the June 14
th
 commemorative event as “a popular festival of national scale to 
which the community withdrawn from Algeria is invited in a vast pilgrimage to the sources of its 
history that the monument to the Centennial symbolizes. The program was conceived to combine 
the joy of reunions with the fervor of remembrance in a site of which the still-intact natural 
beauty could not be praised more.”17  This commemoration was the occasion that rallied the most 
Algérianistes.
18
  
“Mémoire d’avenir” 
In 2002, the Cercle Algérianiste dedicated its annual conference to the theme of 
“mémoire d’avenir” and employed the following quote by fellow North African, Saint 
Augustine, as its credo: “The present time of things past is memory; the present of things present 
is action; the present time of things future is expectation.”19 Members of the Cercle were playing 
with the relationship between past, present and future and this conference was a product of the 
Cercle Algérianiste’s awareness that they needed to re-imagine their project for the younger 
generation and new memory culture. The purpose of thinking about “mémoire d’avenir,” then, 
was to “imagine what we still need to accomplish, at the moment when we pass the baton to the 
youngest among us.”20 Pieds-Noirs recognized that as those with personal memories of Algeria 
passed away, their future as a community rested on reconsidering how they used their past to 
forge social bonds. Whereas they had built their community by creating and celebrating a shared 
Algerian past, their practices would no longer work for a generation who did not share this past. 
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“Above all,” wrote one influential Cercle member a few months after the conference, “locking 
ourselves up in a ghetto of nostalgia can only have the principal effect of tearing our own youth 
from our ranks [...] [for] their efforts are principally and understandably oriented towards the 
future, towards their future, towards that of their own children.”21 The time had thus come to 
develop not a new understanding of the past, but a new approach and relationship to it. 
The Cercle Algérianiste had always been aware that the youth, their children, were their 
community’s key to survival. In the first issue of L’Algérianiste, President Maurice Calmein 
announced that “Appreciation (connaissance) of the past must be deepened and widely spread, 
especially among the young generations.”22 Over the years the Cercle introduced a variety of 
initiatives designed to involve their children and young Pieds-Noirs in the association. As early 
as 1977 they tried to organize a youth branch, the Mouvement de Jeunesse Algérianiste (MJA), 
that would meet the particular needs of Pieds-Noirs who were too young to recall life in 
Algeria.
23
 Yet the members of the Cercle were continually aware of and disappointed by the 
younger generation’s general lack of interest. In 1979 one of the organizers expressed his 
frustration, declaring, “Having, over the past two years, tossed and turned the problem, I have 
only up until now met with failures. I have the disagreeable impression that the MJA does not 
interest many people. If this is the case, please tell me, and I will learn a lesson.”24 After 1986, 
there were no more proposals to a start youth group. By 1993, Calmein had identified the need 
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not simply to interest the youth in their project, but to actually “redefine our project for a new 
generation of algérianisme.”25 Now it was not just a “culture” but also a “civilization in peril.”26 
For members of the Cercle, focusing on “mémoire d’avenir” also entailed tailoring their 
memory practices to a wider audience. In the early years of the association, the Cercle mainly 
directed its initiatives at fellow Pieds-Noirs. As interest in the colonial past grew in France 
during the 1990s, however, the Cercle became aware that they needed to engage with a larger 
audience. They had to educate not just their children, but the rest of France as well about their 
history. Hence in 2004 the Cercle announced its intention to publish “‘testimonies’ by families 
of our compatriots who disappeared in Algeria so as to demonstrate to the ensemble of 
authorities, public powers, and also the media, the reality of this drama and the intensity of 
attacks.”27 Memory practices such as these were the only way to bring about the national 
recognition of their suffering that the new memory culture demanded and that the Cercle has 
come to value. As President Thierry Rolando explained, “beyond our community’s recognition 
of these sufferings, the Nation’s recognition of them is our dearest wish, because the Republic is 
grand when she is the mother of all her children, the Republic is grand when she is the Republic 
of all memories.”28  
Members of the Cercle have not only sought new audiences and developed new 
practices; they have also shifted the time period on which most of their memorial practices 
focused. Since in the wider French memory culture people have been most interested in the 
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Algerian War, Pieds-Noirs have been forced to position themselves in relation to this event, even 
though they consider that their history began long before 1954. The monument to the “disparus” 
during Algerian War is evidence of this shift, as are the protests against using March 19
th
 as the 
commemorative date marking the end of the Algerian War. In 2002, the National Assembly 
passed a measure to adopt March 19
th
 as a national commemoration.
29
 Pieds-Noirs have claimed 
that this decision willfully ignores the massacres of French Algerians on March 26 and July 5, 
1962 and the disappearances that occurred after this date. Demonstrations against March 19
th
 
commemorations have become an integral part of the Cercle’s memorial repertoire. Some 
members of the Cercle have become frustrated with the dominant focus on the period of the 
Algerian War, however, because they do not believe that these years define them as a people. 
These Algérianistes have argued that emphasizing the dark era of the war distorts their history.
30
 
Yet the Cercle has found that events commemorating these dates attract the most participation 
within their community.
31
  
The 2002 “mémoire d’avenir” conference was also significant because it introduced a 
new language for articulating their relationship with the past—in terms of “mémoire.” Members 
of the Cercle have understood “mémoire” as narratives and tropes that can be transmitted to 
others, collective losses and victories that can be commemorated, and, perhaps most importantly, 
duties and rights to be fulfilled and defended. Before the conference, this word was only one of 
many, including souvenir, passé, and témoignage, that they used to talk about how they recalled 
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and commemorated their collective past. Several of the association’s original aims focused on 
preserving their connections to French Algeria. They declared their intention “To keep alive the 
flame of memory (souvenir) of French Algeria” and “to denounce the lies and hypocritical 
silences that surround our past (passé).”32 Yet these goals were not expressed in terms of 
“mémoire.” After the 2002 conference, the Cercle identified “the field of memory” as its “major 
battle today”33 and continued to dedicate annual conferences to this theme.34  
Members of the Cercle Algérianiste were not alone, of course, in their recent, and 
growing, interest in “mémoire.” They have co-opted a popular and scholarly discourse that has 
become increasingly ubiquitous. In the aftermath of the Holocaust, as French Jews prompted the 
state to take responsibility for the deportation of Jews during WWII, the focus of 
commemorations shifted from honoring “those who died for France” to “those who died because 
of France.”35 French Jews proclaimed their status as victims of the French state in terms of 
“mémoire.” They declared their right to express their own particular collective memory, which 
they called their “droit de mémoire,” as well as their duty to commemorate their dead, their 
devoir de mémoire.
36
 Eric Savarèse has argued that “devoir de mémoire” and “droit de mémoire” 
have come to constitute new moral and civic norms in French society and that the devotion to 
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collective memory is a new republican value.
37
 Pieds-Noirs in the Cercle have employed this 
language of memory to frame and justify their commemorative practices since 2002.  
As members of the Cercle have become interested in transmitting their “mémoire” to 
younger generations and on a national level, they have identified the particular importance of 
expressing this memory through “lieux de mémoire.” Pierre Nora introduced this term, which he 
defined as “any significant entity, whether material or non-material in nature, which by dint of 
human will or the work of time has become a symbolic element of the memorial heritage of any 
community” in the 3-volume series he edited, called Lieux de Mémoire.38 Andrea Smith has 
observed that Pierre Nora’s volumes “achieved such widespread popular appeal in France that 
they themselves now play a role in shaping the very activities that he set out to analyze and 
critique in the first place.”39 Indeed, members of the Cercle have adopted the term and used it to 
shape their memory work. Members have interpreted the expression literally, as a place where 
they store and through which they represent their memory. In 2008, panel members at their 
national conference on the theme, “What droit à la mémoire for French Algerians?” articulated 
their understanding of the meaning and significance of “lieux de mémoire” as memory practices. 
They explained, “To implant and cement the facts of history in the spirit that those who, not 
having lived through them, do not end up moving away from them to the point of forgetting 
them. Nobler still: to fix the truth in stone, so that it can defy time…and lies.”40 After all, they 
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claimed, “the lieu de mémoire teaches history. It is therefore the principal and perhaps unique 
vector of memory transmission, ‘especially when the actors and witnesses have disappeared.’ To 
this history of blood and pain, the lieu de mémoire brings skin and spirit.”41 They thus 
definitively declared, “There is no memory transmission without lieux de mémoire.”42  
Pieds-Noirs certainly always had such sites of memory, but the Cercle was now 
articulating a conscious policy of using them to ensure the future of their community. They 
discussed the status of a museum project, the Mémorial de la France d’Outre-Mer, that was 
being considered in Marseille and likely evoked the Centre de Documentation des Français 
d’Algérie project they were developing in Perpignan in the minds of many conference attendees. 
The panelists cited the Mur des Disparus as their crowning achievement in this effort, however, 
because “What are in this old country the most visible and popular lieux de mémoire? The lieux 
de mémoire justifiably burdened with the transmission of memory? You guessed it: monuments 
to the dead.”43 
Remembering Violence: The Mur des Disparus 
The Mur des Disparus thus reflects the ways in which members of the Cercle have 
adapted their practices in the new millennium. This memorial, dedicated “to the memory of the 
disparus, who died without burial, Algeria 1954-1963,” consists of a wall that is 15m long and 
2.5m high. On this wall, 2,619 names of “disparus,” mainly French Algerian civilians, along 
with several hundred French soldiers, some Harkis and a few known OAS members, are 
engraved in bronze. In the center of the wall is a sculpture, designed by Pied-Noir Gérard Vié, of 
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a male torso that is gagged and contorted, as if in pain, with a cavity where his heart should be. 
Plaques on either side of the sculpture feature dedications “to ALL disappeared harkis, whose 
names have been erased” as well as quotations by Jean Brune, an Algérianiste author and 
partisan of French Algeria, and Rene de Chateaubriand, a French romantic author. The citation 
from Brune reads, “The only irreparable defeat is forgetting,” suggesting it is the Pieds-Noirs’ 
devoir de mémoire to commemorate the disparus. Chateaubriand’s quotation declares, “Society’s 
downfall lies not in killing an innocent man even though he is innocent, but in killing him as 
though he were guilty,” and thus emphasizes the Pieds-Noirs’ victim status. The Mur des 
Disparus monument was inaugurated in November of 2007 in Perpignan, France. It is located in 
the courtyard of the Couvent Sainte-Claire de la Passion, which would house the Centre de 
Documentation des Français d’Algérie in 2012.  
44
 
The shift to commemorating the “disparus” can be interpreted in part as a reaction to the 
current cult of victimhood in France. While Pieds-Noirs have always understood themselves as 
non-combatant casualties in the war between the FLN and the French state, the disparus attest to 
the extent to which the Pieds-Noirs were also victims of the French rush to decolonize. In his 
work on the civilian Europeans who disappeared during and after the Algerian War, historian 
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Jean-Jacques Jordi defined the category of “disparus.” He explained, “Disappearance is at once 
an abduction, a concealment, and a deprivation of freedom, yet must also be accompanied by a 
complete denial on the part of those who took the person and a cover-up of the fate reserved for 
the disappeared person.”45 The “disparus” constitute visible, accepted symbols of victimhood. In 
1998 the International Law Commission branch of the United Nations defined “enforced 
disappearance” as a violation of human rights and when the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court went into effect in 2002, it declared that “enforced disappearance” constituted a 
crime against humanity.
46
 Moreover, most “disparus” were taken after March 19, 1962, in 
violation of the terms of the Evian Accords.
47
 Jordi has argued that the French state knew about 
the disappearances but that due to the ideological climate of the postwar period, the government 
did not want to investigate “the abuses of the FLN and those of the new Algerian government in 
power.”48 To hold the French state accountable for its role in the disappearances, eleven families 
of French Algerian “disparus” followed in the footsteps of the Harkis and filed a case against 
France for crimes against humanity in 2002.
49
 Their case, like that of the Harkis, was ultimately 
unsuccessful.
50
 
The cause of the disparus has provided the Cercle with a way of blending public and 
private memories and of mourning their collective losses. The monument was first conceived in 
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2004, when the Cercle dedicated its annual conference to making the plight of the disparus and 
their families known to the entire Pied-Noir community and the rest of French society. At this 
event, Pieds-Noirs whose loved ones went missing during the Algerian War shared their personal 
memories. One of the conference organizers announced, “Today, we are all families of the 
disparus,” making their disappearance part of the Pieds-Noirs’ shared memory.51 The Cercle 
made a video of this conference available for those who were unable to attend the event to 
purchase. When the Mur des Disparus was unveiled in 2007, Cercle president Theirry Rolando 
assured the families of disparus that “an entire community shares your pain, appropriates your 
history, recognizes itself in your ordeal, and remembers this tragedy.”52 Four thousand people 
attended the ceremony and the memorial has since become a site of pilgrimage for Pieds-Noirs.  
The monument also offers an opportunity to gain sympathy and acceptance from the rest 
of French society. Whether consciously or not, the designers of the Mur des Disparus have 
drawn on conventions for commemorating traumatic and divisive events that emerged following 
World War II. For example, WWII and other post-traumatic monuments have often employed 
universal symbols of mourning and religious imagery in order to overcome social and political 
divisions in the commemorative process.
53
 Serge Barcellini and Annette Wieviorka have 
observed that in WWII monuments, “the majority of symbols that cross the different memory 
families are funereal symbols.”54  
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Through the Mur, Pieds-Noirs have universalized their losses, so as to make their past 
more acceptable and to facilitate acceptance of their monument. The sculpture located in the 
middle of the monument depicts a Christ-like figure. The wall has also acted as a tombstone for 
those who disappeared and died without being buried by their loved ones. It was referred to as a 
“symbolic gravestone” by the president of the Perpignan branch of Cercle Algérianiste, Suzy 
Simon-Nicaise, at the unveiling ceremony.
55
 At the same time, Simon-Nicaise was careful to 
state that the religious overtones were not meant to exclude non-Christian mourners. The Mur 
was, after all, meant to honor missing Harkis as well. She proclaimed to the “dear disparus,” 
“you who were not entitled to crosses of wood, of iron, or of stone, you who were not entitled to 
the star or crescent or even the broken column of agnostics, men, women, children of all 
confessions, receive here the emotion-filled tribute of your own who have not renounced any of 
their past and who have not forgotten you.”56 Footage from the ceremony reveals that attendees 
placed flowers at the foot of the wall as they would at a grave and the occasion had the somber 
feel of a funeral, with many people crying.
57
 Thus, the monument was presented as a universal 
site of mourning.   
Moreover, in naming 2,619 “disparus,” the monument fits into an important trend in 
commemoration. An imperative to honor the individual soldiers who gave their lives for France 
was first manifested on WWI monuments. The practice of identifying the dead was expanded 
following WWII, when victims were divided into categories, including military, deportee, and 
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civilian.
58
 The Vietnam Veterans Memorial, completed in 1982 in the United States, adapted the 
practice by engraving names onto the monument, thus adding an interactive element to heighten 
its ability to heal. Kristin Hass has explained how “the carving invites tangible interaction. Each 
name has a physical presence. It asks to be touched.”59 The fact that the names of the disparus 
are raised on the surface of the Mur allows them to become a physical connection to the 
disappeared. This is evidenced by the fact that in most photos from the unveiling ceremony, 
attendees are shown touching a name. Visitors also took pictures of the names, making them 
souvenirs of the Mur des Disparus that they can take home. The ceremony was recorded on a 
DVD, which people could purchase to remind themselves of this experience. 
The designers of the Mur des Disparus also called on WWII tropes and traditions of 
remembrance that give the “bystander (passant),” whomever he or she may be, an injunction to 
remember.
60
 A plaque near the wall reads, “Passant, come, read these names/ Men – Women – 
Children/ Do you know that one unlucky (mauvais) day they walked out their doors to disappear 
forever/ Abducted – Abducted – Abducted/ no scream – no body – no trace/ Nothing left of 
them! Passant, linger here/ This is their first and final tombstone.”61 In doing so, they have drawn 
a connection to World War II and the Holocaust commemorative practices and the duty to 
remember the losses incurred during these tragic events. 
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In order to have their victims publicly recognized, Pieds-Noirs have gone to great lengths 
to portray the monument not as belonging not to one particular group, but to the nation as a 
whole. The Cercle has downplayed the fact that the Mur des Disparus was designed by Pieds-
Noirs and privately funded, instead portraying it as apolitical and as originating from the state. 
The website for the city of Perpignan explains that the names on the wall came in part from the 
state’s official records and that the monument has prompted the state to investigate the subject 
further.
62
 The monuments’ designers also made overtures to inclusion when identifying the 
victims that the Mur des Disparus is ostensibly commemorating. On the Cercle Algérianiste 
website, the association proclaims that the memorial honors “everyone who disappeared between 
1954 and 1963 without any distinction on the basis of sex, age, origin, or religion,”63 despite the 
fact that the wall names only victims of the FLN. This sentiment of inclusion was echoed by one 
of the invitees to the event, the Minister of Veterans’ Affairs, Alain Marleix. In his speech, 
Marleix declared that the memorial commemorated “Men and women, without distinction of 
origin, social status, religion, who remained without a tomb in Algeria.”64 The presence of 
Marleix and other national and municipal officials at the unveiling ceremony revealed efforts to 
give the ceremony an official tone. These figures participated in a parade, which included a 
military band, that was orchestrated to convey the impression that the unveiling was an important 
national event. To further communicate this message, in her speech Suzy Simon-Nicaise 
described mobilization for the monument as taking place on a national level and the association 
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emphasized the role of Perpignan officials in the design, funding, and construction processes in 
interviews and articles.
65
 
As another way of portraying the monument as apolitical, the Mur des Disparus avoids 
identifying the perpetrators of the disappearances. Barcellini and Wieviorka have observed this 
practice in World War II monuments, noting, “In the vast majority of cases, the identity of those 
who caused the death is not mentioned.”66 Hass has remarked that the designer of the Vietnam 
Memorial, Maya Lin, likewise “gave form not to the event that caused the deaths but to the 
names of the dead, to the fact of the deaths.”67 In her speech at the unveiling ceremony, Suzy 
Simon-Nicaise described the victims as “Apprehended, abducted, kidnapped, never given back, 
never returned, hidden, abandoned, concealed, these are our disparus.”68 The only reference to 
the context in which the losses occurred is the word, “Algeria” and the dates 1954-1963. Thus 
members of the Cercle avoid identifying those responsible for the abductions, although they have 
admitted elsewhere that members of the FLN and ALN committed these acts.
69
 Pieds-Noirs have 
also criticized the French state for its failure to investigate the disappearances and to recognize 
the disparus as victims of the state, yet these critiques are offered only implicitly through the 
memorial.
70
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Reactions to the Mur des Disparus 
The Mur des Disparus memorial sparked controversy and strong objections even before it 
was unveiled. Analyzing these reactions reveals that the monument was not perceived as 
inclusive, but rather as privileging some victims over others. The most divisive feature of the 
monument lay in its identification of individual disparus. Marita Sturken has observed that 
“naming is a notoriously fraught aspect of memorials, one that more often than not reveals the 
desire to create hierarchies of the dead and that entails problems of inclusion and exclusion.”71 
Indeed, including only the names of victims of the FLN on the wall ultimately undermined 
efforts to portray the monument as a national memorial and to appeal to universal emotions of 
grief and devotion.  
A number of prominent French colonial historians, who gathered in 2004 at the 
Université de Perpignan to discuss their concerns over the monument and the proposed Centre de 
Documentation des Français d’Algérie, anticipated the difficulties that would arise from the 
practice of naming. They observed that it would be impossible to list the names of all of the 
disappeared without including members of the OAS, yet they feared that commemorating these 
disparus would offend the families of victims killed by OAS actions.
72
 The scholars therefore 
proposed two solutions. One was that the proposed memorial be abandoned because “this 
project, having been inspired by memory politics, cannot win unanimous support.”73 If the 
Cercle insisted on pursuing the project, then the historians declared that they must inscribe the 
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names of all disparus, including any known victims of OAS actions, on the wall. According to 
the historians, these solutions would prevent the Cercle from having to make “a choice between 
different categories of victims” and thus avoid the conflict that would stem from such a 
decision.
74
 The committee charged with designing the Mur did not adopt either suggestion. 
Two incidents that occurred before the monument was unveiled appeared to confirm the 
scholars’ predictions that the naming of disparus would be a problematic aspect of the Mur. The 
first was a dispute over the monument’s inscriptions. The original design featured quotations, 
which had already been engraved on the marble plaques, by Albert Camus and Algerian author 
Slimane Benaïssa. The citation by Camus, a reference from The Plague, read, “To not be among 
those who bear witness (témoigner) by keeping quiet, to leave at least a reminder (souvenir) of 
the injustice and violence that was done to them.” Camus is arguably the most famous French 
Algerian and members of the Cercle have referenced his work often in their publications. It is 
likely that the monument’s designers wished to draw on the authority of this highly respected 
figure in metropolitan France to establish their victimhood. The quote by Slimane Benaïssa read, 
“You are in the hands of God for eternity, in our hearts for life, and in our memory for peace.” It 
was probably selected to emphasize the inclusive nature of the monument, evoke universal 
symbols of mourning, and reinforce the Pieds-Noirs’ ties to their Algerian past. Yet when 
Camus’s daughter and Mr. Benaïssa found out that the monument would include the names of 
members of the OAS, they both sent letters requesting that the quotations not be used.
75
  
Benaïssa asked to have his message of harmony and faith removed from the wall because “One 
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does not construct peace in a partisan manner and especially not with people who continue the 
war on the terrain of memory.”76  
As a result of these objections, the Mur’s designers chose the quotations by Jean Brune 
and Rene de Chateaubriand, engraved them on new marble slabs, and placed them over the 
original inscriptions. These selections contradicted the universal moral duty and right to 
remember that designers had invoked in order to justify the Mur des Disparus. Brune is 
considered one of the leaders of the Algérianiste literary movement and thus evokes a connection 
to the Pieds-Noirs’ Algerian past, as the other authors were intended to do. Yet this choice also 
risked alienating the public, as Brune has been associated with the OAS. His declaration that 
“The only irreparable defeat is forgetting,” seemed to suggest one must avoid forgetting the OAS 
members who were killed in particular, so that their cause was not ultimately defeated. 
Chateaubriand, a French Romantic author, was far removed from the conflict, yet the content of 
his quote engages with controversial issues of innocence and guilt. In asserting, “Society’s 
downfall lies not in killing an innocent man even though he is innocent, but in killing him as 
though he were guilty,” the monument conveys the message that all victims of the FLN were 
equally innocent.  
The other incident involved the accidental inscription of the names of Pieds-Noirs who 
had not actually disappeared, but rather migrated to France. According to Jordi, between the 
soldiers whose names were already honored on Quai Branly memorial, Pieds-Noirs who returned 
to France, victims who fall outside the Mur’s parameters (dead, rather than disappeared; outside 
the dates of the conflict), repeated names, and spelling mistakes, as many as forty percent of the 
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names on the wall are inaccurate.
77
 These errors have called into question the authority of the 
monument. Moreover, some of the French Algerians, including an ardent anti-colonialist and 
communist and his family members, who were mistakenly included on the Mur have been 
publically outraged over being included on a memorial that also named members of the OAS. 
Their reaction highlights one of the inherent problems with naming: the fact names are not empty 
signifiers that can be put to use un-problematically for a commemorative purpose. They 
represent individuals with backgrounds and ideas, which can undermine attempts to portray the 
commemoration as apolitical.  
Opposition to the Mur culminated with a protest by 200 members of the coalition “No to 
the wall-museum of the Perpignan town hall and the Cercle Algérianiste” near the site the 
evening before the monument was unveiled. This coalition consisted of 50 organizations, 
including “human rights defense groups, parties on the left, trade unions, veterans associations 
and even certain harkis.”78 Organizers announced that they were opposed to “this shameful wall” 
because it “organizes a selective sorting of victims of colonialism.”79 Mouloud Aounit, one of 
the organizers, called it a “wall of division” and another leader declared, “all of the ideological 
ingredients are present to ignite a new war of memories, to divide and arouse hate and 
communautarisme.”80  
The Harkis were identified on the monument as a particular group to be commemorated, 
with the dedication, “to ALL disappeared harkis, whose names have been erased.” Yet most 
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Harki victims were not individually named. Children of Harkis were divided in their reactions to 
the monument. For participants on the Coalition Nationale des Harkis et des Associations de 
Harkis website, the effort to include the Harkis among the disparus constituted a reason to 
support the memorial.
81
 Fatima Besnaci-Lancou, President of the Association des Harkis et 
Droits de l’Homme, however, was opposed to Mur des Disparus because it singled out specific 
groups of victims. She declared, “The AHDH is not against the commemoration of disparus, but 
rather against the commemoration of selected disparus.”82  
Participating in France’s “Memory Wars” 
Members of the Cercle Algérianiste have interpreted reactions to the Mur des Disparus 
and their other memory practices within the framework of the “memory wars” paradigm. They 
have employed the current discourse of memory to declare their right to express their version of 
the past and to commemorate their dead and to claim that historians, the French state, and other 
memory communities are violating this right. In understanding themselves as victims of a current 
“memory war,” members of the Cercle have thus reinvented familiar themes of victimhood. This 
contemporary victim status has offered opportunities to develop new memory practices that are 
highly unifying and participatory. Pieds-Noirs of all generations have experienced indignation 
over being denied a memory and this righteous anger has united them. The Mur des Disparus is 
central to their new project because it has provided a site for their community to defend 
collectively. 
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Building the tradition of “devoir de mémoire,” these Pieds-Noirs have claimed that 
paying homage to one’s dead is “a natural, imprescriptible right of all men.” 83 They have 
extended this line of reasoning to argue that having a “lieu de mémoire” is the inviolable right of 
all communities. “For,” as one member of the Cercle argued, “these lieux de mémoire establish 
the present and enable the future. Contesting lieux de mémoire means denying the history of 
man, denying history and finally denying man.”84 President Rolando likewise claimed that “all 
suffering has the equal right to be recognized”85 and declared the need to “respect the legitimate 
right of each community touched by the Algerian War to express in peace its memory and 
suffering.”86 The language of memory has thus infused their memory practices with moral 
justification. Their statements also suggest that the Cercle would not infringe on the ability of 
other groups to commemorate their losses.
87
 
Yet, they have claimed that their own “legitimate right”88 has been rejected by others and 
that all of their “lieux de mémoire are contested, their existence fought and threatened.”89 In 
2008, when the mayor of Marignane dismantled a commemorative monument dedicated to 
partisans of French Algeria, Rolondo described this move as “the first concrete manifestation of 
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a will to eradicate all trace of our painful memory.”90 At their annual conference that year, 
Rolando presented “those who demand the destruction of a Mémorial des Disparus, those who 
want to ignore the thousands of men and women and children who were kidnapped and 
assassinated simply because they were French Algerian,” as morally corrupt.91 He has declared 
that Pieds-Noirs must mobilize themselves, along with “all democrats and those passionate about 
justice and fairness in order to denounce the sectarianism and intolerance” committed against 
them.
92
 
The Cercle Algerianiste has adopted a language of memory originally developed by 
scholars to make its case that the Pieds-Noirs are being excluded, denied, forgotten, and 
sacrificed by the way history is being written. As they have understood it, in the context of the 
“infamous memory wars,” “some are favored by the still dominant ideology, the one that uses 
the word ‘colonialism’ to discredit the colonial enterprise, the one that benefits from easy access 
to the media and the force of the law […] while others, ours for example, because it goes against 
the grain, is threatened with suffocation.”93 Rolando specified that while the porteurs de valises94 
and FLN militants have been honored in France, “French Algerians are denied the right to honor 
their dead in dignity and peace.”95 Echoing a debate among scholars about the relationship 
between “history” and “memory,” the Cercle has maintained that the notion of “the Universality 
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and the Truth of History” has been used to discredit their memories, which challenge the 
dominant understanding of the colonial period.
96
 Again employing the metaphor of war, they 
have added that “a collective of political parties and leftist associations is in war against our 
memory in waving the ultimate weapon: history.”97 
Members of the Cercle have contended that historians in particular have refused the 
Pieds-Noirs’ right to ”mémoire,” and compromised their own obligation to be objective, in the 
name of writing a ‘politically correct’ version of history. They have argued that rather than 
helping the Pieds-Noirs reconstruct their past based on the fragments and traces that remain, 
historians have ignored subjects that pertain to their past, including the fate of the disparus. 
Moreover, Pieds-Noirs have claimed that scholars have contributed to the inverse process, 
actually aiding in “the dispersal and deliberate effacement of memories of our lives in Algeria.” 
One member therefore asked, “Is that not the real war against memory, this slow and devious 
process?”98 Pieds-Noirs have expressed the sense of again being sacrificed, as they were in 1962, 
to the general political will. They have explained that they simply wished to preserve what is left 
of their memory because, in the words of fellow French Algerian Camus, “giving the floor to he 
who passes away, to he who does not have voice, to those who do not have a voice, is to make 
the vanquished speak, those that history has stricken down, soon to disappear into oblivion, 
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swept up by the secular rumor of history.”99 As the excluded from history, then, members of the 
Cercle have claimed subaltern status for their memory and strengthened their identity as victims. 
Through the Mur des Disparus and their reaction to attacks against it, then, members of 
the Cercle have conflated their sense of being “wounded” and “betrayed”100 in the “guerre de 
mémoires” with the victims status of the “disparus” and that of their families. Pieds-Noirs have 
also used the cause of the disparus to rally their aging community. In the issue of L’Algérianiste 
preceding the 2007 inauguration of the Mur, a member of the Cercle urged his fellow Pieds-
Noirs to join him at the ceremony in Perpignan on order to preserve the collective memory of the 
disparus. He declared, “The souls of our disparus will find in this place the anchor point that 
History and men have refused them. These souls will come live in this marble. But in order to do 
this, they need the countless bodily presence of the living, of our physical presence. It is thus a 
formidable rendez-vous. Even worse, it is a duty that History burdens us with.
101
 This moving 
entreaty considered the Pieds-Noirs’ united presence to be the only way the tragedies of the past 
could be laid to rest. Collective action is also necessary for ensuring the future of their 
community. Rolando and other members of the Cercle have recognized that defending the Mur 
offers “opportunities to affirm that we are a community that is standing up, a community that 
assumes its historic past, a community that is proud of the work accomplished in Algeria, a 
community proud of its roots.
102
 Pieds-Noirs in the Cercle Algérianiste affirm that, just as in 
1973 when the association was founded, they have remained “proud to be French Algerian.”103 
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Members of the Cercle have expressed optimism that their new way of understanding 
their past has given new life to their community. One adherent wrote that the 2008 conference 
drew 1,200 participants, who came “to affirm the legitimacy of their right to express their 
memory and to have their lieux de mémoire respected.”104 The Algérianiste publication 
proclaimed that defending their devoir de mémoire has “contributed to forging our spirit of 
resistance, and to sharpening our Pied-Noir consciousness and ability to rebel yet again against 
the betrayal of our history.”105 In response to protests against the Mur, another member declared 
that attempts to destroy the Pieds-Noirs by refusing them their right to memory have had the 
opposite effect. “We have understood in Perpignan,” he exulted, “that we are, more than a 
‘community,’ we are a family…thank you, gentlemen!”106 Once again, then, the Pieds-Noirs 
have ensured the future of their community by evoking their past.  
The disappearance of the Sidi-Ferruch monument from the Cercle’s memorial repertoire 
after 1994 is a striking indicator of their move away from celebrating the pioneering aspects of 
their memory and identity. This commemoration has remained part of how they understand 
themselves and their past. It is no longer featured, however, at the center of their memorial 
practices. One member of the Cercle who noticed this shift felt that they had gone too far. He 
explained that while the association has realized an indispensable “devoir de mémoire” through 
the Mur des Disparus, educating people about “the incontestable benefit that our compatriots 
from diverse origins, with few resources contributed to the metropole […] is equally a devoir.” 
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He argued that doing so is essential for combating the stereotype of the Pieds-Noirs as 
exploitative colonists that their youth have received through the press and from textbooks.
107
 The 
majority of the Cercle no longer shares this view. 
Conclusion: Online Sites of Pied-Noir Memory 
As the Cercle has sought a wider French audience and identified the need to attract the 
interest of the second generation, members have searched for new ways to communicate their 
collective memory. One initiative has been to start employing cyber vectors of memory. Leaders 
of the Cercle have established a website for their national association, sites for local branches, 
and a blog to publish the proceedings of their national conference.
108
 As Hélène Martin-Berthet, 
an adherent of the Cercle who advocated this development explained, “We must be conscious of 
the behavior of those to whom we wish to transmit our memory.”109 Martin-Berthet cited 
evidence that fifty percent of the French public surf the Internet and that younger generations 
spend half of their free time online as proof of “the upheaval of cultural practices to which we 
need to adapt ourselves.”110 Martin-Berthet concluded her defense of cyber vectors by declaring, 
“we owe it to ourselves to be present in this ‘era of ubiquitous memory’ as Emmanuel Hoog 
notes in his work Mémoire année zéro, where everything is called to be preserved and to be 
accessible to everyone, thanks to the introduction and the democratization of these new 
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technologies that are digital, the Internet or mobile communications. A blog has the advantage of 
being very reactive and interactive while still remaining serious.”111   
The Cercle’s website publicizes the association’s projects, including the Mur des 
Disparus, and offers a history of the Algérianiste movement. In this way, it resembles Harki 
websites that are connected to memorial associations. Other prominent Pied-Noir organizations 
have set up sites to communicate their activities as well.
112
 Pieds-Noirs have also established 
websites that are intended to encourage participation in protests and demonstrations.
113
 As with 
the Harki site, all aim to educate the public about their collective past. Unlike the Harki websites 
analyzed in Chapters 4 and 5, however, most Pied-Noir cyber carriers do not have public 
discussion forums and are not designed for participation directly on the site. This suggests that 
the Pieds-Noirs have been more interested in attracting involvement in their memory practices 
and activism than in negotiating collective understandings of the past. For many Pieds-Noirs, 
these narratives and tropes are, by now, well established.  
Pieds-Noirs employ cyber vectors for an additional, commemorative purpose that is not 
common among second-generation Harki sites. Most websites are devised to help Pieds-Noirs 
reconstruct and maintain traces of their homeland. The majority of Pied-Noir websites are 
dedicated to particular cities, towns, and villages in Algeria.
114
 They provide photos and personal 
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memories of these locales; sites that are affiliated with associations also organize gatherings for 
former residents. These sites attest to the lingering importance of regional identities for the 
Pieds-Noirs. Other sites provide information on the whereabouts of vestiges, such as monuments, 
plaques, and church bells, of French Algeria or the fate of French Algerian cemeteries.
115
 A few 
of the blogs and websites provide a guest book as well, where Pieds-Noirs can post inquiries or 
share reflections about places, symbols, or fellow French Algerians.
116
 These sites, then, offer a 
means of assuaging the loss of French Algeria and resisting the process of forgetting. The Centre 
de Documentation des Français d’Algérie, discussed in Chapter 8, addresses these same needs. 
The case of the Cercle Algérianiste not only offers insight into how the Pied-Noir 
community has adapted its memory practices in response to its current needs and desires for the 
future; it also presents an opportunity to study 21
st
 century French memory culture and to 
evaluate the tools that other scholars have developed for analyzing it. As France has come to 
terms with its colonial past, the clear distinction that historians have claimed exists between their 
own work and that of architects of memory (memorial associations and amateur scholars with 
access to testimonial evidence) is now being challenged. The fields of history, memory, and 
politics have become intertwined and share the same language. Thus, like the term “lieu de 
mémoire,” the notion of “memory wars” has migrated from the academic setting in which it was 
created and has actually contributed to a politically charged culture of memory competition. As 
groups have engaged with this scholarly discourse, it has reinforced an antagonistic framework 
through which they interpret responses to their memory work and competing narratives.  
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CHAPTER 8: MEMORIALIZING FRENCH ALGERIA IN THE CENTRE DE 
DOCUMENTATION DES FRANÇAIS D’ALGÉRIE, 2012 
In 2012, the Cercle Algérianiste, in conjunction with the city of Perpignan, opened the 
Centre de Documentation des Français d’Algérie (Resource Center on French Algerians, 
CDDFA), the only museum and archive site in France currently devoted to an episode in the 
colonial past.
1
 As the first scholarly evaluation of the CDDFA, this chapter places the site in the 
context of recent French museum projects that deal with themes of cultural difference. A number 
of successful exhibitions on colonial topics in the 1990s reflected a growing interest in colonial 
history in France,
2
 yet the state has not been able to produce a national museum that successfully 
and directly engages with its controversial colonial legacy. I argue that the CDDFA exists 
because it is the work of an association that shares a clear, if narrow, vision of the nature of 
French Algeria. Its roots are also the main source of criticism toward the project. As an act of 
memory for French Algerians, the CDDFA does not have the same imperative to be inclusive 
that a national, historical museum project would have, yet it relies on public funding. To 
demonstrate this point, this chapter also constructs a history of the CDDFA as an institution and 
analyzes how French Algerians use the museum and archive as memory technologies. I argue 
that the Cercle Algérianiste’s goals for the site and its museological choices reflect twin desires: 
to preserve the cultural and historical differences that make French Algerians unique and to 
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challenge the understandings that others have of French Algerians and their lives in Algeria that 
have formed the basis for their exclusion in France. 
French Colonial Museum Context 
During the colonial period, museums served to construct and perpetuate the cultural 
hierarchies that underpinned the imperial enterprise. Objects looted by colonists were displayed 
“as glorious symbols of geopolitical power,”3 and France was exalted through her comparison 
with the colonial “other.” In the aftermath of colonialism, France and other Western nations have 
had to rethink the institutionalized presentation of difference. The French have made several 
attempts to update museums to be more inclusive and appreciative of other cultures, but have 
failed to successfully engage with the subject of colonialism, and in most cases, these projects 
are still framed as an encounter with the “other.”  
The Musée du Quai Branly (MQB, Paris), which opened in 2006, re-appropriated art 
acquired during the colonial era with the goals of “of abolishing aesthetic hierarchies and paying 
homage to non-Western societies.”4 Curators, however, selected an approach that privileges the 
aesthetics of non-Western art
5
 at the expense of ethnographic or historical context. As a result, 
these works are presented in a cultural vacuum, and we learn little about the societies from which 
they originated. There is no discussion of how the pieces were collected or of the consequences 
of colonialism for these societies.
6
 For the Cité Nationale de l’Histoire de l’Immigration (CNHI, 
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Paris), which opened a year after the MQB, the state repurposed a former colonial museum—
built as “an architectonic colonial manifesto” for the 1931 Exposition Coloniale7 to memorialize 
the contributions that immigrants have made to French society. In this way, a celebration of post-
colonial immigration, including that of Algerians of non-European origin who migrated to 
France following Algerian independence, has substituted for a thorough examination of 
colonialism. The aim of this institution is to incorporate the history of immigration into the 
national historical narrative, yet this museum project is still framed as an encounter with the 
“other.” As Dominic Thomas has argued, “the defining umbrella rubric for the project is 
specified by the statement, ‘Leur histoire est notre histoire’ (Their history is our history)” while 
“the relationship between the other and the we remains exceptionally vague, confused and 
complicated by the question of appropriation, as well as the specter of republican ideals and 
values.”8 The Musée des civilisations de l’Europe et de la Méditerranée (MuCEM) that opened 
in Marseille in 2013 documents cultural encounters and exchanges in Euro-Mediterranean 
history since 1000. The impact of European colonialism is essential to narrating this history, and 
yet it has not constituted a main focus in the institution.
9
 This omission is particularly noticeable 
because the MuCEM is located in a city where a large post-colonial immigration population has 
settled, and thus the weight of the colonial past is apparent.
10
  
France continues to struggle with how to memorialize what many consider to be a 
shameful and disputed phase in its national history. Two national projects that, like the CDDFA, 
are specifically dedicated to colonial themes, have met substantial resistance. In 2000, the city of 
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Marseille joined with the national government to propose a Mémorial National de l’Outre-Mer, 
which, despite the reference to memory in its name, was intended to provide an objective 
historical narrative of colonialism. The project was placed under the direction of Jean-Jacques 
Jordi, an historian who specializes in the decolonization of Algeria, while “associations of pieds-
noirs, former colonials or special interest groups with personal links to the former empire” were 
excluded from participating on the committee he headed in order to protect the goal of 
impartiality.
11
 The initiative, however, encountered significant logistical obstacles and sustained 
opposition from these associations. The committee found it difficult to maintain the neutrality of 
the project in the current heated memorial context and the venture has been abandoned.
12
 Plans 
to create a Musée de l’Histoire de la France en Algérie in Montpellier have likewise been 
cancelled following disputes among historians, associations, and politicians over the intended 
purpose and focus of the institution. The mayor of Montpellier proposed to create a 
contemporary art museum in the space that had been chosen for the project, since it seemed 
likely to attract more visitors and incite less controversy.
13
  
The CDDFA is predominately the work of one association representing a particular 
community in France, even though it is supported by its locality. Its existence and ability to 
employ public funds for its own purposes reflects a broadening access to the power to display in 
France. In the wake of the colonial era, the French state has been unable to impose a single 
interpretation of its imperial past, and architects of collective memory have proliferated to fill 
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this gap. Various communities, associations, and individuals have marked the public sphere with 
their private memories, competing for public resources and spaces through which to transmit 
their memories. Different actors often present contradictory perspectives on the past, particularly 
with regard to narratives of the colonial period. Some historians and other public figures have 
interpreted this situation as a crisis. They perceive the competing expressions of collective 
memory as a potential fracture of the republic into different communities of interest.
14
  
Reactions to the CDDFA reveal concerns over who should have the power to transmit, 
and ultimately impose, understandings of the past. In 2004, a collection of historians and other 
scholars met at the Université de Perpignan to discuss their concerns over the plans for the 
CDDFA and the Mur des Disparus. They argued that as a project financed by the municipality of 
Perpignan, a research center on Algeria “concerns all citizens and should not address itself to 
only a single category of individuals.”15 In addition, eighty members of the group “for a non-
falsified Franco-Algerian history” protested against the inauguration of the CDDFA, chanting, 
“No! No public money for those who are nostalgic for French Algeria.”16 They considered the 
allotment of 1.8 million Euros to pay for the CDDFA a “misappropriation of public funds for 
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partisan purposes.”17 Protesters argued it was “scandalous” to grant a subsidy of this amount to 
institutionalize one association’s interpretation of the past. 18  
Other significant concerns with the site stem from the desire to maintain a distinction 
between sites of memory and works of history as competing sources of knowledge about the 
past. Barbara Misztal has argued that memory, which derives its authenticity from personal 
experience, can “play an important role as a source of truth” in places “where political power 
heavily censors national history and where oppressed nations have a profound deficit of truth.”19 
This is also the case in societies in which national history is not censored, but is still being 
negotiated, as in France with regard to the colonial legacy. History, in contrast to memory, 
derives its authority from a rigorous methodology: “only history is subject to the demands of 
scientific research--meaning, notably, particular demands in terms of questioning, of sources, 
and of validation of results.”20 Historians of French Algeria have been well aware of the 
obstacles to producing scholarly works on this period, including a serious lack of sources, 
particularly on the lives of the indigenous population, and the politically sensitive nature of the 
subject.
21
 
 The CDDFA can be interpreted as a response to the relative dearth of historical works 
and knowledge about the lives and experiences of people in French Algeria. Two of the 
CDDFA’s stated goals are to “give witness to the history, memory and identity of French 
                                                 
17
 Henri Pouillot, “Le Centre de Documentation des Français d’Algérie à Perpignan ne sera pas autre chose qu’un 
‘musée’ d’apologie de l’Algérie Française,” accessed December 9, 2013, http://www.henri-
pouillot.fr/spip.php?article258. 
 
18
 “Deux Visions de L’histoire Franco-Algérienne, Un Seul Musée,” Lindependant.fr, accessed January 16, 2014, 
http://www.lindependant.fr/2012/01/24/deux-visions-de-l-histoire-franco-algerienne-un-seul-musee,109860.php. 
 
19
 Barbara Misztal, “Memory Experience: The Forms and Functions of Memory,” in Museums and Their 
Communities, ed. Sheila Watson (London; New York: Routledge, 2007), 379–396: 383. 
 
20
 Savarèse et al., "Rapport de recherche sur le projet de réalisation,” 4.  
 
21
 Ibid. 
276 
Algerians” and to “enhance the teachings of history by opening the Center to reflection on the 
totality of exiles.” Critics of the project, however, argue that any attempt to address this history 
must do so in an inclusive and objective manner, which can only be accomplished by having a 
group of scholars on the advisory committee. The collection of historians who met at the 
Université de Perpignan declared, “the research and exposition center must offer a vision of 
Franco-Algerian history that is at once neutral and impartial, designed to inform and not 
influence the public of potential visitors. To this end, only the constitution of a scientific 
committee endowed with autonomy and decision-making powers is likely to satisfy this 
demand.”22 Likewise, the group who protested against the CDDFA announced, “We do not 
challenge the creation of an information center, provided that it focuses on French-Algerian 
history, that it is a shared site of memory and that it is managed by a scientific committee 
composed of historians.”23 
To some extent, no history can be “neutral and impartial.” The CDDFA does not meet the 
standards of a critical work of history, even if its curators may want to portray it as such in order 
to give the site legitimacy. A brochure for the CDDFA, for example, describes its archive as “a 
real tool for scientific research” and the Cercle’s website boasts about the “numerous researchers 
from around the world”24 who visit the museum. Yet the museum is the product of a memory 
community and presents an idealized, simplified interpretation of Franco-Algerian relations with 
a one-sided perspective of their shared history. Within the CDDFA, the native populations of 
Algeria can only be viewed through European perspectives of them during the colonial era. 
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There is no reflection of the dynamism of these populations or acknowledgement that they might 
have experienced this period differently. Nor is there recognition of the fact that French Algeria 
was a political construct with shifting criteria of belonging. The CDDFA’s displays do not 
engage critically with the imperial motivations behind the creation and use of particular objects 
or images, but merely present them as evidence of the past. This is a common museum practice 
and one that is fairly understandable in the context of a site of memory. Claire Farago and 
Donald Preziosi explain, “all museums stage their collected and preserved relics in such a way as 
to enhance the facticity of these surviving objects, documents, and monuments.”25 In describing 
an earlier incarnation of the CDDFA, Robert Aldrich wrote, “The goal is to preserve these 
souvenirs and to reaffirm the heritage of pieds-noirs. A critical appraisal of colonialism is not to 
be expected.”26 Visitors should not expect this of the current CDDFA site, either.   
The CDDFA Project 
Since its inception, the Cercle Algérianiste has been interested in “any action aimed at 
saving our culture from oblivion (museums, libraries, resource center…)” and association leaders 
immediately began collecting documents and objects related to life in French Algeria from its 
members.
27
 By 1983 they had opened a small Centre de Documentation et de Culture 
Algérianiste in Perpignan, a precursor to the current institution. Within five years, this center had 
doubled its holdings and became the Musée de l’Algérie Française, inaugurated in early 1989.28 
The goals for this institution were both private and public: to help French Algerians “maintain a 
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connection to the past” and to make the accomplishments of the settlers in Algeria known and 
appreciated in France.
29
 The museum also reflected the myth of the civilizing mission. Cercle 
president Maurice Calmein explained that the site was intended to “demonstrate that French 
Algeria was a beautiful and grand endeavor (œuvre).”30 In 2005, historian Robert Aldrich 
described this museum as “an amateur effort, a collection of treasured bric-a-brac associated with 
Frenchmen who lived in Algeria, many of whom died in Perpignan.”31 
The location of these early incarnations of the CDDFA is evidence of a special 
relationship between the Cercle and the city of Perpignan. French Algerians exercise 
considerable political weight in the south of France, where most of them settled following their 
migration in 1962. Their electoral strength is especially felt in Perpignan, which is situated on 
the Mediterranean, near the Spanish border. The city’s website boasts of a particularly warm 
welcome offered to the French Algerians in 1962 by then mayor Paul Alduy of the Union pour 
un Mouvement Populaire party (UMP, right-of-center), “contrary to what was occurring nearly 
everywhere else. Paul Alduy had the heart to reduce the traumas stemming from the exile of 
French populations at the moment Algerian independence was declared.”32 Alduy made a 
symbolic gesture towards the French Algerians in 1986 when he inaugurated the Sidi-Ferruch 
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memorial at Port-Vendres.
33
 Alduy’s son, who succeeded him as mayor, continued to support the 
interests of French Algerians.  
In the early 2000s, members of the Cercle decided that their collection of documents and 
objects had grown too expansive for their home in the Musée de l’Algérie Française and began 
looking for a more “fitting” location that would draw a larger public. Suzy Simon-Nicaise, vice 
president of the Cercle and also adjunct mayor of Perpignan, discussed enlarging the museum 
and archive space with the current mayor, Jean-Marc Pujol, who was also French Algerian.
34
 The 
Perpignan City Council approved the Cercle’s expansion project in 2006 and agreed that the city 
would renovate the proposed location, the Couvent Sainte-Claire de la Passion (a 16
th
 century 
convent that was used as a prison from the French Revolution until 1989)
35
 while the Cercle 
would provide the content.
36
 The city financed the project with approximately one million Euros 
to create the CDDFA and provided an annual operating budget of 150,000 Euros.
37
 The final 
renovation costs were approximately 1.8 million Euros.  
The original name of the institution was to be the Centre de documentation de la 
présence française en Algérie, (Resource Center on the French Presence in Algeria) but was 
changed to the more specific Centre de documentation des Français d’Algérie before its 
inauguration on Sunday, January 29, 2012. The timing of this inauguration was auspicious 
because 2012 was an important election year and the CDDFA was interpreted by some as the 
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UMP’s attempt to cater to French Algerian voters.38 Pujol denied that this was a political 
project,
39
 but the fact that the CDDFA is funded by the city reveals that the French Algerians 
have significant electoral influence.  
The CDDFA is made up of a permanent exposition space of three hundred
 
square meters 
on the second floor of the building, an adjoining space for temporary exhibitions, and a reading 
room on the first floor in which to consult the institution’s archival holdings. The CDDFA 
archive is part of the Perpignan municipal library system, whose website states that the 
collections of the Centre “are composed of more than 5,000 books, periodicals, files, postcards, 
photographs and maps.”40 The Cercle website, however, asserts that the CDDFA document 
database holds more than thirty thousand items, including over eight thousand books, journals, 
and magazines and five thousand postcards.
41
   
Within the permanent exhibition space, signs on the walls highlight key episodes and 
themes in the history of French Algeria. The displays are organized chronologically so that the 
section to the right upon entering the exposition room covers the Algerian territory before the 
arrival of the French, identified by a sign as the period of “Algeria before Algeria.” This portion 
of the museum has been set up to support the “pioneering myth,” which depicts Algeria as a 
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French invention, that French Algerian associations have constructed.
42
 Significantly, the section 
on the centuries before the French occupation is given much less space than the comparatively 
short period in which the French dominated.  
The section on the left presents particular features of life in French Algeria (Public 
Health, Infrastructure, Education, Politics, Daily Life, Culture) and significant events (the 
centennial of French Algeria, the World Wars, the Algerian War), ending with the migration of 
French Algerians from Algeria in 1962 (Exile). The signs guide how the corresponding images 
and items in the display cases should be interpreted. These items, most of which were donated by 
French Algerians, include what we might call “banal” objects: trinkets and souvenirs such as 
stamps, playing cards, fans, a bottle opener, a shoe horn, a box of matches, cigars, and ticket 
stubs. The museum presents some works of “high culture”—paintings, drawings, and 
sculptures—as well, but provides little context for reading them, often not even providing the 
artist’s name, other than as evidence of the aesthetic beauty of French Algeria. The courtyard of 
the building includes the Mur des Disparus, which was unveiled five years before the CDDFA 
opened. The Cercle’s website boasts of having welcomed over fifteen thousand visitors to the 
Mur and CDDFA in under two years.
43
 
“A Safeguard Against Oblivion”: Memory Transmission 
Even though it is the product of a single organization’s efforts, the CDDFA project 
allows us to evaluate the concerns of the wider French Algerian community. The fact that the 
Cercle was able to get the CDDFA built, particularly in light of the multiple failed colonial 
museum projects in France, shows that French Algerians constitute a well-organized, influential 
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group. Why is having an archive and museum site so important to their community? Convincing 
research has been done on the important social functions that museums can serve for groups by 
connecting past and present.
44
 Elizabeth Crooke has explained how objects in a museum “can 
authenticate the nation,” or other imagined community, like the French Algerians, “provide 
inspiration for the future, and legitimise present actions.”45 Similarly, archives have proven 
valuable to migrant groups for sorting out the “meaning of memory.” Through selecting and 
preserving particular traces of their past, migrants consciously construct their collective identity 
and a place for themselves in their new society.
46
 The Cercle’s goals for the CDDFA hint at two 
related challenges that the French Algerian community in particular faces and hopes to address 
through this institution. 
First, since French Algerians come from an absent place, a geopolitical entity that no 
longer exists, their connection to the land and domestic items associated with Algeria has been 
irrevocably severed. Barbara Misztal has explained the significance of places to the construction 
and transmission of collective memory: “a group’s memory is linked to places, ruins, landscapes, 
monuments and urban architecture, which – as they are overlain with symbolic associations to 
past events – play an important role in helping to preserve group memory. Such sites, and also 
locations where a significant event is regularly celebrated and replayed, remain ‘concrete and 
distinct regardless of whether they are mythological or historical.’”47 The power of place is 
especially evident among migrants, who have lost the historically significant places of their past. 
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In examining migrant practices, Anna Hayes and Robert Mason have observed that local spaces, 
such as migration museums, “have become vital sites, providing space in which to enact 
identifications with multiple localities beyond that immediately experienced.”48 Beyond the 
symbolism of the place, the CDDFA performs an essential social function for French Algerians 
as a place to visit, gather and discuss the past: one brochure describes it as “a site for debates, 
conferences, meetings, lectures, and screenings.” 
French Algerians also have a particular need for new, local sites. Many French Algerians 
have been unable or unwilling to return to Algeria and those who did go back found most of their 
symbolically important places changed or gone. Cemeteries with the remains of their loved ones 
have fallen into disrepair and many monuments and other symbolic reminders of the colonial 
past have been destroyed.
49
 The inclusion of the Mur des Disparus at the CDDFA invests the 
museum with emotional and commemorative significance, serving as a proxy monument for 
those who cannot visit the graves of loved ones. Evelyne Joyaux, the president of the Aix-en-
Provence branch of the Cercle, observed that the choice of a former convent as the location of 
the CDDFA gives it an added spiritual dimension. In a report on her visit to the site, Joyaux 
exclaimed, “Yes, places can inspire!  Even a famous French politician who proclaimed himself 
an atheist [Maurice Barrès] nonetheless affirmed that he was sensitive to ‘these places where the 
Holy Spirit breathes.’ How could it be possible for the prayers of the nuns, whispered over such 
a long time, not to have permeated the walls?”50 At the same time, however, the site has retained 
some of the trappings of its former function as a prison. A plaque that reads “prisons” remains on 
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an exterior wall of the building and there are bars on several windows. These reminders of 
captivity lend a very different kind of solemnity, one that evokes specular supervision and the 
power of the state, to the site. 
51
 
Objects are equally significant following displacement: for migrants who face “loss of 
homes, livelihoods, and even a whole sense of themselves in the world, in addition to their social 
ties […] objects of memory, no matter how mundane, would prove important mnemonics 
offering at least temporary reassurance of social continuity in a world in great flux.”52 French 
Algerians do not have many personal objects that connect them to Algeria, making the remaining 
ones especially precious to them. Scholars have observed a trope of the “two suitcases” in the 
personal narratives of French Algerians; many explain that they could only bring what would fit 
into two suitcases.
53
 In fact, the objects presented in the CDDFA attest to the abrupt and 
permanent nature of the French Algerians’ departure from Algeria. Their banality serves as 
evidence of migration under duress and reinforces the claim of some French Algerians that they 
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were victims of a rapid, complete exile. At the same time, domestic objects do not carry the 
politics linked to larger history. They offer material proof that French Algeria existed and that 
life in this land was defined by a blend of metropolitan French, European, and North African 
cultural influences. Yet they do so without pointing directly to the issues of colonialism.  
54
 
The second main challenge that French Algerians face is that as a community united by a 
shared set of historical experiences, they have struggled with how to transmit their collective 
memory, culture, and identity to children and grandchildren who have never known Algeria. The 
descendants of French Algerians can choose to identify with this past, but, as Eric Savarèse 
explains, “this element is for them only one among other possible affiliations; it is no longer 
fundamental to their social status or self-esteem.”55 To some extent, this is true of all migrant 
populations. However, French Algerians, like other former settler communities, are perceived as 
oppressors by the general public and thus face additional challenges in transmitting their 
identities and collective memories to their children. In her introduction to the volume Museums 
and Their Communities, Sheila Watson has observed that “museums play a key role in not only 
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preserving memories but also in re-ordering them and making sense of them for later 
generations.”56 The Cercle’s desire for the CDDFA to serve this function for the French 
Algerians is reflected in a brochure for the institution, which declares in bold-faced print, 
“Transmission to the youth is an absolute priority.”   
In the face of an uncertain intergenerational transmission, the CDDFA preserves the 
shared material culture of the French Algerian community and is essential to its members as a 
“safeguard against oblivion.”57 Tangible reminders of the past help to “combat the transitory 
nature of memory”58 and provide a means of corroborating the existence of French Algeria after 
its inhabitants are gone. Simon-Nicaise explains, “This world having disappeared, we have an 
obligation to transmit it through books, works of art, digitized documents, personal 
accounts…”59 In fact, a flyer for the CDDFA describes its collection as originating mainly from 
private archives and consisting of items such as “letters, notebooks, manuscripts, journals, tracts, 
administrative papers, objects, photos, post cards, and drawings” that were “among a family’s 
most precious goods, often the only trace of a life spent in Algeria.”60 Advertisements for the 
CDDFA emphasize the permanence the institution endows on records of the past and, by 
extension, individual memories. One flyer announces to French Algerians, “Your memories 
constitute tomorrow’s archives.”61 The CDDFA’s brochure states that one of its missions is to 
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“Save the material and immaterial elements of the French Algerian heritage,” including, for 
example, a fragment of the destroyed Sidi-Ferruch monument. The city of Perpignan’s support 
for the museum and archive provides the remaining traces of their past with added protection: 
“The coordinated inscription of our archival funds in the city registers, those of the national 
museums, and those of the province of Catalunya will assure their permanence and the 
impossibility of their destruction, disappearance, or transfer.”62 Thus, the museum curators claim 
that the CDDFA “of the Cercle Algérianiste forever preserves the memory of those who lived in 
French Algeria”63  
“To Colonize is to Settle and Make Prosper”: Narratives of French Algeria 
The CDDFA seems designed as a response to the continuing exclusion that some French 
Algerians feel based on the unpopularity of the colonial past in France. Andrea Smith reports that 
in her interviews with French Algerians, they often bemoan “metropolitan ignorance of their 
history.”64 This ignorance appears to them to stem from disinterest in their misfortunes, contempt 
for their attachment to French Algeria, and shame over colonialism. Museum curators and 
leaders of the Cercle Algérianiste avoid using the term “colonial” in their brochures, websites, 
and other publications related to the CDDFA. They would prefer to frame French Algeria as a 
lost part of France, which all Frenchmen should mourn, rather than as a former colony. Within 
the museum, however, they engage with the subject of colonialism so as to put their own, more 
positive spin on the nature of French Algeria. Curators justify French presence in Algeria 
through the pioneering myth. As one of the signs in the CDDFA proclaims, “To colonize is to 
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settle and make prosper.” By transmitting an idealized version of French Algerian history, the 
CDDFA constitutes an attempt to eliminate the sources of French apathy or antipathy regarding 
their community.  
This museum and archive offers an important means of making their past known to the 
rest of the French and of validating historical narratives. As Sharon Macdonald has argued, 
“Although museums have much in common with other institutions of memory, their authoritative 
and legitimizing status and their role as symbols of community constitute them as a distinctive 
cultural complex.”65 The CDDFA can thus lend credibility to their accounts of the past in ways 
that other media cannot, which is especially valuable as members of the community seek greater 
recognition for their past.  
The significance of the larger French public as an audience also helps explain why 
leaders of the Cercle updated their museum. The Cercle’s shift from the amateur feel of their 
early museum to a more professional and therefore authoritative design can also be seen as a way 
of harnessing the legitimizing power of museums and archives as institutions. Amy Levin has 
argued with regard to local museums, “To be successful, museums must adopt the technology 
and display methods that will most attract visitors at a given time. […] In fact, throughout the 
world of these museums, an imperative toward professionalism as opposed to volunteer or 
amateur staff is evident.”66 This same compulsion can be observed in the CDDFA.  
Many of the signs in the permanent exhibit construct clear narratives about the 
modernizing and civilizing efforts of the French Algerians and the ways they improved Algeria 
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in the fields of public health, education, infrastructure, and agriculture. These signs offer 
simplistic chronologies, contrasting Algeria upon French arrival and departure. The one on 
public health, for example, explains that in “1830: The (Ottoman) Regency had no sanitary 
equipment or medical structure.” This signage confuses temporality with causality, since 
metropolitan France also lacked adequate sanitation facilities before 1830.  By 1954, when the 
Algerian War of Independence began, however, “half of the population benefitted from free 
medical assistance.” Photos of nurses distributing quinine and bathing Algerian children 
supplement this assertion. The same pattern holds for the signs on education and infrastructure. 
The statement that in “1830: public education did not exist” is accompanied by workbooks and 
other school supplies that provide evidence of instruction during the period of French Algeria. 
The claim that there was no public education in Algeria before French arrival is misleading, 
since a vast network of religious schools had educated the population in this territory under the 
Ottomans. Moreover, the French ultimately had a deleterious impact on the education of 
Muslims in Algeria, which is belied by the triumphant tone of this section.
67
 With regard to 
infrastructure, maps of electricity lines and train routes are contrasted with an explanation of how 
in 1830, “In a country with a challenging terrain, communication routes were scarce and 
inadequate.”  
The CDDFA also manifests a desire among French Algerians for greater French 
appreciation of their ancestors’ contributions and sacrifices in Algeria. The sign on agriculture 
describes the difficult process of cultivating the land in Algeria and presents French settlers in 
heroic terms: “The concessions of land, modest and granted under specific conditions, had to be 
cleared, drained, irrigated, and decontaminated in conditions of precarious hygiene and 
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insecurity. Irregular and often disappointing results did not prevent these impromptu settlers 
from clinging to this land, and making it thrive, at the cost of their health.” It is true that life in 
French Algeria could be extremely challenging, due to the inhospitable climate and soil, 
widespread disease, and often hostile resistance from the native population. In fact, most early 
settlers decided not to remain in French Algeria. Between 1842 and 1846, there were 198,000 
arrivals and a staggering 118,000 departures from this territory.
68
 
The Cercle uses the CDDFA as a public forum for attempting to “alter received notions 
and perceptions” of French Algerians as well.69 Through a sign titled, “The socio-professional 
distribution,” these French Algerians argue that not all the settlers in Algeria were powerful 
landowners: “Contrary to the common preconception of an omnipresent ‘colonial’ agriculturist, 
the distribution of the European population among major professional categories demonstrates 
the existence of a middle class and a significant working class.” This assertion is accurate, as 
most European settlers were industrial workers and civil servants and could be characterized as 
“poor whites.”70 Another sign, “The colonists in agriculture,” explains that those who were 
involved in agriculture did not entirely dominate the profession. It notes, “27% of the cultivated 
land belonged to Europeans,” while “36.30% of European farms had fewer than 10 hectares.” At 
the same time, they address and try to correct the perception that settlers of French Algeria were 
backward or uncivilized. A sign called “An exuberant culture” proclaims, “the mainland 
Frenchman who landed in Algeria was surprised by the wide range of ‘cultural offerings.’ […] 
We acted, we sang, we performed, we drew; Algeria was a veritable cultural breeding ground!” 
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Not surprisingly, the curators of the CDDFA and members of the Cercle also seek 
empathy for the struggles faced by the French Algerians, including the loss of loved ones during 
the Algerian War and their difficult migration to France. Cercle President Thierry Rolando has 
explained how important it is to French Algerians to have their status as victims known. At the 
Cercle’s annual conference in 2012, he insisted on “the eternal need for recognition of the drama 
that we lived through, of the memory of those whom we left on the other side of the 
Mediterranean.”71 The CDDFA includes somber images from the “exodus”—photographs of 
masses of French Algerians boarding the boats with their suitcases—along with a sign describing 
their experiences of exile. Simon-Nicaise explains, “We want to show through our history that 
exile always leads to the obligation to quit one’s country under the duress of banishment or 
deportation, the threat of death or persecution, obliging one to go live in a ‘foreign’ country with 
all that implies in terms of specific social constraints and this feeling of remoteness from the 
homeland (for us of abandon), with its share of nostalgia, of uprooting.”72 This approach situates 
the French Algerians in a position similar to that of other migrants from French colonies, which 
some might consider disingenuous. The suggestion that French Algerians were forced to quit 
their country also undermines their argument that French Algeria constituted an integral part of 
France. 
The images in the “exodus” section concentrate on the trope of the family. This focus 
may constitute an effort to distance the French Algerians from the notion of the violent OAS 
male that was ubiquitous in the metropole during the Algerian War. The photographs suggest 
that rather than embodying an aggressive, abnormal masculinity, as the French media had 
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proposed, French Algerian men were instead husbands and fathers who were powerless to 
protect their families from exile. A sculpture of the male torso featured on the Mur des Disparus 
reinforces this idea. Like the version on the memorial, the area where the figure’s heart should be 
is represented by an empty space. In this incarnation, however, there is also a hollow cavity in 
place of the figure’s genitals. The image of the emasculated Pied-Noir male appears more likely 
to garner sympathy from the rest of French society. 
73
 
In contrast to these sentiments of loss, displacement, and vulnerability, museum curators 
convey through the CDDFA the sense of a cohesive, singular French Algerian identity that began 
in 1830 and thus has deep historical roots in this territory. They display souvenirs, including a 
commemorative plate and blanket, posters, and images, of the “Centenary of the Conquest” 
celebrations, which remind visitors that by 1930, the French Algerians were well established in 
Algeria. As historian Michèle Baussant has argued, the figure of the European settler, glorified, 
for example, on posters during these celebrations, has “symbolized the deep-rootedness of 
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France in Algeria (in contrast to the ‘mobility’, in the sense of ‘nomadism’, attributed to what 
were called the ‘native’ populations, especially the Bedouins).”74 
 Depictions of the “Centenary of the Conquest” celebrations also convey how well the 
French Algerians believe they were accepted and supported by the indigenous population. 
Baussant has explained the myth among French Algerians of the “melting pot,” which “refers not 
only to the idea of their taking root in a land that some of them believe they helped to create, but 
also to a sort of ‘mythical Andalusia’ where inter-community relations were harmonious, at an 
interpersonal level.”75 Historians have argued that it is possible, and even likely, that positive 
cross-community relationships existed among individuals, but it is essential to remain aware of 
the significant legal, political, economic, social, and even moral and sexual, barriers and 
inequalities that existed between groups in Algeria.
76
 
Thus, the site projects a model of an integrated Muslim-European Algeria that was lost 
upon Algerian independence.
77
 The curators convey a paternalistic view of native Algerian 
populations, but suggest coexistence overall. The displays include photos of “Europeans” and 
“Muslims” working and attending school together and of side-by-side synagogues, mosques, and 
churches. A sign on “Daily life” describes a simple life, in which everyone got along: “The 
numerous boulodromes (bowling pitches) were places for meeting, sharing, and friendship that 
gathered citizens of all origins.” A display on the World Wars argues that joint participation in 
                                                 
74
 Baussant, “Caught between Two Worlds,” 91. 
 
75
 Ibid, 100. 
 
76
 Savarèse et al., "Rapport de recherche sur le projet de réalisation,” 8. 
 
77
 The CDDFA not only presents positive relations with Muslims, but also challenges the historic divide between 
French Algerians and members of parties on the left of the political spectrum. Signs announce, “You might be 
surprised to learn: one could be a communist and attend church, could campaign for the left without contesting 
French presence in Algeria, and even defend it, weapons in hand (particularly in 1961-1962).” 
 
294 
the African Army was one of the most effective means of fostering mutual understanding and 
friendship. The curators provide evidence that “Muslims” supported the French presence, in the 
form of speeches at the “Centenary of the Conquest” celebrations, including one titled, “To our 
homeland, France,” given by “representatives of Muslim intellectuals, elected officials and 
influential indigenous families in Algeria” and another marking “the centenary of the definitive 
establishment of France in North Africa” attesting “once more and in a formal manner our 
unfailing attachment to the mother country.” The display also gives figures from the Algerian 
War to show that more “Muslims” fought for France to maintain Algeria than for independence. 
“In 1961: the Algerian National Liberation Army (ALN) strung together 24,000 combatants and 
22,000 auxiliary troops.” By contrast, “225,000 Muslims served under the French flag.”  
Conclusion 
In 2005, Robert Aldrich remarked, “France has many colonial sites, but no museum of 
colonial history.”78 Eight years later, this observation remains true, due to the state’s failure to 
impose a dominant narrative and scholars’ inability to agree on a historical interpretation. The 
CDDFA constitutes both a response to the lack of a colonial museum on the national level and an 
attempt to establish the former colonists’ interpretation of French Algeria as definitive. French 
Algerians interpret silence about the colonial past as apathy, even antipathy, towards them. They 
are aware of the symbolic capital of museums and archives in influencing how their past is 
interpreted. Through the CDDFA, they attempt both to promote a favorable impression of their 
past in the French public sphere and to maintain a separate community, identity, memory, and 
culture. These French Algerians are not, however, necessarily acting at the expense of others and 
their memories. They do not include other memories and interpretations, but the institution’s 
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name change is essential evidence of their intentions: a Museum of French presence in Algeria 
would have positioned their narrative as authoritative.
79
 The name Centre de documentation des 
Français d’Algérie makes it clear that the CDDFA constitutes another site of colonial memory, 
not a museum of colonial history from multiple perspectives. 
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CONCLUSION 
Today, the return of the colonial, and the return of the colonized, does not spare any 
terrain, from the political to the cultural, the academic, and the popular, and the land of 
the imagined universals. Everywhere the colonial paradigm has proved, for better or for 
worse, highly disruptive of established routines and polite discussions. Syndrome or 
revulsion, the freezing of the past has broken down, and a few deceptions with it.
1
 
 
The “unfreezing” of the colonial past in France has elicited dismal predications for the 
future of the Fifth Republic. The law of February 2005, the fierce debates it sparked, and the 
social unrest in the banlieues later that year seemed to confirm fears that engaging with the 
history of colonialism portended disastrous social upheaval and strife. Confronting this past has 
seemed such a perilous endeavor because some of the most sensitive and visible political 
challenges France faces today are rooted in the colonial period. Scholars, politicians, and the 
French public alike fear the questions about race, identity, and French universalism that must be 
raised through close investigation of the colonial regime and its inconsistencies. It is in this 
context that the competitive memory model, and the “memory wars” paradigm in particular, 
have come to dominate in France.  
The Harkis, Pieds-Noirs, and their descendants are at the center of efforts to break 
silences and negotiate competing understandings of the colonial past. Members of these 
communities have an evident stake in how the colonial legacy is interpreted in France, since their 
identities are tied to this period. Both groups have served as uncomfortable reminders of the 
colonial era in Fifth Republic France. They have been marginalized in scholarship and in French 
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society more generally. Pieds-Noirs have borne the image of oppressors and the burden of 
colonialism. Harkis have been assigned the label of traitors and, along with their families, have 
suffered rejection from the rest of the North African community in France and Euro-French 
society. In the past decade, Harki and Pied-Noir resistance to official silences as well as their 
attempts to commemorate their suffering and to shape national understandings of their past have 
been interpreted by scholars as acts of war. 
I have argued that the “memory wars” metaphor does not offer a productive way of 
interpreting the memory work of these communities. Harki and Pied-Noir memory practices 
have at times triggered strong reactions, particularly online, in this highly charged memorial 
context. Yet focusing on these responses distracts from the intent behind their acts. Their 
narratives and practices have almost always been aimed at fostering inclusion, carving out spaces 
for reconciliation, and providing the basis for belonging in France. Even the Pieds-Noirs, who 
have resisted full integration into metropolitan French society, have identified closely and 
consistently with France. Pieds-Noirs have struggled to preserve their cultural and historical 
differences precisely because they are so secure in their French identity. The Harkis and their 
children have likewise exhibited a fierce attachment to France. Due to their North African origin, 
Harkis have had to fight for full acceptance in French society in ways that Pieds-Noirs have not. 
The question of how best to frame their past in order to accomplish this aim has served as a point 
of contention among second-generation Harkis.  
Both groups have sought validation of their victimhood from the rest of the French. 
Harkis, Pieds-Noirs, and their descendants have made demands on the French state for 
recognition, reparations, and official apologies, which are central to establishing their status as 
victims. In doing so, they have followed a precedent established by French Jews in the aftermath 
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of the Holocaust. Benjamin Stora, one of the most prominent advocates of the memory wars 
paradigm, has observed that in France, “a kind of separation, of memory communitisation 
(communautarisation) by victim position, has taken hold in a competition for the status of the 
best victim. From there, the different memory groups, already on the fringes of society, do not 
hold the state or political leaders accountable, but rather the other communities.”2 My research 
has revealed that while Harkis and Pieds-Noirs may wish to establish their interpretations in the 
national canon, they have not attempted to annihilate other communities’ collective memories. 
There is evidence that Harkis and Pieds-Noirs are comfortable with the co-existence of 
competing memory narratives. Indeed Pieds-Noirs in the Cercle Algérianiste have professed that 
they respect the right of all groups to their own narratives and commemorations. 
I disagree, then, with Benjamin Stora’s assertion that the most significant memory 
conflicts occur between groups in France. Harkis and Pieds-Noirs have most often directed their 
efforts towards the state and I would argue that the struggle between a state and its citizens is not 
best understood through the metaphor of war. It is more appropriate to situate their work in the 
important tradition of offering personal testimony in the face of official silence. Harkis, Pieds-
Noirs, and their descendants have challenged the ideal of a single, hegemonic narrative and have 
resisted attempts to ignore those interpretations not sanctioned by the state. Yet, even in holding 
France responsible for its role in the post-independence violence against the Harkis and their 
families, the Harkis have asserted their Frenchness. France wronged the Harkis as French 
citizens and their children have demanded recompense from their state. 
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A further drawback of the “memory wars” paradigm is that it obscures the diversity of 
memory narratives within these communities. Although he has advocated this model, which 
focuses on conflicts between groups, Eric Savarèse has conceded “the Algerian memory wars 
also run through the webs of Pied-Noir groups.”3 The case of the Harkis makes it clear that both 
memory conflicts and multidirectional memory practices cut across communities. Studies of the 
Harkis and Pieds-Noirs afford the opportunity to explore how the categories of gender and 
generation inform the ways in which memories are constructed and transmitted. These identities 
intersect in different ways within Harki and Pied-Noir memory communities, owing to the 
disparate situations of the two populations in France. Comparing these groups highlights the 
important roles that race, religion, and perceived cultural difference have played in French 
memory politics. 
Both communities have struggled with the inter-generational transmission of memory, 
though for different reasons. First-generation Harkis have generally remained silent about their 
past due to fears about jeopardizing their place in France, lack of visibility and access to 
resources, and shame about their role in the Algerian War. Pieds-Noirs, on the other hand, were 
immediately active in constructing shared memory narratives in France. They were motivated by 
the perception that unless they acted decisively to preserve traces of their Algerian heritage, this 
aspect of their identity would quickly vanish. Second-generation Harkis have inherited the 
weight of the past from their fathers, but not the specific content, which they have had to 
negotiate themselves. Pieds-Noirs, in contrast, have found it difficult to interest their children in 
their Algerian past. They are struggling against the forces of integration, the unpopularity of the 
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colonial past, and their image as oppressors. As a result, they have adapted their memory 
practices away from commemorating the conquest of Algeria and towards honoring the disparus. 
My investigation of whether men and women remember differently reveals that memory 
practices are indeed gendered in the cases of the Harkis and Pieds-Noirs. The memoir appears to 
be a feminine genre in these communities. Women have served an important role as storytellers 
in Algeria, transmitting personal memories within families. Harki daughters and Pied-Noir wives 
and lovers have also sought to exonerate their “traitor” fathers and “violent” partners, 
respectively, through their stories. There is also evidence that colonial understandings of gender 
have persisted in Fifth Republic France. These emerge in Pied-Noir depictions of Algeria as a 
woman and the ways in which the French public has embraced Harki daughters’ writings as acts 
of emancipation from their fathers and brothers.  
Women’s contributions to memory practices have followed different trajectories in Harki 
and Pied-Noir memory communities. Pied-Noir women have been more active since their arrival 
in France; female memoirs were published in the 1960s and 70s and the Cercle Algérianiste’s 
second president was a woman. Harki daughters, on the other hand, did not become leaders in 
their community until the early 2000s. Another difference is that memory narratives are gendered 
among second-generation Harkis. Harki sons appear more invested in the Harkis’ soldierly 
identity and their martial masculinity. They have situated their fathers’ contributions to France 
within a republican memorial tradition. Daughters may feel more secure in France, as North 
African women seem to fare better than their male counterparts in contemporary France, and 
have more freedom to challenge the narrative of the Harkis’ patriotic sacrifices. They also have 
an easier time seeking reconciliation with Algerian immigrants because of their distance from 
their fathers’ wartime past. 
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Harkis and Pieds-Noirs are memory communities, each united by the shared experiences, 
predominately of suffering, of their members. At the same time, they are highly diverse groups 
with respect to their backgrounds and political views. This diversity explains why it would be 
inaccurate to say that there is such thing as a “Pied-Noir vote.”4 It is clear from the Pieds-Noirs’ 
successes in getting the February 2005 “pro-colonial” law passed and securing public funds for 
the CDDFA, however, that they have considerable political resources at their disposal. Indeed, 
they wield significant lobbying power and electoral influence, particularly in southern France, 
where they are concentrated. Nor does a “Harki vote” exist, although the campaign promises of 
Nicolas Sarkozy and François Hollande to the Harkis suggest that they are seen as an important 
potential electoral bloc. Harkis have historically been more politically marginalized than the 
Pieds-Noirs and their children have expressed a general distrust of the political system. 
The Harkis’ political marginalization may account for the significance of websites as 
memory vectors among the Harkis’ descendants. The memory carriers that groups choose to 
employ depend on their access to financial resources and political influence. Monuments and 
museums have more authority and visibility in France’s memorial landscape. Cyber vectors, 
however, offer more opportunities to participate in the production of a shared memory. When 
Harkis and Pieds-Noirs have made use of the same types of memory carriers, they have 
employed them differently. The Harkis’ memorials have centered on their collective experiences 
in France, while Pieds-Noirs have concentrated entirely on the period up to their arrival in 
France.
5
 This difference between the groups extends to how they use websites as well. Harkis 
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have utilized cyber carriers to construct narratives and carve out a place for themselves in 
France, whereas the Pieds-Noirs have remained focused on preserving their connections to 
French Algeria.  
Pied-Noir memory carriers reveal that certain distinctions among French Algerians 
during the colonial era have remained significant in the metropole. Most of their websites and 
associations are dedicated to particular places in French Algeria, highlighting the continuing 
relevance of their particular regional affiliations. Their attachment to their different European 
heritages has persisted as well, although to a lesser extent. Some Pied-Noir organizations are 
designed to safeguard their Spanish, Italian, and Maltese cultures. 
Harkis have not organized themselves around their specific places of origin since their 
arrival in France. Their different Arab and Berber ethnic identities have also not played a 
significant role in their community. The French had emphasized these ethnic distinctions as a 
divide-and-rule tactic during the colonial period. They awarded the Berber minority a privileged 
status in the colonial hierarchy with the justification, provided by French ethnographers, that 
they were descended from Europeans. Even though Berbers had a greater stake in the colonial 
regime, Arabs were just as apt to become Harkis, as this was not necessarily a politically or 
ideologically motivated decision. The Berber identity has remained important in post-
independence Algeria and Berber activists have challenged the dominance of the Arab culture 
and language, particularly in Algerian schools. While some second-generation Harkis have self-
identified as Berber, mainly on websites, it has not served as a source of division among them. 
The exclusion that Harkis and their families have faced from French of North African origin and 
and Euro-French has united them and has made ethnic differences less significant. The absence 
of tension between Arab and Berber Harkis also attests to their definitive break with Algeria. 
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Religion has provided an additional source of continuity for Pieds-Noirs and change for 
Harkis. Religion was a key category in French Algeria, as civic and confessional identities were 
intertwined in this territory. Pieds-Noirs have continued to participate in activities, including 
pilgrimages to holy sites, that affirm their Christianity in the metropole. Some first-generation 
Harkis, including those who participated in the UNACFCI association during the 1980s, 
expressed a desire to preserve and celebrate their Muslim heritage and rituals. Religion provided 
a means of distinguishing themselves from other French soldiers as well as from other repatriates 
at this time. In the context of François Mitterrand’s droit à la différence policy, embracing their 
Muslim identity also allowed them to seek rapprochement with other French of North African 
origin. The backlash from the far-right and the ultimate failure of this policy, however, have led 
second-generation Harkis to avoid referencing religion in their memory work. Even the female 
memoir authors who seek reconciliation with Algerian immigrants do so as secular French 
women and do not wear headscarves. Their adherence to France’s secular tradition is another 
indication that they wish to situate themselves firmly in France and to be accepted.   
This dissertation is a history of two collective memories. Analyzing how Harkis, Pieds-
Noirs, and their descendants have adapted their memory narratives and practices since 1962 
provides an occasion to examine the evolving politics of memory in France. The return of the 
colonial past to public consciousness has, as Florence Bernault has observed, disrupted 
“established routines and polite discussions.”6 It has shown that race and religion have remained 
important categories in postcolonial France. Still, for all the unease that this disturbance has 
caused, there are indications that engaging with the history of colonialism offers possibilities for 
rapprochement. Focusing on the productive, rather than competitive, work of collective memory, 
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uncovers the multiple, shifting allegiances that have been built based on understandings of a 
shared past. It is possible that a more stable, and indeed more ethical,
7
 society, one that respects a 
plurality of interpretations of the colonial period, may emerge from these struggles. 
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